O trabalho de campo, da Iniciativa de Monitoria da Governação Local, nos 6 distritos abrangidos, concluiu que, até ao momento, os governos distritais ainda não realizam sequer metade das actividades inscritas nos PESOD

Para justificar o baixo nível de execução dos PESOD, os governos distritais reconheceram a existência de fragilidades institucionais no processo de planificação, que não é acompanhado de orçamento, de forma que a planificação é feita antes de se ter conhecimento dos tectos orçamentais, resultando daí numa planificação irrealista. O que na realidade acontece é a elaboração de um “shopping list” contendo todas as necessidades do distrito. Por outro lado, este processo continua ainda muito dependente dos sectores ao nível do governo províncial ou mesmo do governo central. Tal como foi apontado no primeiro exercício de monitoria, o principal constrangimento deste processo, está na engenharia institucional em torno da elaboração do PESOD.

O exercício de Auditoria Social, de 2009, apurou que persitem problemas de ordem técnica na área de infra-estruturas, sobretudo, na componente de fiscalização e, como resultado, os empreendimentos realizados no âmbito do PESOD têm problemas de qualidade e durabilidade.

Para além dos empreendimentos seleccionados para o ano de 2009, o trabalho de monitoria incidiu igualmente sobre as actividades que constavam dos PESODs de 2008 que, entretanto, não haviam sido realizadas e/ou estavam em curso na altura em que foi realizado o trabalho de campo em 2008. Concretamente, o trabalho de campo procurou verificar até que ponto as actividades, que não foram realizadas em 2008, transitaram para os PESODs de 2009. Isto servia para aferir o nível de coerência na planificação. Sobre estas actividades, o trabalho de campo apurou que, apenas, 17,9% dos empreendimentos não realizados em 2008 foi incluído nos PESODs de 2009. O trabalho de campo procurou ainda verificar até que ponto as actividades que estavam em curso quando se realizou o trabalho de campo em 2008 tinham sido concluídas em 2009. Sobre estas actividades, o trabalho de campo apurou que, em termos percentuais, 38% tinham sido concluídas, 28,6% estavam em curso e 33,3% tinham sido paralisadas, ou seja, foram iniciadas em 2008 e não tiveram seguimento em 2009.

"The African Union seeks to build an integrated Africa, a prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens and representing a dynamic force in the international arena"
African Union Strategic Plan (2004-2007)

One year ago in Libya, 53 Heads of States agreed to ratify and accede to all OAU and AU treaties by July 2010. They further called on African Union organs to assist with advocacy and sensitisation of African Governments. The decision is in line with Article 4.1(b) of the Rules of Procedures of the Assembly of Heads of States. Under this Article, the Assembly is required “to monitor the implementation of policies and decisions of the Union as well as ensure compliance by all Member States”.

The State of the Union project was established three months later by civil society organisations to respond to this decision. The State of the Union project tracks and engages Governments and the African Union on their commitments by managing in-country research, community hearings and national consultations. In this regard, it could be called an African Peoples Review Mechanism.

This 2010 State of the Union Africa report assesses the continental performance of Member States against key governance, economic, social, civil and political policy standards and rights instruments over the period 2004-2009. The report incorporates national findings from ten countries reviewed in 2010. The ten countries are drawn from the five regions in Africa. They are Algeria, Egypt (North Africa), Nigeria, Senegal, Ghana (West Africa), South Africa, Mozambique (Southern Africa), Kenya, Rwanda (East Africa) and Cameroun (Central Africa). Combined, the population of these ten countries is 450 million people. Delivery on AU legal instrument and policy standards in just these ten countries would have an impact on two fifths of Africa’s citizens and peoples.

Ten AU legal instruments and four policy frameworks have been selected in recognition of the tremendous opportunities they offer for eradicating poverty, promoting justice and realising political, economic and social rights in Africa. The ten legal instruments are the;

• African Charter on Human and People’s Rights in Africa
• African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance
• African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child
• African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources
• African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption
• African Youth Charter
• Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa
• Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community relating to the Pan-African Parliament
• Revised African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources and the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community

The four policy frameworks are the Abuja Call for Accelerated Action towards Universal Access to V/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria Services by 2010, the African Health Strategy 2007-2015, the Maputo Plan of Action for the Operationalisation of the Continental Policy Framework for Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights 2007-2010 and the NEPAD Comprehensive Africa Agricultural Development Plan (CAADP). Combined, the ten AU legal instruments and four policy standards significantly raise the bar for most African Governments in the areas of political, social and economic rights.

The reports take place at a critical moment for Africa. 2010 is an important year for several national, continental and international processes. Some of the most critical are the;

• Celebration of 50 years of independence for seventeen African countries
• Tenth anniversary of the African on the Rights and Welfare of the Child
• Fifth anniversary of the AU Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa entering into force
• Launch of the African Women’s decade (2010-2020)
• The last milestone for African Governments to raise their health expenditure to 15% of national budgets and realize the Abuja Call for Accelerated Action Towards Universal Access to HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria Services
• The end of the period to implement the Maputo Plan of Action for the Operationalisation of the Continental Policy Framework for Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights 2007-2010
• Tenth anniversary of the UN Millennium Declaration and review of the progress reached in meeting the Millennium Development Goals by 2015
• Fifteen year review point on the implementation of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action

While an exercise in enquiry, we hope this report will “stir” and commit policy-makers and citizens alike to unleash the systemic changes required at national and continental levels to promote, protect and realize the freedoms and rights contained in these legal instruments and policy standards. In this way, this report and the ten national reports could contribute to creating a tipping point for change so desired by Africa.

Download document...

L’AfCoP-GRD vient de publier son premier recueil. Intitulé Gestion axée sur les résultats de développement: Regards sur l'Afrique, il incarne l'engagement des 1200 membres de l’AfCoP qui s'efforcent de rendre leurs organisations plus orientés vers la performance.

Innovants, - Cette première édition du recueil de l’AfCoP sur la GRD innove en tirant pleinement parti de la plate-forme de l’AfCoP. Quatre des études de cas publiées ont été d’abord développées par des discussions en ligne. Des échanges Sud-Sud entre membres de l’AfCoP les ont nourries. Les auteurs ont reçu des commentaires, questions et suggestions sur leurs sujets. Ils ont partagé des présentations, des cartes de leurs projets et des photos de leur lieu de travail pour enrichir leurs études.

Contextes africains - Les études de cas mettent en évidence que l’appropriation des politiques contribue à la réalisation de résultats. Alors que cet aspect essentiel de tout effort de développement fait trop souvent défaut dans les contextes africains, les auteurs donnent des pistes concrètes pour surmonter ce problème par le biais de processus participatifs et de renforcement des capacités. Ils présentent des méthodes à adapter afin d’obtenir des résultats sur le terrain et répondre aux attentes des citoyens africains voulant voir les plus grandes réalisations possibles avec les fonds disponibles.

Auteurs - Les études de cas ont été écrites par les membres de l’AfCoP venant de neuf pays africains. Leurs différents parcours et perspectives fournissent une excellente vue d’ensemble des défis liés à l’obtention des résultats. Plusieurs d’entre eux dirigent des départements de Suivi-Evaluation, mènent la planification de projets ou travaillent dans les directions du Budget du ministère de l’Economie et des Finances.

Public - Ce document est principalement créé pour les praticiens des résultats et de la fonction publique. Les études de cas sont des outils à adapter par les gestionnaires pour leurs propres programmes et besoins. Cette publication permettra de mieux faire comprendre aux lecteurs comment apporter des changements dans leurs organisations de développement.

Les co-présidents de l’AfCoP, Dev Ruhee et Abdou Karim Lo, respectivement, de Maurice et du Sénégal, ont déclaré: " Nous espérons que cette publication sera utile dans le travail quotidien de nombreux praticiens de la GRD en Afrique, qui s’efforcent d’obtenir des résultats mesurables afin d’éradiquer la pauvreté. Notre optimisme n’a jamais été aussi grand que maintenant, au moment où les gouvernements se montrent de plus en plus déterminés à mettre leurs pays sur les rails de la GRD. Toutefois, les obstacles à surmonter restent nombreux, et il y a lieu de renforcer la capacité en GRD. L’AfCoP et ses sections nationales continueront certainement de jouer un rôle de premier plan dans l’obtention de meilleurs résultats pour l’Afrique. "

Le Recueil de l’AfCoP est disponible en ligne à l'adresse: http://www.africacop.org/library/docs/AfCoP-CaseBook-French.pdf

Pour plus d'informations, visitez la plate-forme de l’AfCoP à l'adresse: www.afcop-mfdr.org

The AfCoP-MfDR has just released its first Casebook. Titled Managing for Development Results: A Focus on Africa, it embodies the commitment of the 1,200 AfCoP members who are striving to make their organizations more performance-oriented.

Innovative – This first edition of the AfCoP Casebook on MfDR innovates by taking full advantage of the AfCoP’s web platform. Four of the published cases were first developed through online discussions. Live South-South exchanges between AfCoP members fed these cases. The authors received feedback, questions, and suggestions on their topics. They posted presentations, maps of their projects and photos of their workplaces to bring life to their stories.

African contexts – The case studies make evident that ownership is instrumental in successfully accomplishing results. As this key aspect of every development effort is all too often lacking in African contexts, the authors provide concrete approaches to overcoming this issue through participatory processes and capacity building. They present methodologies to adapt to best achieve results on the ground and respond to African citizens’ expectations to see maximum value for the funds spent by their governments.

Authors – The case studies have been written by AfCoP members coming from nine different African countries. Their various background and perspectives give a great overview of the challenges of achieving results. Several of them are leading Monitoring & Evaluation departments, spearheading the planning of projects or working in the Budget unit in the Ministry of Economy and Finance.

Readership – This publication is primarily created for results and public service practitioners. The case studies are tools to be adapted by managers for their own programs and needs. This publication will enhance readers’ understanding of the how to bring about change in their development organizations.

The AfCoP's co-chairs, Dev Ruhee and Abdou Karim Lo respectively from Mauritius and Senegal said: "We hope that this publication will be useful in the daily work of the many results practitioners in Africa who strive to produce measurable outcomes in eradicating poverty. Our optimism has never been higher as we see increasing willingness from governments to put their countries on the MfDR track. Nonetheless, numerous challenges remain and the capacity to manage for development results needs to be strengthened. The AfCoP and its national chapters will surely keep playing a major role in delivering better results for Africa."

The AfCoP Casebook is available on the web at: http://www.africacop.org/library/docs/AfCoP-CaseBook-English.pdf

For additional information, visit the AfCoP’s platform at: www.afcop-mfdr.org

The abolition of school fees especially at the basic education level has been adopted by many countries as one of the key policy interventions for influencing education outcomes. In 2004, Ghana adopted a school fees abolition policy, the Capitation Grant (CG), to spur the attainment of universal access to the basic education goal under the Ghana Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS II) and meet its Millennium Development Goal(MDG) targets (2 and 3).

Since the introduction of the CG in Ghana, many studies have been conducted by government, development partners, civil society and other stakeholders in education. These studies have however focused largely on the effects, impact and outcomes of the policy on school enrolment, completion rates and quality outcomes. Not much research has been done to track the disbursement, management and use of the CG. The CG would only be successful in ensuring universal basic education if resources allocated to the grant reach beneficiary schools and at the same time used for its intended purpose.

This study therefore tracks possible leakages and inefficiencies in the disbursement and usage of the CG in thirty (30) public basic schools in Ghana. In particular, the study provides empirical evidence on the leakage (if any) of financial resources allocated to the CG by tracking disbursed resources from the Ghana Education Service (GES) through to the District Education Units and finally, at the service delivery points (schools). More importantly, the study examined the usage of the grant at the beneficiary schools and assessed the robustness of the transparency and accountability measures for the appropriate and efficient usage of the funds.

Policy Recommendations

1. The spending pattern of CG must be evaluated to determine whether it is conducive to improving education outcomes as anticipated by the policy.


2. The relationship between allocation, equity and improved quality outcomes in the education sector must be assessed.
3. Policy measures that will gradually align education policy outcomes from enrolment explosion as a result of CG and other supportive programs to quality outcomes must be formulated and implemented.


4. The fixed amount CG per pupil per year must be reconsidered. Equity and need factor should be the basis for calculation.As it is now, it might in the long run widen the social inequality gap because schools with larger population will have more and will be able to meet basic essentials than smaller schools.


5. Education sector policy makers need to examine enrolment periods of basic schools to establish cutoff points to aid early submission of school and district enrolment records to the GES and the Ministry of Finance for release of the CG funds. Discussions with officials at the district levels and the GES indicate that continuous enrolment often leads to over population in the schools and lesser funds from the Ministry.


6. The CG implementation guidelines call for timely release of the grant to all districts and schools. This must be strictly enforced to make the policy effective.


7. Serious efforts should be made to simplify the SPIP forms to reduce the workload on heads of schools as some heads do not access the CG simply because the amount of paper work is a deterrent.


8. There is the need for continuous monitoring support and improvement in the internal management and implementation processes of the grant, particularly reviewing and revising the implementation guidelines to meet changing trends.


9. Given that the dynamics of power between school heads and SMCs members sometimes tend to be collusive, PTAs could be made grant signatories to increase demand for transparency and accountability by actors outside of the formal management structure of schools.


10. To have more lettered and technical persons on SMCs to improve their effectiveness and efficiency in the discharge of their oversight responsibilities, the GES should consider establishing SMCs for a cluster of schools within a particular area just like the current grouping of schools into circuits for effective supervision.


11. Serious policy efforts should be made to gradually computerize the administration of the CG at the district and school levels to ensure proper records keeping, effective reporting and monitoring. Meanwhile, there should be a policy to sanction heads of districts and schools who fail to keep up-todate and accurate records.


12. The GES should make it a policy that Banks demand copies of SPIPs vetted and approved by district education offices before releasing CG funds to schools.


13. The Ministry of Finance and GES could publish the release and disbursement of funds to the districts in the daily newspapers and on their respective websites for each district to know how much has been released to it by the ministry. District Education officials will then account for the funds received to their respective Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies. Assembly Members can also follow up to schools in their various localities for monitoring and verification of receipts.


14. Education sector policy makers and stakeholders need to undertake cost impact analysis of the Capitation Grant scheme vis-à-vis other education sector policies such as the school feeding program, free school uniforms etc. to assess the long term viability and financial sustainability of these programs.


15. Finally, the fact that challenges to education seems indifferent to the policy interventions is problematic and calls for critical policy review to align policy with expected outcomes. Indeed, the recurrent nature of some of the challenges to education as identified in the study communities raises concern about the long term impact ofsome national efforts at achieving Education for ALL (EFA) goals in Ghana by 2015.

Table of Contents

1. Social Accountability in Africa: An Introduction
   Carmen Malena and Mary McNeil
2. Participatory Budgeting in Fissel, Senegal
   Bara Guèye
3. Civic Participation in Policy and Budgetary Processes in Ilala Municipal Council, Tanzania
   Renatus Kihongo and John Lubuva
4. Tracking the Ghana District Assemblies Common Fund
   Charles Abbey, Vitus A Azeem, and Cuthbert Baba Kuupiel
5. Enhancing Civil Society Capacity for Advocacy and Monitoring: Malawi’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Budget
   Dalitso Kingsley Kubalasa and Limbani Bartholomew Elia Nsapato
6. Gender-Sensitive and Child-Friendly Budgeting in Zimbabwe
   Joy Chidavaenzi and Bob Libert Muchabaiwa
7. The Nigeria Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative and Publish What You Pay Nigeria
   Dauda S. Garuba and John G. Ikubaje
8. Citizen Control of Public Action: The Social Watch Network in Benin
   Cyrille Chabi Eteka and Anne Floquet
9. An Analysis of Social Accountability in Africa
   Mary McNeil and Carmen Malena

Foreword

This is a challenging time for Africa. The combined effects of the global economic crisis, the need for equitable allocation of natural resource assets, and the ever-changing balance of influence and power between the developed and developing worlds are requiring African countries to re-evaluate their governance structures. These challenges are accompanied by new opportunities. For example, the proliferation of information and communication technologies (ICTs) - such as cell phones and SMS text messaging, among others - is opening up government processes to a larger public and empowering ordinary citizens to demand accountability from their leaders. Although in many countries these trends are still nascent, they have the potential to radically change democratic processes.

“Social accountability,” as defined in this book, is an approach to enhancing government accountability and transparency. It refers to the wide range of citizen actions to hold the state to account, as well as actions on the part of government, media, and other actors that promote or facilitate these efforts. Social accountability strategies and tools help empower ordinary citizens to exercise their inherent rights and to hold governments accountable for its use of public funds and how it exercises authority. Global experience has shown that such initiatives can be catalytic and that they increasingly play a critical role in securing and sustaining governance reforms that strengthen transparency and accountability.

The case studies presented in this book represent a cross-section of African countries, drawing on initiatives launched and implemented both by civil society groups and by local and national governments in countries with different political contexts and cultures. They demonstrate that although social accountability approaches are strongly influenced by many underlying legal, social, cultural, and economic factors, they can still be implemented in difficult political environments (Zimbabwe). They point to the overriding problem of access to information (Ghana, Malawi, and Zimbabwe), and the low readability of information when it is available (Benin).

They demonstrate what can happen when governments and civil society work together to institute accountability measures (Nigeria), and the implementation challenges they face in environments ranging from decentralized (Tanzania) to more centralized (Senegal). In the introductory and concluding chapters, the editors explain what social accountability means in the African context and distill some common success factors and lessons that can help other practitioners and innovators in the field.

I am especially pleased that this volume emphasizes the “how to” of reform, as described by those who have implemented such approaches on the ground. The World Bank Institute plans to draw on and integrate this kind of knowledge into its global learning programs, relying increasingly on South-South exchanges of experience.

The credit for this volume belongs to the authors of the case studies, who have shared many astute and personal insights into the challenges they faced. Despite such challenges, each has succeeded in helping citizens make their voices heard and shape the way they are governed.

Sanjay Pradhan
Vice President
World Bank Institute

To purchase this publication access here

1. Introducing Accountability and Transparency to Water and Sanitation Services in Honduras through Enhanced User Participation

In recent years the Honduran municipality of Puerto Cortés has received significant attention for managing its own water and sanitation sectors. National reforms made this possible. This case examines these reforms, with an emphasis on:

• User Involvement in Decision Making. As a result of these reforms, water users in Puerto Cortés now participate in decision making for water and sanitation services at various levels, including by becoming members of the water and sanitation utility itself. Users are also involved in the control and oversight of concession awards, either by becoming members of the local regulatory agency or becoming involved with the utility’s management board.
• Inclusive, Transparent Board Management. More than 50 percent of water users are members of cooperatives that hold stock in a mixed capital utility, establishing a direct relationship between users and the utility operator. This has fostered a climate of trust and transparency, and as a result both groups have committed to improving service. In addition, the bill collection rate has exceeded 93 percent as of 2007.

Download document

2. Advocacy by the Office of the Ombudsman: Enabling Water Reforms Based on Citizens’ Feedback in Peru

This case examines how the Defensoría del Pueblo (National Ombudsman) in Peru amplified the voice of the community by establishing mechanisms for receiving and responding to citizens’ complaints about water delivery. The new system allowed the Ombudsman to use input from the public to improve national public policy and regulations, and in so doing, helped to bridge the disparate interests of service users, water suppliers, and the national regulator.

This type of public inclusion also raised awareness of important aspects of service delivery. Specifically, the Office of the Ombudsman helped water users understand that although the public has the right to access safe and clean potable water, it must also pay the costs of service delivery. In the process, the Ombudsman had to correct the common assumption that water is a free and infinite resource by increasing public awareness of the expenses associated with building and maintaining the infrastructure necessary for water delivery.

Peru has tried to make water services sustainable through reforms, but several factors have blocked the way. Perhaps the most challenging was convincing the public to pay higher prices for water. To make things more difficult, the provision of water services in Peru - and rate setting in particular - had long been politicized. Political actors controlled critical decisions - including rate setting - and as a result, decisions often reflected political priorities instead of the needs of the public. The water boards, along with officials from the decentralized water companies, were responsible for not only managing and operating the utilities, but also for overseeing billing and collections, levying penalties for nonpayment, and connecting and disconnecting users. Despite widespread need for infrastructural improvements and increased coverage throughout the water sector, water officials were often reluctant to implement potentially unpopular measures - such as enforcing rate increases required by the regulator, or disconnecting nonpaying users - for fear of political backlash. The governance situation of water delivery services was therefore untenable and jeopardized the financial sustainability of the decentralized water companies.

Download document

3. Community-Managed Sanitation in Kerala, India: Tools to Promote Governance and Improve Health

The Kerala Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Project was a pioneering grassroots approach initiated by the government of India. The project aimed to revolutionize sanitation services in the South Indian state of Kerala, with the primary goal of improving public health. An array of social accountability tools instituted in Kerala addressed the significant governance problems that had hindered water and sanitation reforms in local and national programs.

Challenges to reform included a lack of accountability and transparency and broad corruption, which made local sanitation and hygiene problems more difficult to solve and accelerated the spread of infectious diseases throughout densely populated Kerala. Corruption therefore affected all segments of the population, particularly the poor and marginalized.

The Kerala Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Project broke new ground by institutionalizing the integration of local communities with Panchayats (local government institutions). By placing communities in charge of their own sanitation, the project supported the sustained delivery of adequate sanitation and water services in rural areas of Kerala’s four districts. This case study differs from other cases by focusing on sanitation (particularly household latrines) instead of water, and by focusing on the actions of local government and civic society organizations instead of public sector institutions, such as utilities and boards. The project has improved on other sanitation programs by addressing critical sanitation needs and encouraging further cooperation among and between community members and local government.

Moreover, the project has mediated competing interests, enforced obligations, and prevented capture of resources by elites and unscrupulous vendors and community members.

Finally, the Kerala project institutionalized several social accountability tools. These tools enhance the prospects for improved governance beyond governmental operations to embrace innovative forms of social development - notably community-led management. It also established mechanisms to enhance gender equity and prevent corruption through public-private partnerships between local government, civil society organizations, the private sector, and user communities. As a result, Kerala has enjoyed significant improvements in development and health outcomes.

Download document

4. Improving Governance in Water Supply through Social Accountability, Communication, and Transparency in Wobulenzi, Uganda

Uganda’s water crisis is largely a result of deficient governance, including dysfunctional institutions, poor financial management, and the inability of citizens to demand change. This case study examines how social accountability tools were used in a pilot program to improve water service delivery in Uganda.

The average potable water coverage of small towns in Uganda (towns of between 5,000 and 15,000 inhabitants) is approximately 51 percent. Some towns, including those with piped infrastructure, have lower coverage owing to a backlog of repairs, replacements, and service renewals and expansion, according to the Ugandan Ministry of Water and Environment (MWE). Some infrastructure is malfunctioning from age, having gone more than ten years without repair.

The government of Uganda has expressed concern that the majority of Ugandans lack access to clean and safe water. It has therefore made water sector reform a priority. Uganda's "Annual Sector Performance Report" for 2006 revealed that the unit cost of water services has increased steadily without a proportional improvement in quality. The discrepancy between the cost and quality of water services is a result of several factors: poor management of water services providers, poor or nonexistent maintenance of infrastructure; the lack of a feedback mechanism through which the public can voice complaints; and a lack of government accountability and transparency. These problems have undermined the Uganda’s efforts to improve water services, particularly in small towns.

Since 2003, the government of Uganda has sought to improve governance in the water and sanitation services sector. In 2006, the multistakeholder Good Governance Sub-Sector Working Group (GGWG) was established within the MWE to improve transparency and accountability.

In 2008, the World Bank Institute (WBI), in partnership with the MWE and the GGWG, launched a non-lending technical assistance program to improve governance in water supply in Uganda through social accountability, communication, and transparency. The program was to be implemented by a local NGO following a competitive bidding process. The Norwegian Trust Fund, the Trust Fund for Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development (TFESSD), and the World Bank’s Communication for Governance and Accountability Program (CommGAP) were to provide funding.

The WBI program aimed to promote the use of transparency and social accountability tools in Uganda’s water sector and to encourage effective communication among stakeholders. Furthermore, it sought to institutionalize the use of these tools within the MWE and the Directorate for Water Development to provide training in sustainable social accountability practices to a national level NGO that would implement the program, as well as to community leaders, local authorities, and local providers. Two surveys were conducted to track changes in public opinion about the performance of water service providers in the Ugandan town of Wobulenzi, in Luwero district. A baseline survey was done in August 2008, and a follow-up survey in December 2009. Additionally, the project included a participatory monitoring and evaluation of Wobulenzi’s water providers and supported the deployment of communication tools to facilitate dialogue among stakeholders about water use and services. Feedback from water users was also sent to service providers.

The program had five components:

• Comprehensive assessment of the local context
• Capacity building of the national NGO and community stakeholders
• Implementation of social accountability tools
• Improved communication to encourage good governance and cooperation among stakeholders
• Monitoring and evaluation to measure progress, results, and outputs, and to track outcomes, difficulties, and lessons learned

Download document

Consumer Feedback Partnership Pilot in the Water and Sanitation Sector, Nairobi, Kenya

On July 29-31, 2008, a three day seminar, “Consumer Feedback Partnership Pilot in the Water and Sanitation Sector” was held to introduce the concept of consumer feedback mechanism as a tool for building social accountability in Kenya’s water reforms.

The workshop brought together stakeholders in the water and sanitation sector to begin the process of institutionalising a consumer feedback mechanism in the form of water action groups (WAGs) as proposed by Kenya’s Water Services Regulatory Board (WASREB). The Water Action Groups will work in partnership with WASREB and service providers to monitor and provide constructive feedback on service delivery issues in the water sector. The proposal to institute WAGs came in response to findings of the Citizens' Report Card on Urban Water, Sanitation and Solid Waste Services in Kenya, 2007.

The workshop was organised around participatory learning sessions that drew from international experience to examine and discuss tools for strengthening social accountability. Participants also discussed the role of communication in building partnerships for strengthening social accountability, the foundations of learning alliances, and the critical need to document experiences in this learning process.

It was attended by 65 participants including senior officials from the Ministry of Water and Irrigation, WASREB, representatives of utilities, residents associations and civil society organisations from the four cities taking part in the pilot of the consumer feedback mechanism.

The seminar was jointly hosted by Kenya Water Services Regulatory Board (WASREB), the World Bank Institute (WBI) and the Water and Sanitation Programme for Africa, (WSP-Africa). Special thanks for the generous support from the Norwegian Government for the trust fund managed by WBI.

The objectives of the seminar were to:

• Begin to design a year-long partnership learning process to implement the proposed consumer feedback mechanism in Nairobi, Mombasa, Kisumu and Kakamega.
• Develop a foundation for a communication program to be used by WASREB.
• To orient the water sector stakeholders on the concept and tools of social accountability and how they have been initiated in different countries and within the water and sanitation sector.

Access programme materials

Improving Governance In Water Provision Through Social Accountability, Communication And Transparency In Uganda

This Social Accountability project is being implemented by Network for Water and Sanitation

(NETWAS) Uganda from May 2008 to June 2009 in partnership with the Wobulenzi Town Council, Luwero District Local Government, the Ministry of Water and Environment, and the World Bank Institute. The project is focusing on improving governance in the water sector through transparency, social accountability and communication approaches and by engaging communities in the Town Council to work in partnership with the service providers to improve the quality of water service delivery. A hybrid methodology known as the Citizen's Report Card (CRC)/Community Score Card (CSC) and various communication tools and mechanisms are being used to promote social accountability.

In Wobulenzi, there are two different private water providers: one is a provider hired by the government through an OBA contract, and the other provider works under a normal private system. The OBA Approach (Output-Based Aid) is a strategy that involves delegating service delivery to a third-party, typically private firms, but also public utilities, NGOs, and community-based organizations, under contracts that tie disbursement of the public funding to the services or outputs actually delivered. Since NETWAS is applying the CRC/CSC to these both providers, this program will be able to compare the impact of the OBA approach in terms of utility performance and effectivess in improving water provision to the non-OBA provider in Wobulenzi, and give them both feedback for improving their performance.

The Citizen’s Report Card (CRC) survey that has been applied in Wobulenzi will provide service providers in both Wobulenzi Town Council and Bukalasa Agricultural College with feedback from the community about the adequacy, efficiency and quality of water services, based on their own experience. Later on, through the Community Scorecard Process (CSC) both community members and service providers will (i) identify priority areas for improvement in the quality of service delivery based on scores – areas with poor/low scores will be given priority for action; (ii) generate suggestions for improvement in service delivery; (iii) work jointly to identify and implement specific actions to improve the quality of water service delivery within a set timeframe and using available resources. The community in Wobulenzi will be able to monitor progress in service delivery through constructive feedback to water providers.

Objectives

The aim of this project is to promote better governance in the water sector in Uganda by fostering transparency, social accountability and efficient communication activities. The specific objectives of this program are:

1. To help local stakeholders understand and apply social accountability, communication and transparency concepts and mechanisms to improve governance in water service provision.
2. To support local stakeholders in designing and implementing effective communication mechanisms to promote a permanent, sustainable and constructive way of providing feedback from users to providers as well as informing users about service provision.
3. To help institutionalize these processes within the Ministry of Water and Environment and the Directorate for Water Development.
4. To train district-level users’ organizations, community leaders, local authorities and local providers in social accountability concepts and practices for the long-term sustainability of social accountability initiatives.

Access programme materials

Gender-Responsive Budgeting (GRB) has become an internationally acknowledged tool for supporting implementation of commitments towards achieving gender equality and the realization of women's rights. UNIFEM contributes extensively to building interest, capacity and commitment to incorporate a gender equality perspective in budgetary processes and practices. Since 2001, UNIFEM has supported GRB initiatives in more than 35 countries and has positioned itself as a leading player in GRB in the UN system.

This evaluation critically examines how UNIFEM can further influence the achievement of gender equality through national budgetary processes and uses the criteria of relevance, effectiveness and sustainability to analyse data. The evaluation was conducted in three stages and produced a number of different findings at each stage, which are documented in three sets of reports.

The first report details the findings and recommendations of the second phase of UNIFEM's global GRB Programme "Strengthening Economic Governance: Applied Gender Analysis to Government Budgets," which launched in 2001 and provided technical and financial support to gender budget initiatives in Latin America, Africa and the Asia-Pacific. The second set of reports provides an analysis of four country case studies - Ecuador, Morocco, Mozambique and Senegal - and the third report is a wider evaluation of UNIFEM's corporate approach to GRB.

• Overview: UNIFEM’s Work on Gender-Responsive Budgeting
  English
• Evaluation: Gender-Responsive Budgeting Programme
  English | French | Portuguese
• Evaluation: Gender-Responsive Budgeting Programme, Ecuador
  English
• Evaluation: Gender-Responsive Budgeting Programme, Morocco
  English | French
• Evaluation: Gender-Responsive Budgeting Programme, Mozambique
  English | Portuguese
• Evaluation: Gender-Responsive Budgeting Programme, Senegal
  English | French
• Pamphlet: Corporate Evaluation of UNIFEM's Work on Gender-Responsive Budgeting
  English | French

The WaterAid paper Water utilities that work for poor people - increasing viability through pro-poor service delivery¹ discussed the need for specific pro-poor measures to ensure water service provision to poor urban populations. This paper follows from that discussion to outline the principles behind, and the application of, social accountability mechanisms as a means to increase the downward accountability and responsiveness of water utilities to poor people. An examination of the provision of sanitation services is beyond the scope of this paper.

Given the proven importance of pro-poor measures for urban water service delivery and viability, the question arises as to why such measures are not undertaken by utilities as normal practice. Although financial constraints matter, they do not constitute the only barrier. WaterAid’s report Bridging the gap - Citizens’ Action for accountability in water and sanitation² argues that the missing ingredient needed in order to reach poor people is accountability to the people, which necessitates the meaningful involvement of users in the planning, delivery and monitoring of water services. This increases the chances of delivering reliable, sustainable and affordable water services to more urban inhabitants.³

The engagement of users in utility reforms and ongoing service improvement processes is crucial, since reforms to improve efficiency (inevitably the main driver for reforms) do not “necessarily translate into geographical equity or a commitment to serve the poor… without incentives, a clear mandate to serve the poor or a ‘champion’, companies chase markets that are ‘easy’, offer the highest returns and do not require subsidies”.⁴ However, user engagement is far from simple and its outcomes far from predictable.

This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 outlines the conceptual framework around accountability; Section 3 discusses the concept of social accountability, followed by an examination of the principles that underlie social accountability mechanisms and tools used by service providers and users to improve the efficiency and pro-poor targeting of reforms. Section 4 provides conclusions. The paper is the third of a set of three WaterAid discussion papers on how to improve urban water and sanitation services for poor people. It was written as part of the preparation for a workshop for training of trainers on civil society participation in urban water reform, organised by WaterAid in Nepal in July 2009. The paper draws on a variety of literature, as well as a series of key-informant interviews.

1. WaterAid 2010
2. WaterAid 2006
3. WB 2009
4. Castro and Morel 2008 p291

Monitoring & evaluating pro poor governance

Governance as the exercise of political authority for purposes of managing the affairs of a society has been around throughout the history of mankind. Its formalization in the era of the modern political state has sharply brought to focus the reciprocal relationship between the state and her citizens. Good governance today is not only about prudent state management, but also the sensitivity and appropriateness of institutional responses to the ever emerging practical and strategic societal needs. In sub Saharan Africa where a majority of the population are poor, marginalised and excluded from decision-making processes, pro poor governance would endeavour to prioritize sustained economic growth, promote public participation and inclusion and avail social and economic empowerment opportunities to citizens. Pro poor governments are also underpinned by an over arching responsibility for demand-driven socio-economic and political reforms that adequately respond to the changing times. In reality, these relationships are much more complex, the needs and rights overlap as much as they are interdependent.

Monitoring governance at whatever level is a function of a well-developed and participatory M&E framework and citizen capacity and conviction to participate. Targets of Pro poor governance initiatives, despite their challenges must be included with deliberate intention to build capacity that would sustain participation and open up more opportunities. Other key stakeholders must equally be harnessed to give contextual insights that should inform the larger indicators and picture about governance. Kenya like any other sub Saharan African state has come far in embracing pro poor reforms and opening the political space for public participation. Our political developments and progress are broadly anchored on three political regimes since independence.

Monitoring governance remains a daunting global challenge. But while few people dispute the notion that the quality of governance matters to development, measuring governance has largely been dominated by top-down, ‘blueprint’ methods of assessments. The World Bank now contend; that all governance indicators have weaknesses; that there are no easy solutions in measuring governance; and that the links from governance to development outcomes are complex hence policymakers should view the different types of indicators as complementary rather than competing.

So, what does governance really mean? When, why and how does governance make a difference to the way a country develops? According to an Overseas Development Institute (ODI) research, governance is too important an issue to be left only to international donor agencies to define and determine. Governance in any case is nothing more than an over-arching programming concept; a synonym for making the political machinery work better. Whether this is achieved or not is better demostrated by the positive changes in the life of the ordinary poor people. This domestic constituency must therefore be brought in to provide a complementary and contrasting perspective.

1. Enactment of Freedom of Information Law: The existing official secrets act is a big hindrance to information gathering, which forms the bane of monitoring and evaluation. Sensitive information can easily be concealed under the guise of the act.
2. Building the capacity of both the demand and supply side is necessary to forging a common understanding of pro poor governance as well as service delivery. Both the soft (knowledge, bureaucracy) and the physical or hard infrastructural capacity remain wanting in supporting an inclusive M&E work. Civic Society led civic education has done a lot among the service users, but the civil service remain weak
3. Develop a multi stakeholder M & E framework capable of accommodating state, corporate and CSO actors. Current framework needs to be expanded to be more participatory to stakeholders as opposed to merely consultative. Moreover, there is need to pursue a more progressive trend towards participatory processes of pro poor M & E, while emphasizing the need to consider and include unique local contexts.
4. Emphasis should be made on greater coordination, harmonization and consolidation of the various M&E agencies and other players. Even better, a system of checks and balances should be struck between the specialised agencies to ensure peer monitoring. The monitors should be monitored too.

The Social Development Network’s main aim is to promote and facilitate effective strategic alliances among members and interested groups within Kenya. As a network, SODNET’s mandate is anchored on the need to restore the institutional integrity and civic sovereignty of the social sector. INFONET, a SODNET programme, originated in 2007, based on the need to create convergences on actions that are critical to the development of the human person. This attached presentation provides an outline of INFONET and its use of various ICT tools to promote accountability of service delivery.

INFONET and its use of online budget tool / mobile tools

The goal of harnessing these tools is to improve community engagement in local development planning and public resource management. INFONET is thus an ICT enhanced collaborative platform for budget tracking, knowledge sharing, especially of the use of constituency development funds at the local level in Kenya. The tool provides communities (especially rural and urban poor) with the possibility of monitoring the performance of central government, parliamentarians and local authorities with respect to budget expenditure, disbursements and service delivery to their local community. In turn, it offers feedback by the citizens to government, parliamentarians and local authorities of their performance. Citizens can also give feedback, via sms, to their local authorities.

INFONET, as a budget tracking tool, is important because it:

• Enables citizens to search different projects funds
• Provides constituency demographic information e.g. population, schools, hospitals etc
• Provides date on the type of funds and allocations summaries
• Reports problems to ward councillor and the constituency MP about overall project implementation
• Allows individuals and groups to report anomalies or incidences of corruption, while also uploading photos, text, videos etc.

Benefit Mapping

Currently, the project allows for the monitoring of the Constituency Development Fund (CDF), Local Authority Transfer Fund (LATF), Youth Enterprise & Development Fund and Economic Stimulus Package (ESP).

• Citizens can use it for: Contribution on projects, anonymous reporting on corruption, gain information on process towards budget making
• Civil society can use it for: Report on corruption, solidarity, networking and institutional strengthening
• Leaders/Fund Councilors can use it for: Possibility of feedback, dialogue with citizens and lobby groups.
• Researchers can use it for: Analysis on devolution of funds, knowledge and memory on best practices from projects.
• Development partners/investors can use it for: Pertinent information on viable projects;

FrontlineSms

FrontlineSMS is a laptop or PC-based software application used for sending and receiving group SMS messages. It does not require an internet connection and works with any GSM network. FrontlineSMS requires a computer and a mobile phone or GSM modem. The software is free. Costs incurred are mobile carrier SMS cost. Installing FrontlineSMS is very quick: on Windows machines the process is fully automated and should complete in approximately two minutes. FrontlineSMS allows NGOs to run awareness raising campaigns, competitions or carry out text-based surveys, or to simply keep in touch with fieldworkers and supporters.

Observations based on the experience so far of INFONET

• Ideological choices: Modernize or Westernize?
• Leverage on existing practices / technology and up-scaling or create from scratch;
• Further political choice vs political will. If its not illegal, it should be done!
• Emphasis on the common person: encourage empowerment of citizen’s to act on their own & improve the universal quality of the human condition.
• Address emerging contradictions on ICTs and its impact on livelihoods
• Ownership, access and control of technology and information e.g. Agricultural knowledge (seeds, seed-banking, farm methods);
• One must also consider the following: Affordability, relevance, usability, availability leading to sustainability.

All are important in the choice of using ICTs in development. If its not relevant and affordable users will not engage it.

* More details on INFONET can be obtained from the authors:

• John Kippchumba
• Phillip Thigo

No documento Que tipo de Estado? Que tipo de igualdade? analisa-se o progresso da igualdade de gênero na Região depois de 15 anos da aprovação da Plataforma de Ação de Beijing, 10 anos da formulação dos Objetivos de Desenvolvimento do Milênio e 3 anos da adoção do Consenso de Quito, na décima Conferência Regional sobre a Mulher da América Latina e do Caribe realizada em 2007. Examinam-se, além disso, as conquistas e desafios que enfrentam os governos à luz da interação entre o Estado, o mercado e as famílias como instituições sociais construídas a partir de políticas, leis, usos e costumes que, em conjunto, estabelecem as condições para renovar ou perpetuar as hierarquias sociais e de gênero¹.

Mesmo que o estudo seja centralizado na América Latina e no Caribe, alguns indicadores se comparam com os da Espanha e Portugal, países que formam parte do Observatório de igualdade de gênero da América Latina e do Caribe e que participam na conferência regional como Estados membros da CEPAL. Da mesma forma, destacam-se algumas políticas no âmbito da paridade e da conciliação com relação às tarefas de cuidado que permitem a compatibilidade dos processos de igualdade em nível global e que dão conta do crescente intercâmbio da Região com outros países.

O papel do Estado no desenvolvimento da igualdade social constitui o eixo central do debate, tal como se propõe no documento La hora de la igualdad: brechas por cerrar, caminos por abrir (CEPAL, 2010a). Trata-se de um conceito chave em uma agenda de desenvolvimento compartilhada pelos diversos agentes da sociedade e que, no caso das mulheres, supõe sua incorporação ao mercado de trabalho em condições iguais às dos homens, juntamente com o reconhecimento da titularidade de seus direitos como cidadãs, sua plena participação na tomada de decisões em todos os níveis da sociedade, o respeito à sua integridade física e o controle sobre seu próprio corpo.

A incorporação das mulheres ao mercado de trabalho em iguais condições que as dos homens requer uma análise e uma mudança estratégica da função social e simbólica estabelecida na sociedade. Isto implica, por uma parte, redistribuir a carga de trabalho não remunerada associada à reprodução e ao sustento da vida humana e, por outra, desmontar o sistema de poder que subjuga as mulheres, tanto na dimensão privada (o direito a uma vida livre de violência, o direito de decidir plenamente sobre a reprodução e suas condições), como na dimensão pública (a representação equitativa nos níveis de tomada de decisões da sociedade).

O progresso na igualdade de gênero se relaciona diretamente com os avanços na autonomia econômica das mulheres, como o controle sobre os bens materiais e os recursos intelectuais, e a capacidade de decidir sobre a renda e os ativos familiares. Por sua vez, está estreitamente relacionado com a autonomia física como requisito indispensável para superar as barreiras que existem no exercício da sexualidade, a integridade física das mulheres e a reprodução, assim como a representação paritária nos espaços de tomada de decisões.

Na segunda parte da análise apresenta-se a situação da América Latina e do Caribe e os avanços alcançados pelos países quanto a políticas, planos e programas com relação à avaliação da aplicação da Plataforma de ,Ação de Beijing e, mais especificamente, os indicadores comparados dos países da Região relacionados à autonomia física, econômica e à tomada de decisões, elaborados pelo Observatório de igualdade de gênero da América Latina e do Caribe da CEPAL.

A análise dos indicadores comparados nesta ocasião atua como boletim informativo do Observatório de igualdade de gênero da América Latina e do Caribe, uma ferramenta que mostra as conquistas e os desafios na Região na última década e demonstra um progresso consistente no desenvolvimento de sistemas de produção de estatísticas e indicadores para medir a desigualdade existente entre homens e mulheres². O Observatório responde a um dos mandatos do Consenso de Quito (2007) e graças a ele foi possível contar com nova informação em nível nacional e regional nas áreas de autonomia econômica, autonomia física e autonomia na tomada de decisões das mulheres³. Trata-se de um esforço interinstitucional, coordenado pela CEPAL e sustentado nos aportes substantivos e financeiros do Instituto Internacional de Investigações e Capacitação das Nações Unidas para a Promoção da Mulher (INSTRAW), o Fundo de Desenvolvimento das Nações Unidas para a Mulher (UNIFEM), o Fundo de População das Nações Unidas (UNFPA), a Organização Pan-americana da Saúde (OPS), el Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo (PNUD), a Agência Espanhola de Cooperação Internacional para o Desenvolvimento (AECID) e a Secretaria Geral Ibero-americana (SEGIB).

Na terceira parte do documento aborda-se a questão do trabalho remunerado e o impacto do trabalho não remunerado das mulheres no emprego formal e informal, seu vínculo com as políticas macroeconômicas e o papel do Estado como promotor de igualdade e políticas públicas para a redistribuição do trabalho não remunerado, partindose do pressuposto de que estas políticas repercutem tanto na regulamentação da produção e nos salários, como no bem-estar das pessoas mediante as medidas de proteção e a assistência social.

As implicações do trabalho não remunerado para a economia e o foco na reprodução social que se leva a cabo nos lares é chave no entendimento das relações entre produção e redistribuição da riqueza. Por isso, a análise busca evidenciar distintas dimensões do trabalho doméstico, não só como uma reivindicação política, bem como um convite ao debate sobre as formas de redistribuição, os modos de produção e a qualidade da relação entre produção e reprodução social.

Destaca-se também a importância de contar com Estados responsáveis pelo respeito, a proteção e o cumprimento dos direitos humanos de maneira integral, mediante a articulação dos direitos sociais, políticos, econômicos e culturais, e a vinculação dos poderes Executivo, Legislativo e Judiciário para o desenho e a implementação de políticas públicas universais em que se assuma intrinsecamente que as políticas laborais estão indissoluvelmente vinculadas às políticas e aos mecanismos necessários para transformar a reprodução social em uma tarefa coletiva.

Enfatiza-se igualmente a necessidade de encaminhar as políticas em direção à conciliação entre a vida laboral e a vida familiar, e se propõe aos Estados e à sociedade em seu conjunto o fortalecimento de iniciativas para que as mulheres superem os obstáculos que lhes impedem ter maior mobilidade e melhores trajetórias laborais sem discriminação para o pleno exercício de sua cidadania.

Em suma, destacam-se os avanços em matéria de direitos econômicos e sociais e o importante papel político das mulheres, ao mesmo tempo em que se oferecem dados que permitem salientar a manutenção ou surgimento de novas desigualdades que, longe de mostrar progressos lineares na Região, mostram um mapa complexo que denota a existência de desigualdades cruzadas entre o desenvolvimento econômico, político e social das mulheres, o que coloca em evidência as variações, os bloqueios e a resistência às mudanças.

No diagnóstico e na análise que se apresentam neste estudo considera-se a heterogeneidade estrutural das economias, a diversidade cultural dos povos e as particularidades territoriais que fazem com que, em alguns casos, o tamanho da população e do território, o impacto dos desastres naturais na economia, a disponibilidade de recursos naturais e o tipo de desenvolvimento institucional sejam fatores que também têm efeitos diferenciados sobre a situação das mulheres em cada país e que devem ser analisados a partir da perspectiva nacional e sub-regional.

Por último, na seção destinada a propor uma agenda de políticas de igualdade de gênero, além de sugerir temas de políticas de curto e médio prazo em torno da redistribuição do trabalho remunerado e não remunerado e de cuidado, sugere-se a importância de incluir as vozes Por último, na seção destinada a propor uma agenda de políticas de igualdade de gênero, além de sugerir temas de políticas de curto e médio prazo em torno da redistribuição do trabalho remunerado e não remunerado e de cuidado, sugere-se a importância de incluir as vozes

1. Em 1995 realizou-se em Beijing a Quarta Conferência Mundial sobre a Mulher e se aprovou uma Plataforma de Ação, que foi avaliada depois de 15 anos no Exame e avaliação da Declaração e da Plataforma de Ação de Beijing e no documento final do vigésimo terceiro período extraordinário de sessões da Assembleia Geral (2000) em países da América Latina e do Caribe (CEPAL, 2009c).
2. Veja http://www.cepal.cl/oig.
3. Na décima Conferência Regional sobre a Mulher da América Latina e do Caribe celebrada em Quito em 2007, os Estados membros da CEPAL solicitaram a constituição de um observatório de igualdade de gênero.

Le document Quel genre d’État pour quel genre d’égalité? analyse les progrès de l’égalité entre les sexes dans la région, 15 ans après l’adoption du Programme d’action de Beijing, 10 ans après la formulation des objectifs du Millénaire pour le développement et 3 ans après l’adoption du Consensus de Quito à la dixième Conférence régionale sur les femmes de l’Amérique latine et des Caraïbes qui s’est tenue en 2007. Il examine en outre les succès et les défis auxquels sont confrontés les gouvernements à la lumière de l’interaction entre l’État, le marché et les familles, en tant qu’institutions sociales construites sur la base de politiques, de lois, d’us et coutumes qui, ensemble, créent les conditions pour rénover ou perpétuer les hiérarchies sociales et de genre¹.

et des Caraïbes, ainsi qu’à la conférence régionale en leur qualité d’États membres de la CEPALC. Par ailleurs, l’étude met l’accent sur certaines politiques appliquées en matière de parité et de conciliation avec les tâches de soins qui permettent de comparer les processus d’égalité à l’échelon mondial et de rendre compte des échanges croissants entre la région et d’autres pays.

Le rôle de l’État dans le développement de l’égalité sociale constitue l’axe central du débat proposé dans le document “L’heure de l’égalité: combler les écarts, ouvrir de nouveaux chemins” (CEPALC, 2010a). C’est un concept clé dans l’agenda du développement que partagent les divers acteurs de la société et qui, dans le cas des femmes, suppose leur intégration dans le marché du travail sur pied d’égalité avec les hommes, ainsi que la reconnaissance de leurs droits de citoyennes, leur participation à part entière à la prise de décisions à tous les niveaux de la société, le respect de leur intégrité physique et la maîtrise de leur propre corps.

L’intégration des femmes sur le marché du travail, sur pied d’égalité avec les hommes, requiert une analyse et un changement stratégique de la fonction sociale et symbolique dans la société. Cela suppose, d’une part, de redistribuer la charge du travail non rémunéré associée à la reproduction et à l’entretien de la vie humaine et, d’autre part, de démonter le système de pouvoir qui soumet les femmes, sur le plan privé (le droit à une vie exempte de violence, le droit de décider pleinement de la reproduction et de ses conditions) et sur le plan public (la représentation équitable aux échelons de prise de décisions de la société).

La progression en matière d’égalité entre les hommes et les femmes est directement liée aux progrès de l’autonomie économique des femmes, notamment le contrôle des biens matériels et des ressources intellectuelles, et la capacité de prendre des décisions concernant les revenus et les actifs familiaux. Tout cela est étroitement lié à l’autonomie physique, une condition indispensable pour surmonter les barrières qui subsistent en matière d’exercice de la sexualité, d’intégrité physique des femmes et de reproduction, ainsi que de représentation paritaire dans les espaces de prise de décisions.

La deuxième partie de l’analyse expose la situation de l’Amérique latine et des Caraïbes ainsi que les progrès réalisés par les pays en ce qui concerne les politiques, les plans et les programmes relatifs à l’évaluation de l’application du Programme d’action de Beijing et, plus précisément, les indicateurs comparés des pays de la région en matière d’autonomie physique, économique et dans la prise de décisions, élaborés par l’Observatoire de l’égalité de genre de l’Amérique latine et des Caraïbes de la CEPALC.

L’analyse des indicateurs comparés fait office de rapport des progrès de l’Observatoire de l’égalité de genre de l’Amérique latine et des Caraïbes, un outil qui met en lumière les réalisations et les défis dans la région au cours de la dernière décennie et rend compte de progrès importants en matière de développement de systèmes de production de statistiques et d’indicateurs pour mesurer l’inégalité entre les hommes et les femmes². L’Observatoire, créé au titre d’un mandat du Consensus de Quito (2007), permet de disposer de nouvelles informations au niveau national et régional, dans les domaines de l’autonomie économique, de l’autonomie physique et de l’autonomie dans la prise de décisions des femmes³. Il s’agit d’un effort interinstitutionnel, coordonné par la CEPALC et soutenu par les contributions techniques et financières de l’Institut international de recherche et de formation pour la promotion de la femme (INSTRAW), du Fonds de développement des Nations Unies pour la femme (UNIFEM), du Fonds des Nations Unies pour la population (FNUAP), de l’Organisation panaméricaine de la santé (OPS), du Programme des Nations Unies pour le développement (PNUD), de l’Agence espagnole de coopération internationale au développement (AECID) et du Secrétariat général ibéro-américain (SEGIB).

La troisième partie du document aborde le thème du travail rémunéré et l’impact du travail non rémunéré des femmes sur l’emploi formel et informel, son lien avec les politiques macroéconomiques et le rôle de l’État en tant que promoteur de l’égalité et de politiques publiques pour la redistribution du travail non rémunéré, étant entendu que ces politiques ont des répercussions à la fois pour la régulation de la production et les salaires, ainsi que pour le bien-être des personnes par les mesures de protection et l’aide sociale.

Les conséquences du travail non rémunéré pour l’économie et la concentration sur la reproduction sociale qui se fait dans les familles sont essentielles pour comprendre les relations entre la production et la redistribution des richesses. Dès lors, l’analyse cherche à mettre en lumière plusieurs dimensions du travail ménager, non seulement en tant que revendication politique, mais en guise d’invitation au débat sur les règles de la redistribution, les modes de production et la qualité de la relation entre la production et la reproduction sociale.

Par ailleurs, le document souligne l’importance d’avoir des États responsables du respect, de la protection et de l’application intégrale des droits humains, par l’articulation des droits sociaux, politiques, économiques et culturels, et l’engagement des pouvoirs exécutif, législatif et judiciaire à concevoir des politiques publiques universelles, qui supposent intrinsèquement que les politiques du travail sont indissociablement liées aux politiques et aux mécanismes nécessaires pour transformer la reproduction sociale en une tâche collective.

Il souligne également la nécessité d’orienter les politiques vers la conciliation de la vie professionnelle et de la vie familiale, et pose aux États et à l’ensemble de la société la question du renforcement des initiatives pour que les femmes surmontent les obstacles qui les empêchent d’avoir une plus grande mobilité et de meilleures carrières professionnelles sans discrimination pour le plein exercice de leur citoyenneté.

Il met en lumière ensuite les progrès en matière de droits économiques et sociaux, et de participation politique des femmes, en même temps qu’il présente des données permettant de déceler la persistance ou l’apparition de nouvelles inégalités qui, loin d’afficher une trajectoire linéaire dans la région, dessinent une carte complexe qui montre l’existence d’inégalités croisées entre le développement économique, politique et social des femmes, ce qui met en évidence les hauts et les bas, les blocages et la résistance au changement.

Le diagnostic et l’analyse présentés dans cette étude prennent en considération l’hétérogénéité structurelle des économies, la diversité culturelle des populations et les particularités territoriales qui expliquent, dans certains cas, les effets différenciés que peuvent avoir divers facteurs tels que la taille de la population et du territoire, l’impact des catastrophes naturelles sur l’économie, la disponibilité de ressources naturelles et le type de développement institutionnel sur la situation des femmes dans chaque pays, facteurs qui doivent être analysés d’une perspective nationale ou sous-régionale.

Enfin, la section destinée à proposer un agenda de politiques d’égalité des sexes, en plus de suggérer des thèmes de politiques à court et à moyen terme concernant la redistribution du travail rémunéré et non rémunéré et des soins, pose la question de l’importance d’inclure les voix des femmes par leur présence démocratique dans la sphère de la prise de décisions, ainsi que de l’importance de reconnaître le mouvement des femmes en tant qu’acteur dans les espaces de dialogue et de gouvernance, et dans les organisations sociales et syndicales.

1. En 1995, la quatrième Conférence mondiale sur la femme s’est tenue à Beijing et a adopté un Programme d’action, évalué 15 ans plus tard, dans le cadre de l’Examen et évaluation de la mise en oeuvre de la Déclaration et du Programme d’action de Beijing et du document final de la vingt-troisième session extraordinaire de l’Assemblée générale (2000) dans les pays d’Amérique latine et des Caraïbes (CEPALC, 2009c).
2. Voir http://www.cepal.cl/oig.
3. À la dixième Conférence régionale sur les femmes de l’Amérique latine et des Caraïbes, qui s’est tenue à Quito en 2007, les États membres de la CEPALC ont demandé la création d’un observatoire de l’égalité de genre.

The document What kind of State? What kind of equality? analyses the progress of gender equality in the region 15 years after the approval of the Beijing Platform for Action, 10 years after the drafting of the Millennium Development Goals and 3 years after the adoption of the Quito Consensus at the tenth session of the Regional Conference on Women in Latin America and the Caribbean, held in 2007. It also examines the achievements made and challenges faced by governments in light of the interaction between the State, the market and families as social institutions built on the foundation of policies, laws, and customs and habits which, together, establish the conditions for renewing or perpetuating gender and social hierarchies.¹

Although the study focuses on Latin America and the Caribbean, some of the indicators are compared with those of Portugal and Spain, which are members of the Gender Equality Observatory for Latin America and the Caribbean and participate in the Regional Conference on Women in Latin America and the Caribbean as member States of ECLAC. Particular mention is also made of certain policies on gender parity and reconciliation of caregiving and productive work, in order to draw comparisons with equality processes under way at the global level and bring attention to the region’s increasing dialogue with other countries in this area.

The State’s role in promoting social equality is the crux of the debate, as affirmed in the document Time for equality: closing gaps, opening trails (ECLAC 2010a). This is a key concept in a development agenda shared by various social actors: it assumes that women will be incorporated into the labour market under the same conditions as men, that their rights as citizens will be recognized, that they will participate fully in decision-making at all levels of society, that their physical integrity will be respected and that they will have control over their own bodies.

The incorporation of women into the labour market under the same conditions as men presupposes an analysis of their social and symbolic role in society and a strategic change therein. This will entail redistributing the unpaid workload associated with the reproduction and sustainment of human life as well as dismantling the power system that subjugates women both in private (thereby guaranteeing them the right to a life free from violence and the right to free choice in matters of, and conditions relating to, reproduction) and in public (through their equitable representation at all levels of decision-making in society).

Progress in gender equality is directly related to advances in women’s economic autonomy, such as control over material goods and intellectual resources and the ability to make decisions regarding family assets and income. It is also closely linked with physical autonomy as an essential requirement for overcoming the barriers to the exercise of sexuality, to women’s physical integrity and to free choice in matters of reproduction, as well as with parity in decision-making.

The second section of the document depicts the situation in Latin America and the Caribbean and the progress made by countries in policies, plans and programmes relating to the assessment of the application of the Beijing Platform for Action and, more specifically, the comparative indicators for the countries of the region regarding physical and economic autonomy and decisionmaking as seen in the Gender Equality Observatory for Latin America and the Caribbean of ECLAC.

On this occasion, the analysis of the comparative indicators serves as a progress report of the Gender Equality Observatory for Latin America and the Caribbean, a tool that draws attention to the achievements and challenges in the region in the last decade and reveals substantive progress in the development of indicators and statisticalproduction systems to measure inequality between men and women.² The Observatory was established in response to one of the mandates of the Quito Consensus (2007) and has made it possible to have new national and regional data on women’s economic autonomy, physical autonomy and decision-making autonomy.³ This interagency effort is coordinated by ECLAC and supported by the substantive and financial contributions of the United Nations International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women (INSTRAW), United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Spanish International Cooperation Agency for Development (AECID) and Ibero-American Secretariat (SEGIB).

The third section of the document addresses paid work and the impact of unpaid work on women in formal and informal employment, the connection between unpaid work and macroeconomic policies and the role of the State in promoting equality and of public policies in the redistribution of unpaid work. These policies are understood to influence production regulation and wages as well as well-being through social welfare and protection measures.

The economic implications of unpaid work and households’ focus on social reproduction provide a key to understanding the relationships between production and the redistribution of wealth. Hence, the analysis attempts to draw attention to the different dimensions of household work, not only as a political demand but also as an invitation to debate on rules for redistribution, modes of production and the type of relationship between production and social reproduction.

The document also highlights the importance of States’ being responsible overall for the respect, protection and fulfilment of human rights by interlinking social, political, economic and cultural rights and coordinating the executive, legislative and judicial branches in order to design and implement universal public policies based on the assumption that labour policies are indissolubly linked to the policies and mechanisms needed to transform social production into a collective undertaking.

It also emphasizes the need to gear policies towards reconciling work and family life, and proposes that States and society overall strengthen initiatives for women to overcome obstacles to greater mobility and better career prospects without discrimination, and thus gain access to full citizenship.

In sum, the document stresses the progress made in women’s economic and social rights and in their key political role, while at the same time offering data that suggest that new inequalities persist or have emerged. Far from suggesting that there have been linear advances in the region, these data trace a complex map that denotes overlapping inequalities in women’s economic, political and social development. And this map underscores the vicissitudes, the impasses and the resistance to change.

The diagnosis and analysis set forth in this study take into account the structural heterogeneity of the economies, the cultural diversity of its people and specific territorial features, since these can sometimes cause certain factors - population and territory size, the impact of natural disasters on the economy, the availability of natural resources and the type of institutional development - to have differentiated effects on the status of women in each country, warranting further analysis from the national or subregional perspective.

Last, the section that calls for an agenda on gender equality policies refers to short- and medium-term policies centred on the redistribution of paid and unpaid and care work and highlights the importance of including women’s voices through their democratic presence in the decision-making sphere as well as the importance of recognizing the women’s movement, women entrepreneurs and businesswomen in dialogue and governance forums and in social and trade union organizations.

1. The Fourth World Conference on Women was held in Beijing in 1995, and the Platform for Action adopted on that occasion is the subject of a 15-year review entitled Review of the implementation of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action and the outcome of the twenty-third special session of the General Assembly (2000) in Latin American and Caribbean countries (ECLAC, 2009c).
2. See http://www.cepal.cl/oig.
3. At the tenth session of the Regional Conference on Women in Latin America and the Caribbean, held in Quito in 2007, the ECLAC member States requested the creation of a gender equality observatory.

Qu’est-ce que le Forum sur l’efficacité du développement des OSC?
Le Forum sur l’efficacité du développement des OSC - ou Open Forum - est un processus international mené par les OSC dont l’objectif est de définir un cadre global d’efficacité des OSC pour le développement. A cette fin, il réunira les OSC et d’autres acteurs du développement, notamment les gouvernements et les bailleurs officiels, à l’occasion de consultations et de dialogues multipartites au niveau national, régional international

Quels sont les objectifs de l’Open Forum?
L’Open Forum va faciliter des consultations et des dialogues multipartites au niveau des pays et des régions et au niveau international pour

1. Permettre aux OSC d’arriver à un consensus sur un cadre global de l’efficacité pour le développement des OSC, comportant un ensemble de principes, d’indicateurs, de directives d’application, de bonnes pratiques concernant les mécanismes de responsabilité ainsi que des normes minimales pour que les OSC travaillent dans des conditions favorables.
2. Fournir aux OSC un espace d’apprentissage, fondé sur la confiance mutuelle, où elles peuvent discuter de leur travail et de leur place au sein de la sphère des acteurs du développement.
3. Persuader les bailleurs officiels et les gouvernements, et peut-être d’autres acteurs du développement, de concourir à ce que l’environnement dans lequel travaillent les OSC soit un environnement favorable.

Qui est en charge de l’Open Forum?
Un Groupe de facilitation global (GFG), de 25 OSC, assure la coordination, la direction politique et la visibilité de l’Open Forum. Le GFG se réunit régulièrement pour faire le point sur les consultations et les dialogues multipartites et définir les orientations du futur agenda. On trouvera la liste de ses membres à l’Annexe 3. Le GFG a donné mandat à un consortium de six organisations de gérer au jour le jour les travaux de l’Open Forum (voir l’Annexe 2).

Pourquoi ce kit?
Ce kit de sensibilisation est une ressource pour les consultations de l’Open Forum. Son objet est d’enrichir le débat sur l’efficacité pour le développement des OSC, et d’être un guide pour les OSC travaillant au niveau local, national, régional ou international, dans le Nord, le Sud, ou à l’échelle internationale, qui vont contribuer à définir un cadre global de l’efficacité du développement.

A qui s’adresse ce kit de sensibilisation?
Il s’adresse:

• Aux réseaux et plateformes d’OSC en charge de la facilitation des discussions sur l’efficacité pour le développement des OSC, au plan national.
• Aux OSC participant aux consultations nationales, régionales ou thématiques/sectorielles sur l’efficacité pour le développement des OSC.
• Aux OSC participant aux Assemblées mondiales de l’Open Forum.
• Aux autres acteurs du développement participant aux consultations.

Comment peut-on l’utiliser?

• Pour fournir tous les éléments du contexte: Les sections 1 et 2 concernent tous les éléments du contexte de la création de l’Open Forum et du processus de consultation. Elles contiennent aussi des informations sur les processus parallèles menés par les donateurs, et des informations sur les autres initiatives centrées sur les OSC. Ces sections sont à l’intention des participants aux consultations, mais elles doivent aussi étayer le travail des organisateurs et des facilitateurs des consultations.
• Pour instruire et guider le débat: La section 3 comporte un exposé des questions clés concernant l’efficacité pour le développement des OSC, et un certain nombre de questions de fond pour alimenter et guider le débat.
• PPour mettre au point, structurer, mener les consultations et consigner leurs résultats: La section 4 est principalement à l’intention des organisateurs et des facilitateurs des consultations. Elle comporte des idées, des recommandations et des outils pour les aider à mettre au point, structurer et mener les consultations et à consigner leurs résultats. L’Annexe 1 contient un modèle de fiche récapitulative des résultats de la consultation.

Où peut-on trouver d’autres informations sur l’Open Forum?
On peut trouver d’autres informations sur l’Open Forum sur www.csoeffectiveness.org qui est le principal canal d’informations sur le Forum. Toutes les informations concernant l’Open Forum, notamment les dernières nouvelles, les ressources, les rapports et les résultats de toutes les consultations et de tous les échanges entre les parties prenantes seront postées sur ce site.

What is the Open Forum for CSO Development Effectiveness?
The Open Forum for CSO Development Effectiveness is an international CSOdriven process towards defining a global development effectiveness framework for CSOs. To this end, it will bring together, between mid-2009 and mid-2011, CSOs and other development actors, including governments and official donors, in consultations and multi-stakeholder dialogues at country, regional and international levels.

What are the objectives of the Open Forum?
The Open Forum will facilitate a global consultation and multi-stakeholder dialogue process at country, regional, and international level to

1. enable CSOs to reach consensus on a global CSO development effectiveness framework, to include a set of principles, indicators, implementation guidelines, good practices for accountability mechanisms and minimum standards for enabling conditions.
2. provide a learning space, based on mutual trust, where CSOs can discuss issues and challenges relevant to their work and relationships as development actors.
3. build understanding and support among official donors, governments and possibly other development stakeholders for an enabling environment for CSOs.

Who is involved in the Open Forum?
A Global Facilitation Group (GFG) of 25 member CSOs acts as governance body, providing leadership to and representing the Open Forum. The GFG meets regularly to monitor and draw lessons from the consultations and multistakeholder dialogues, and to set directions for the future agenda. See annex 3 for a list of members.

The GFG has delegated the day-to-day work on the Open Forum to a Consortium of six supporting CSOs (see annex 2).

What is the purpose of this toolkit?
This toolkit is a resource to support the Open Forum’s consultations. It should nform discussions on CSO development effectiveness and guide contributions of CSOs operating at local, country, regional and international levels, North and South, as well as globally, towards defining the elements for a global development effectiveness framework.

Who is this toolkit for?
The toolkit is targeted at:

• CSO networks and platforms tasked with facilitating national discussions on CSO development effectiveness.
• CSOs participating in national, regional or thematic/sectoral consultations on CSO development effectiveness.
• CSOs participating in the Open Forum’s Global Assemblies.
• Other development actors participating in the consultations.

How can it be used?

• To provide essential background information: Sections 1 and 2 provide essential background information on the Open Forum and the consultation process, including information on parallel donor-led processes and other CSO focused initiatives. These sections are primarily aimed at participants in consultations, but should also underpin the work of organisers and facilitators of consultations.
• To inform and guide the discussion: Section 3 provides an exploration of key issues in CSO development effectiveness and poses some fundamental questions in order to stimulate and guide the discussion.
• To set up, structure, run and record consultation workshops: Section 4 is primarily directed at consultation organisers and facilitators, mostly from national CSO platforms and networks. It includes useful ideas, recommendations and tools to assist them in setting up, structuring, running and recording the outcomes of national consultation workshops. In annex 1, a template for recording the outcomes of consultation workshops is provided.

Where can I find more information on the Open Forum?
Visit www.cso-effectiveness.org, the main communication channel of the Open Forum. All information pertaining to the Open Forum including updates, resources, reports, and the outcomes of all consultations and multi-stakeholder dialogues will be posted on this website.

Aid and Budget Transparency in Mozambique¹

Transparent budget processes are critical in democratic societies and citizens have the right to know where and how their resources are being invested. In Mozambique, where nearly half of the budget is financed by external aid, aid transparency becomes an important factor in supporting this democratic process. This short study looks at some of the constraints faced by governments (in preparing and implementing the budget), by the parliament (in their oversight role) and by civil society (in monitoring the budget process) related to lack of transparency of aid and the budget.

Aid transparency

External donors contributed some US$1.6 billion in aid to the Government of Mozambique in 2009. These donors have all committed to making aid more effective by adhering to the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) and to the Accra Agenda for Action (2008). However information about how much money is available, how it is being spent and what are the results of that aid are still poor.

Mozambique has made some progress in recording information about aid flows through the establishment of an online database called ODAMOZ (www.odamoz.org.mz) where donors record regularly how much money they have committed to spend or have spent on individual projects. This database however has been undermined by two things. Firstly, not all of the data is uniformly or correctly entered, making the picture inaccurate and secondly, the database is not yet linked to the government electronic state financial administration system (E-SISTAFE). This latter problem however should be addressed with the launch of the new version of ODAMOZ in May 2010.

Poor information affects in particular the health sector where aid is extremely fragmented in different projects. It is hard to budget without a clear idea of how much money will be available and aid commitments are not always delivered upon. The Global Fund, which is the largest donor to the health sector, in 2007 for example only disbursed 54% of its aid during the last month of the year, making it impossible to spend in that year. The United Nations practice of designing transversal programmes in various sectors, including health, makes it hard for the Ministry to know how much money is available.

When aid is reflected in the budget and in national financial management systems, it is easier to plan for and monitor. Yet nearly half of all aid money coming to the government does not use government budgetary execution, reporting or procurement procedures and two-thirds does not use government audit procedures. This makes it all but impossible for the government, parliament or civil society to monitor clearly how this money is being spent. The United States was the largest donor to Mozambique in 2009 but not one dollar of this money was channelled through Mozambican systems. The African Development Bank, the World Bank and Portugal also bypass national systems to a considerable extent.

Finally lack of predictability about aid in the future makes budgetary planning difficult. The only two donors to have rolling future commitments to Mozambique are the British and Dutch governments.

Budget transparency

The government has made efforts to improve the public financial management system through the introduction of the Single Treasury Account, but the planning and monitoring of the budget still lacks sufficient parliamentary and citizen engagement and oversight for a democratic country. As one interviewee said "the budget process is exclusively the governments and others hardly take advantage of the windows of opportunity for participation." While some of the explanation for this can be attributed to lack of capacity on the part of for example parliamentarians and civil society organisations, there are still transparency gaps which need to be improved.

The budget planning process is hindered by the fact that the budget is delinked from the planning process (Economic and Social Plan) and is not based on the budgetary ceilings that are defined in the Medium Term Expenditure Framework.

The key document for budgetary reporting is the State General Account; however a key limitation is that there is nearly a two year delay in publishing this report. Legally this report should be presented to the parliament within 8 months, which does not happen. And while it is shared with the donors, it is not made available in sufficient time to the public. The Administrative Court has recommended that a number of inconsistencies and opaque areas (e.g transfers to public companies, sectoral own revenue) in the report are clarified but these issues have still not been addressed. The Administrative Court have recently committed to making this report available in a simplified version of the general public which would be an improvement.

At the local level, the problem of lack of access to information is particularly acute, where interviewees cited a number of problems they encountered including intimidation and lack of collaboration of local authorities, lack of publication of information about local taxes and public officials reluctant to share information.

The weight of aid in the budget contributes to the fact that there is more energy invested in the government - donor joint review process, where results are measured against donor agreed performance frameworks, than in facilitating parliamentary or citizen oversight.

Key recommendations:

The study recommends that a number of actions be taken by the government, parliament, donors and civil society to improve the budget process through increased transparency. Donors need to provide more timely information about predictable aid and channel more of their aid through government systems. The government should publish revenue reports and make the Economic and Social Plans the basis of the State Budget which should in turn be clearly linked to the mediumterm expenditure framework.

Civil society and the parliament both need to increase their monitoring and oversight role. Parliamentarians need to take a more proactive role in demanding accountability and transparency from the government and donors, and in demanding transparency and effectiveness in the districts that they are linked to. Civil society organisations could increase their capacity to engage in budget monitoring by focusing on a few strategic areas.

1. This is a summary of a study commissioned by the Informal Governance Group (a group of international NGOs working on governance and aid effectiveness issues in Mozambique) and the Alliance 2015

Observatoire mondial sur la société de l'information (OMSI) 2009 est le troisième d’une série de rapports annuels qui contiennent une analyse critique de l’état de la société de l’information du point de vue des organisations de la société civile dans le monde.

OMSI vise trois objectifs interdépendants:

• Faire le point sur les politiques de technologies de l’information et de la communication (TIC) au niveau local et mondial
• Encourager un débat critique
• Renforcer le réseautage et le plaidoyer pour une société de l’information juste et inclusive.

Chaque année, le rapport privilégie un thème. OMSI 2009 s’intéresse plus particulièrement à « l’accès à l’information et au savoir en ligne pour faire avancer les droits humains et la démocratie ». Il contient plusieurs rapports thématiques sur des questions essentielles dans le domaine, ainsi qu’un aperçu des institutions et des indicateurs qui permettent de rendre compte de l’accès à l’information et au savoir. Le rapport contient cette année une nouvelle section qui présente une cartographique visuelle des droits et des crises politiques au niveau mondial.

Par ailleurs, 48 rapports de pays analysent la situation de l’accès à l’information et au savoir en ligne dans des pays aussi différents que la République démocratique du Congo, le Mexique, la Suisse et le Kazakhstan, alors que six aperçus régionaux présentent une vue d’ensemble des tendances régionales.

OMSI est une initiative conjointe de l’Association pour le progrès des communications (APC) et le Humanist Institute for Cooperation with Developing Countries (Hivos).

UNECA presentation at dialogue of the executive secretaries of the Regional Commissions with ECOSOC

The achievement of gender equality is a sine qua non to the achievement of all the Millennium Development Goals. The existence of MDG 3 on Gender Equality notwithstanding, the success of poverty reduction, universal basic education, child health, maternal health, the eradication of diseases such as HIV/AIDS, environmental sustainability and global partnerships depend on the achievement of gender equality. Examining the regional perspectives are important within the African context as the 2009 Africa Review of the Beijing Platform for Action reveals both major accomplishments and challenges in this field.

While successes have been identified in the fields of primary education, women’s human rights and political advancements, the Region suffers from limited success rates in efforts to reduce maternal health, women’s participation in conflict prevention and resolution, high rates of violence against women and girls, limited access to productive resources and continued negative stereotypical tendencies towards women. In the light of evidenced-based research which demonstrates positive linkages between gender empowerment measures and economic growth, issues of gender equality and the empowerment of women must be given the needed prominence to make this possible.

The development of an index that best suits the needs and aspirations of the continent is timely as the region takes stock of progress in gender equality through the accountability processes of ICPD +15 and Beijing +15 reviews of 2009. The African Women's Report (AWR) is also being launched at a time when the world observes 30 years of existence and implementation of the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).

The core objective of the New Partnership for Africa's Development is to underscore the importance of Africa's lead role and ownership in finding solutions to problems affecting the continent. The gathering of information and data is vital to achieving this goal.

Premised on the absence or inadequacy of data on issues pertaining to the legal, social, economic and political fields, the AWR has demonstrated and indeed affirmed the need for African countries to place statistical development, especially the gathering of gender statistics on the front burner of development efforts. Such steps will provide early warning signs of gaps in policy design and implementation in country efforts to meet goals and targets set in the area of gender equality under international, regional and sub regional frameworks.

Through the prism of the limited data that was made available for the report, a diagnosis of continuing gender inequality in the aforementioned fields has nevertheless been made.

The report highlights difficulties that countries are facing with respect to the full realisation of women's rights due, among other things, to the persistence of negative cultural and religious beliefs and attitudes towards women. High Maternal Mortality Rates as highlighted during the ICPD and Beijing +15 regional reviews of October and November 2009 and further established in the AWR is an issue of catastrophic concern.

The AWR also demonstrates the different and changing dimensions of gender inequality being experienced in some countries, especially with respect to child health where there are increasing signs of male stunting, malnutrition and school drop out rates. These outcomes are not an indication of the need to reduce investments in affirmative action in favour of the girl child. They rather demonstrate lack of precise and targeted planning and implementation using tools such as disaggregated data.

xviii African Women's Report 2009 Measuring Gender Inequalities in Africa This edition of the AWR is technical in nature, given that it is based on the use of a technical tool, the African Gender and Development Index and thus makes it distinguishable from previous flagship reports of the African Centre for Gender and Social Development. The report in its present form reaches out to a wide range of users such as politicians, technocrats, civil society organizations, academia, researchers and development agencies. It is with a view to ensuring that the report can be used and understood by an even wider audience that the UNECA has produced the accompanying Synopsis.

It is the hope of the UNECA that the report will be used as a resource for change, knowledge building, information sharing and policy formulation in Africa.

The last two decades have shown that it is possible to defeat the scourge of poverty. Progress has not been uniform across countries, and there have been setbacks and disappointments. But overall, the rate of progress in reducing poverty and in increasing access to basic health, education, water, and other essential services is unparalleled in many countries’ histories.

The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) have provided an important motivational force and measuring rod for this progress. They were deliberately ambitious, and their achievement would require an unprecedented pace of progress in most countries. The fact that many countries are on track to achieve a significant number of the goals will transform the quality of life for hundreds of millions of people, and should be a sign of hope and a spur to action in others.

This summary is part of initial findings from an ongoing review of development progress, which will include a set of ‘MDG indicators to construct league tables’ highlighting progress on these indicators. The review will generate comparative analysis that illustrates relative and absolute progress at national, sub-national and regional levels. In addition, a number of analytical case studies will provide a deeper understanding of the nature of progress and its contributing factors.

The analysis is based on the MDG database, with the exception of income poverty data for Africa, which are based on the ReSAKSS database. The data on equity – the distribution of progress within a country – are based on household Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) and Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys (MICS). Two measures are used to evaluate progress: absolute and relative. Both measures are needed to tell the full story of progress, particularly in low-income countries. Where the available data permit, countries have been compared over the same time period against average annual rates of progress, irrespective of population size.

This summary focuses on progress towards three MDGs and some of the factors contributing to that progress: Goal 1 (eradicating extreme poverty and hunger); Goal 4 (reducing child mortality); and Goal 5 (improving maternal health). Goals 4 and 5 are seen as having a critical role to play in getting all MDGs on track and have been identified as priorities for discussion at the G8 and G20 summits in June 2010.

Most countries are making progress on most of the key MDG indicators. Since the MDG clock began ticking towards 2015, the proportion of people living in extreme poverty fell from an estimated 1.8 billion in 1990 to 1.4 billion in 2005 (UN, 2009). While the economic situation for many millions of people remains precarious, the direction is unambiguously positive. Equally, the share of children in primary school in low- and middle-income countries has risen from just over 70% to well over 80%. Ninety-five per cent of countries are making progress in reducing child mortality, which overall fell from 101 to 69 per 1000 live births between 1990 and 20071. And, despite wide variation in progress on maternal mortality, access to maternal health services has increased in about 80% of countries.

The key message from many years of working towards the MDGs is that progress is possible. In every aspect of development – even in the least successful of the MDGs reviewed here, on maternal health (Goal 5) – a significant number of countries have made real achievements. Although these statistics are encouraging, the challenge for the remaining five years and beyond is to learn from, and build upon, progress made.

Poor transport networks are a huge obstacle to economic growth in Tanzania. To address this, significant money is allocated in the budget to infrastructure development. In the just-unveiled budget for 2010/11, it will receive 1.5 trillion shillings. This is about 13 percent of the entire budget, and 37 percent more than the 1.1 trillion shillings allocated in 2009/10. A good part of these resources go to road works. But how well is this money managed?

Recently the Controller and Auditor General (CAG) released the first value for money (performance) audit of road works in Tanzania, in which 10 major road projects under TANROADS’ management were audited. The audit assesses the effectiveness of the government’s systems to manage road works. This brief summarises the findings of the audit and presents the recommendations that the Controller and Auditor General has put forward to correct identified problems.

The audit concludes that the management system for road works of the Ministry of Infrastructure Development/Tanzania Roads Agency (MOID/TANROADS) does not do well in ensuring the economy, efficiency and effectiveness of road works. This leads to poor quality, delays, cost overruns and above all reduced value for money from the resources provided by tax payers. The Auditor General’s report suggests ways to better ensure that the large budgets allocated to roads will be well spent.

Dans un mémo rendu public mercredi 23 juin à Bunia, la Société civile de l’Ituri demande au président Joseph Kabila de ne pas cautionner le nouveau contrat agréé le 2 juin par le gouvernement congolais en faveur de la compagnie pétrolière Caprikat. Ce contrat octroie à cette entreprise l’exploitation des blocs pétroliers 1 et 2 du Graben Albertine.

Selon le président de la société civile de l’Ituri, ces deux blocs font l’objet d’un contentieux non encore résolus par le gouvernement entre les compagnies pétrolières Tullow Oil et Divine Inspiration.

Le mémo indique la population de l’Ituri ne cèdera pas à l’exécution de ce «contrat porteur des magouilles perpétrées par certains membres du gouvernement imbus d’intérêt égoïste».

Le président de la société civile de l’Ituri appelle Caprikat à se retirer de ces réserves pétrolières querellées parce que les contrats qui lie le gouvernement aux parties en conflit (Tullow Oil et Divine Inspiration) ne sont pas encore résiliés.

Participants at the Annual Conference on African Women in Politics held on the 7^th – 9^th June 2010, organized by the African Women’s Development and Communication Network (FEMNET) have called on governments to, among other things, strengthen legal and policy frameworks in their countries by aligning them with international and regional principles and standards of democracy in particular those supporting equal participation and representation of men and women in political leadership.

Communiqué from the Annual Conference on Women in Political Leadership in Africa

We, the participants gathered in Lusaka, Zambia on the occasion of the Annual Conference on African Women in Politics held on the 7^th – 9^th June 2010, organized by the African Women’s Development and Communication Network (FEMNET) in collaboration with the Zambia Association for Research and Development (ZARD), the Zambia Non – Governmental Coordinating Council (NGOCC) and the Zambia National Women’s Lobby;

Having come together in the spirit of sisterhood and guided by our common agenda of promoting respect, protection and fulfilment of women’s rights and women’s empowerment as essential elements for the achievement of sustainable development in Africa;

Recognizing that the leaders of our countries represented at the Conference namely Botswana, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mauritius, Malawi, Namibia, Tanzania, Uganda, Sudan, Zambia and South Africa have at the international, regional and national levels made various commitments to promote women’s rights and in particular the right to equal participation and representation of men and women in leadership and decision making at all levels;

And taking cognisance of the fact that by making these commitments through the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, the Covenant for the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), and the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights and by endorsing the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (BPfA) of 1995 and the 2000 Millennium Declaration and Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) the state parties have the primary responsibility to ensure the fulfilment of all the rights entrenched therein;

Appreciating that the African Union as the main standard setting organ on the Continent has in the last 10 years taken leadership through its supreme body the Africa Union Heads of states and government Summit to adopt two key human rights instruments namely the Protocol to the Africa Charter on Human and People’s Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, 2003 (the Protocol on Women’s Rights) and the Africa Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, 2007 (Democracy Charter) that require member states once they become party thereto to take measures and actions to promote the achievement of gender parity in leadership and decision making at all levels;

Further acknowledging with appreciation that many African countries have taken a number of commendable steps, measures and actions at the national and local levels to implement some of these commitments that have led to increased numbers of women in national parliaments and local government councils and several occupying key political leadership position;

Concerned that half of the countries represented at the Annual Conference have not ratified the Protocol on Women’s Rights which specifically requires state parties in Article 2 (d) to combat all forms of discrimination against women that hinder or obstruct their full and equal participation by taking corrective and positive actions in those areas where discrimination against women in law and in fact continues to exist;

Noting with concern that despite of the measures and actions taken to promote gender equality and women empowerment none of the countries represented at the Annual Conference has achieved gender parity in decision making structures and the key democratic institutions like parliaments at national and sub- regional levels and neither at the local government or administrative levels;

Greatly concerned that the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance which sets out standards for the promotion, nurturing, strengthening and consolidation of democracy and good governance in Africa has not come into force more three years since its adoption in January 2007 and more importantly noting that if the Democracy Charter was to be fully enforced by all African countries it will greatly contribute to achieving the objectives and principles of the Constitutive Act of the African Union particularly Articles 3 and 4 which emphasize the significance of good governance, popular and equal participation, the rule of law and human rights;

Determined to promote and strengthen women’s participation in building strong democratic societies in Africa as one of the strategies for reducing wars, civil conflicts and insecurity in Africa;

Convinced of the need to entrench a culture of democracy as a way of life across Africa;

Reaffirming our commitment to work together with African leaders and governments, women in politics, and our partners operating at different levels, to promote the Africa Union standard of gender parity in leadership and decision making structures as an indicator of good governance and sustainable development in Africa;

Urge key actors mentioned below to urgently take the following measures and action:

African Governments


1. Strengthen legal and policy frameworks in their countries by aligning them with international and regional principles and standards of democracy in particular those supporting equal participation and representation of men and women in political leadership.


2. Aim to achieve universal ratification of the Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa and its full implementation by the year 2015 as part of the framework for the achievement of the goals of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action and the global agenda for development articulated in the Millennium Development Goals;


3. Ratify the Africa Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance as a clear demonstration of their political commitment to achieve universal values and principles of democracy, good governance, human rights and the right to development;


4. Ensure that the political environment at local, national, sub-regional and continental levels is conducive for both men and women’s participation in the democratic processes of their countries by promoting a culture of peace and democracy, and securing a level playing field that is free from any form of discrimination, threats and intimidation;


5. Take preventative measures to protect all citizens, most especially women active in mainstream politics from all forms of violence, sexual harassment and intimidation;


6. Apprehend, adjudicate and subject all perpetrators of political related violence to appropriate punishment according to the law including those engaged in violence instigated by state security agents against political opponents;


7. Take corrective measures and affirmative actions to address the gaps and obstacles that hinder women’s equal and full participation in political leadership and decision making focusing attention to the need to overcome social norms, prejudices and practices that negatively portray women in political leadership.


8. Ensure that electoral laws in place make it an obligation for political parties to adhere to the gender parity principle in appointing or electing representatives to the governance bodies and choosing party candidates at different levels, development or review of their party constitution and manifesto, and the equal involvement of members in the party affairs;


9. Promote the use of ICTs to ensure citizens’ access to critical information on the democratization processes in order to facilitate citizens’ involvement and participation giving attention to information needed by different categories of women, the youth and special interest groups.


10. Condemn the killings of innocent civilians, the atrocities and human rights violations in the Darfur Region in Sudan affecting large numbers of innocent women and children and fully support the implementation of the Africa Union decisions made on Darfur particularly the recommendations made by the High Level Panel on Darfur and the AU Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) adopted on the 29^th of October 2009 at its 207th Meeting held in Abuja, Nigeria. The AUPSC decisions specifically focus on the urgent need to restore peace, justice, security and reconciliation among the people of Darfur and Sudan as a whole and the need to ensure that the peace process remains peaceful, inclusive and expeditious.


11. Support the implementation of the Plan of Action submitted by the Chairperson of the AUC to the HOSG Summit in January 2010 in order to achieve the goals of the 2010 Year of Peace, Security and Stability in Africa including building the momentum for achieving concrete results on the security situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Somalia.


12. Continue to put pressure on the government of Zimbabwe to fully implement the Global Partnership Agreement, avoid the use of excessive force and abuse of human rights when dealing with political opponents and above all respect the rights of women and children and punish all those in its ranks that abuse women’s and children’s rights with impunity;

Governments in the SADC and East African Community


13. Take all measures to achieve the universal ratification of the SADC Gender Protocol by the launch of the Africa Women’s Decade which is scheduled to take place in October 2010.


14. Ensure that the countries in the East African Community that have not ratified the Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa rise up to the occasion to accede to this Protocol and embark on its domestication and full implementation for the benefit of all the people within the Community.

Political Party leaders


15. Make amendments to the Party Constitution to incorporate the democratic values and principles particularly those that support equal representation and participation of men and women in the affairs of the party.


16. Ensure that women leaders within the Political party have equal access to the resources of the party.

Women in Politics


17. Recognize the progress made in the last ten years in changing the landscape of leadership in Africa and learn from what has worked for women to deliver on the common agenda of promoting peace, equality and development;


18. Build and strengthen networks within countries and across borders through which peer support and solidarity, learning and experience sharing and access to the much needed resources (including information, material and financial resources) can be enhanced;


19. Speak out strongly against any form of violence in the public or private and that which is instigated by state that is directed to any woman in politics irrespective of her party affiliation.


20. Join hands with African women’s rights activists to celebrate the successes of courageous African women politicians that are currently occupying or held in the past high ranking political positions and effectively used their presence and power to strategically promote the women’s rights agenda of transforming society by dismantling patriarchy, its cultures and practices and all forms of oppression and discrimination against women;


21. Enhance skills and knowledge on the strategic use of the media and ICTs for organizing successful campaigns, maintaining linkage with the people and the issues affecting the constituency, organizing on common issues of interest and concern to women irrespective of party affiliation, and engaging with civil society actors to secure their support and technical input on issues where they have demonstrated expertise and experience.


22. Reach out and encourage young gender – sensitive women with leadership qualities and potential to join political parties and be active in shaping the policies, manifestoes, and practices of the political parties.


23. Recognize the role of civil society and the women’s rights movement in mobilizing women as a constituency to support and propel the 50/50 campaign and take steps to create or strengthen strategic linkages and partnerships with the key actors, networks and organizations;


24. Explore and take advantage of insurance schemes and other social security arrangements available to create personal safety nets as a strategy for minimizing the risk of women taking part in mainstream politics;

Sub – regional and Regional Organizations


25. Profile women in high ranking positions including among others the first female president H.E Ellen Johnson - Sirleaf of Liberia; the former vice president of Uganda Specioza Naigaga Wandira Kazibwe; the Vice president of Zimbabwe Joyce Teuri Ropa,Mujuru; the two former vice presidents of South Africa, Pumzile Mlambo Ncquka and Bleka Mmakota Mbete; the vice president of the Gambia, Isatou Njie-Saidy; and the Vice president of Malawi, Joyce Hilda Banda.


26. Facilitate and remain engaged with the process of establishing an Africa Women’s Fund whose main function will be to provide financial and technical support to women in politics particularly those vying for the presidency to organize their election campaigns, rally the support of women as a strategic constituency for their leadership and develop and build strategic partnerships;

Africa Union Commission


27. Put more pressure on member states to ratify the Protocol on Women’s Rights in order to achieve Universal ratification by the Women’s Day celebration in 2013 as a milestone to mark the end of the first three years of the Africa Women’s Decade (2010 – 2020);


28. Call upon all countries that have or have had elections at any level or a referendum in 2010 which have not ratified the Africa Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance to take all necessary steps to complete the ratification process so that the Africa Democracy Charter comes into force in 2010, the Africa Year of Peace, Security and Stability;


29. In addition to suspension issue sanctions against any country in the Africa Union that illegally changes its political leaders and government and where human rights violations occur as a result of the chaos the AUC should undertake thorough investigations and all members states put pressure on the concerned leaders and government to restore democracy, the rule of law and punish perpetrators of such violence.


30. Accelerate the process of establishing the Africa Court of Justice and Human Rights, streamlining its functions, jurisdiction and engaging its staff team in addition to the Court Judges so that it is operational by the end of 2010 and in position to adjudicate cases where governments fail to make those accountable for human rights violations during elections, referenda and other democratic processes in their countries.

Partners, the private sector and friends of women in Africa


31. Support the efforts of Regional women’s organizations and national initiatives to establish a Special fund for African women aspiring to be candidates in public offices – presidential and parliamentary - to ensure that we deliberately address the resource limitations that female candidates face;


32. Create mechanisms through which younger and upcoming female politicians can benefit from leadership training and mentorship available through government and party training programmes and those provided by regional and national civil society organizations in Africa involved in women’s leadership development.

We strongly believe that people are at the centre of a comprehensive and sustainable social and economic development framework. At the end of the day all activities of the government must create positive impact for people. Since the people comprise heterogeneous groups which face different realities, obstacles, and opportunities, some of these groups show a greater lack of economic and social advancement. Poverty reduction strategies will need to take such differences into consideration to remove obstacles, address needs and expand opportunities for these groups. In this connection, it is essential to identify the excluded, disempowered and vulnerable members of the society. Some of them are women, children, indigenous people, persons with disabilities and other disadvantaged groups. Comprehensive, value-based, and sustainable social and economic development can be achieved only by eliminating discrimination at all levels. Therefore, we are cognizant of the fact that gender based disparities and discrimination have to be eliminated and efforts towards that end must form an integral part of development initiatives.

This government is fully committed to deal with addressing the gender based inequalities and discriminations. It is our strong commitment to build and use women resource of the country, ensure creation of space for them to effectively contribute to the development of Bangladesh and also enjoy the fruits of development. The Constitution of Bangladesh ensures equal rights to all citizens and prohibits discrimination and inequality on the basis of sex and strives to promote social and economic equality. Specifically, with respect to women, Article 28 states "Women shall have equal rights with men in all spheres of state and public life."

In line with the spirit of the constitution we are committed to effectively introduce, implement and strengthen a gender budgeting process. This gender budgeting is expected to create more pro-people budgeting, and to create scope for greater transparency and accountability. This is going to be a long process and will require a change in the mindset of the people associated with making policies, plans, programmes and projects.

As a part of this process to introduce a gender sensitive budget we undertook an initiative last year to disaggregate the budgets and beneficiary data for some ministries on a gender basis. This year we have expanded the exercise and taken up ten ministries to carry out the disaggregation. This new initiative is a starting point for deeper understanding of the challenges to be faced in introducing gender budgeting. This will allow us to identify where and what actions need to be taken. I would also like to take this opportunity to thank all the involved personnel for their unrelenting efforts in formulating this report.

We intend to continue to undertake this exercise for other ministries in the future.

All payments and receipts in the mining and oil and gas sectors starting from 2008 will be published in detail, the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) Coordinating Committee decided in a workshop in Maputo 19-20 May 2010.

Mozambique was admitted as a candidate member of EITI in May 2009 and must submit its first report to the EITI Secretariat in Oslo by 14 May 2001. EITI is based on comparing payments made by mining companies with receipts reported by government, and the committee decided that its first report should be for 2008, which is the most recent year for which data is available. Results will be reported on a reconciliation basis, with each side reporting by company and type of payment, for example: Company: Sasol; Payment type: Company tax; Amount: X.

All companies in the sector are covered, including those doing investigation and prospecting, and both state and private companies are included. All payments and receipts are to be reported, including taxes, contract signing bonuses, contributions by companies to training and capacity building, community funds, and social responsibility payments.

Any discrepancies between company and government reports will be investigated by an independent auditor (so long as the cost of the investigation is not more than the amount in question). Under rules set out by the EITI Secretariat in Oslo, the reconciliation and audit must be done by a recognised international audit firm, chosen by public tender. The Maputo workshop instructed the Committee Secretariat to draft terms of reference for selecting the audit firm.

The Coordinating Committee is headed by the Vice Minister of Mineral Resources, Abdul Razak, and has four representatives each chosen by government, civil society, and the mining companies. It has a five person secretariat, who were hired by open competition and the posts were advertised in the daily Notícias. Candidates were interviewed and chosen by three members of the Committee.

The Executive Secretary is an auditor by profession and before joining EITI was internal auditor of the Nampula roads and bridges company (ECMEP - Empresa de Construção e Manutenção de Estradas e Pontes). One member of the staff is a driver, although the Committee has no car.

The participants in the Maputo workshop came from various places in Mozambique and included representatives from mining and oil and gas companies, ministries, national directorates, universities and civil society organisations. Guests came from East Timor and Liberia, and included the EITI director for English and Lusophone Africa, Eddie Rich.

Objective and scope of the survey

Tanzania’s expansion in primary and secondary education over the past years has been impressive by all standards. However, the question is whether the expansion in education infrastructure and enrolment has been matched with a commensurate increase in resource allocation, that the resources have reached out to service delivery providers, and in particular schools, and to what extent it has been implemented without undue sacrifices on quality of education as measured by students’ performance. To provide some answers to the above, the Government of Tanzania has commissioned a Public Expenditure Tracking Survey (PETS) for Primary and Secondary Education in mainland Tanzania.

This report presents the findings of the survey. The survey covers resource allocation and use for government primary and secondary schools in mainland Tanzania. Through the survey a comprehensive set of data was collected from a sample of regions, councils and schools that gives a fair representation of all regions, councils and schools of mainland Tanzania. The survey data were combined with national records and many of the analyses performed are based on data for all regions, councils and schools. It covers all resource flows and use including central level grants, regional and council level contributions as well as contributions from parents and others. It covers data and analysis of both wage and non-wage spending. Accordingly, it is the most comprehensive education sector tracking survey in Tanzania commissioned to date.

The survey was commissioned by the Ministry of Education and Vocational Training (MoEVT) jointly with the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs (MoFEA), the Prime Minister’s Office – Regional Administration and Local Government (PMO-RALG), the Ministry of Community Development, Gender & Children (MoCDGC), the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), representatives of Civil Society Organisations (CSO) and Development Partners (DP), all represented in a subcommittee chaired by MoEVT overseeing and guiding the implementation of the survey.

The survey was designed to address several issues related to primary and secondary education in mainland Tanzania (ref. terms of reference in Annex I), among others:

• low of public funds; Do funds allocated through state and Local Government Authority (LGA) budgets reach the schools as intended, if not is this due to delays, leakages and/or other factors?
• Equity in distribution; Is there a correlation between allocation/releases and other factors such as school level, district and regional characteristics?
• Private/community/parent contributions; What is the level of community/parent contributions to primary and secondary schools?
• Quality of education; What is the level of dropouts, completion, exam passed and other tests as compared to resource intensity and other characteristics of the district/school?

This report presents findings in relation to all the above issues. The survey has focused on resource flows and use at the national, regional, district and school levels; how the amount of resources allocated is reaching the schools and what they have been used for. It has also included school level contributions from other sources including contributions from parents.

The survey covered allocations and expenditure for primary and secondary education for the fiscal year 2007/2008 (FY2008). To enable analysis of links to education sector performance data, data at national, district and school levels were collected for the school year 2008 and used as an approximation to fiscal year performance.

The Nigeria Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (NEITI) held a stakeholder Road show/Town Hall meeting involving about three hundred stakeholders drawn from across the North-West geo-political Zone in Kaduna on 27^th May 2010. Speakers, discussants and participants were drawn from the NEITI National Stakeholder Working Group (NSWG) and Secretariat, Women Groups, Non-Governmental Organizations, Civil Society Organizations, Government Agencies, Traditional Rulers, Development Partners, the Media and the Extractive Industry Unions.

Participants welcomed the implementation of Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) in Nigeria and commended the Roadshow/Town Hall meeting as an important opportunity for Nigerians to understand and discuss the operations of these sectors and the work of the NEITI.

After extensive discussions and deliberations, consensus was reached on the following:

1. The need for continuous engagements with civil society through roadshows/townhall meetings especially at the grassroots and also the need for NEITI to broaden the composition of the civil society invited to its Roadshow/ Town Hall Meetings.


2. The need for citizens, especially civil society to strategize and engage the ational Assembly to ensure the passage of the Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB) and Freedom of Information Bill (FOI) into law as a matter of urgency.


3. The necessity for the government to begin to diversify and focus on the solid minerals sector especially coal which can contribute to the federation account, and also contribute immensely to the energy needs of the country.


4. The imperative of inter-agency cooperation and collaboration which should be enhanced, including agencies within the extractive industry sector in the area of information sharing.


5. The need for credible electoral reforms to ensure good governance in the extractive industry as well as in all other sectors of the economy.


6. The urgent need to build modern refineries, refurbish existing ones to refine crude oil locally in order to have sufficient petroleum products, reduce costs and generate employment.


7. The initiative to develop a holistic National Strategy to Combat Corruption and the role of NEITI and the Technical Unit on Governance and Anti-Corruption Reforms (TUGAR) in the process was agreed upon.


8. The need for the NEITI communications strategy to be implemented in a form that the message can be easily accessible to all Nigerians. Participants expressed deep satisfaction on the drama sketch as an effective communication strategy.


9. The need for an informed, committed and globalized media that is able to invest and build capacities in specialized areas for improved reporting skills in the respective areas of expertise.


10. NEITI was commended for the initiative, and the hospitality of the government and people of Kaduna State was appreciated.

Todos os pagamentos e recebimentos dos sectores mineiro e petrolífero feitos a partir de 2008 serão publicados em detalhe, conforme decisão do Comité de Coordenação da Iniciativa de Transparência nas Indústrias Extractivas (ITIE) tomada no workshop de Maputo nos dias 19 e 20 de Maio de 2010.

Moçambique foi admitido como país candidato à ITIE em Maio de 2009 e deverá submeter o seu primeiro relatório da ITIE até 14 de Maio de 2011. A ITIE é baseada na comparação entre os pagamentos do sector da indústria extractiva e os recebimentos do Governo. O Comité decidiu que para efeitos do primeiro relatório da ITIE, deverá ser considerado o ano de 2008 por ser o mais recente cujos relatórios de contas estão prontos e disponíveis.

Relativamente aos dados a incluir no relatório e a sua forma de apresentação, foi escolhido o tipo de relatório de reconciliação (comparação/reconciliação dos pagamentos e recebimentos). Sendo que os dados deverão apresentados por empresa e por tipo de pagamento.
Por exemplo: Empresa: Sasol; Tipo de Pagamento: Imposto sobre o Rendimento de Pessoas Colectivas (IRPC); Valor pago: XXX.

Em termos de abrangência, deverão ser abrangidas todas as empresas do sector mineiro e petrolífero (pesquisa, prospecção) – sejam elas públicas ou privadas - que tenham contabilidade organizada. Nesse processo de reporte e reconciliação de pagamento e recebimentos, deverão ser considerados TODOS os pagamentos fiscais e extra-fiscais que as empresas fazem ao Estado Moçambicano (impostos, taxas, bónus de assinatura de contratos, contribuições empresariais para capacitação institucional e contribuições para Fundo Social – caso das petrolíferas, despesas/investimentos em programas de responsabilidade social corporativa, etc.).

Ora, em caso de se encontrarem discrepâncias entre os dados do Governo e das Empresas, o auditor decidirá fazer investigações adicionais, caso a materialidade da discrepância assim o justifique (quer dizer, não deverão merecer investigações as discrepâncias cujos valores forem inferiores aos custos das investigações necessárias).

The Department for International Development has successfully supported developing countries in progress against goals of universal enrolment in primary education and improved educational prospects for girls, according to a report published today by the National Audit Office. However, quality of education and levels of attainment remain low and pupil and teacher absenteeism is still too high. The report concludes that, given tight resources for education in developing countries, a greater emphasis on quality and cost-effectiveness to achieve good value for money is especially important.

DFID's 22 priority countries have made significant progress towards universal enrolment: from typically 50 per cent of children or lower in the mid-1990s to 70 per cent to 90 per cent now. But pupil drop-out is high; typical drop-out rates are 10 per cent to 15 per cent in year one and completion of primary education is low, ranging from 57 per cent of children in Nepal to 17 per cent in Malawi. Because pupil and teacher attendance is poor, there are insufficient teaching hours. And, although pupil attainment has been poorly measured, the information that is available shows low levels of literacy and numeracy.

Since 2001 DFID, along with other donors and recipient governments, has focused on enrolment more than the quality of education. It has started to redress this imbalance but needs to focus more on key factors like teacher and pupil attendance, quality and attainment in its interventions.

Typically, salaries - mostly those of teachers - consume 90 per cent of education budgets in developing countries, yet pay is not routinely monitored. Wage-bills have reached levels which limit the affordability of educational expansion in DFID priority countries. There are other opportunities to work with governments to help raise cost-effectiveness: non-formal education initiatives designed to reach remote or migrant communities have features which could be applied successfully in formal schools.

Amyas Morse, head of the National Audit Office, said today:

"DFID support to primary education in developing countries has helped increase provision, with enrolment levels rising greatly, especially for girls. More emphasis now needs to be placed on quality, attainment and cost-effectiveness and DFID has begun to move in this direction. In my view it needs to do more and to take a tougher, clearer stance on the importance of cost and service performance information, and in particular indicators of education delivery and attainment if it is to make sure that its contributions achieve the maximum good effect."

Notes for Editors

1. The UK is a signatory to ambitious United Nations Development Goals seeking primary education for all by 2015 and reduced illiteracy in developing countries, with all children able to complete a full course of good quality primary schooling.
2. DFID has committed to rising expenditure on education, which is planned to reach at least £1 billion in 2010-11. Some 69 per cent of this is bilateral support (country-to-country) and the rest is channelled through other organisations. DFID is one of the largest funders of primary education, alongside the World Bank and the Netherlands.
3. The NAO looked in detail at DFID's work in four countries: Ghana, Kenya, Ethiopia and India, which is where DFID has major education programmes and which represented, in total, 39 per cent of its bilateral education expenditure in 2007-08.
4. Fourteen of DFID's 22 priority countries are on track to achieve the enrolment goal by 2015 and progress on achieving equal numbers of boys and girls enrolled has been good, with eight countries already having achieved the goal.
5. Press notices and reports are available from the date of publication on the NAO website, which is at www.nao.org.uk. Hard copies can be obtained from The Stationery Office on 0845 702 3474.
6. The Comptroller and Auditor General, Amyas Morse, is the head of the National Audit Office which employs some 900 staff. He and the NAO are totally independent of Government. He certifies the accounts of all Government departments and a wide range of other public sector bodies; and he has statutory authority to report to Parliament on the economy, efficiency and effectiveness with which departments and other bodies have used their resources.

Downloads

• Executive summary (PDF - 157KB)
• Full report (PDF - 658KB)
• National Data on completion, attainment and unit costs (PDF - 183KB)
• Methodology (PDF - 26KB)

The 9^th Commonwealth Women’s Affairs Ministers Meeting (9WAMM) was held in Bridgetown, Barbados on 7-9 June 2010. Delegations from 32 countries attended the Meeting. The Meeting was opened by the Hon Freundel Stuart, Acting Prime Minister of Barbados and chaired by the Hon Stephen Lashley, Minister of Youth, Family and Sports, Barbados.

Background

1. The theme of the conference was “Gender Issues in Economic Crisis, Recovery and Beyond: Women as Agents of Transformation”.


2. Ministers stressed that fifteen years on from the historic adoption of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, and five years following the adoption of the Commonwealth Plan of Action for Gender Equality 2005-2015 (PoA), progress on gender equality has been slow and uneven.


3. Ministers called for greater recognition that women’s involvement is key to sustained economic recovery and the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals.

Gender and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)


4. Ministers recognised that all eight MDGs affect women, with MDGs 3, 5 and 6 being particularly important for gender equality. Commending the global efforts and investments towards the achievement of these goals, they observed, that far too many women, still do not have their basic rights met. They further noted that with only five years left until the 2015 deadline, accelerated progress, increased resources and innovative solutions were necessary for the attainment of the goals.


5. Ministers welcomed some positive trends in relation to Goal 3: promoting gender equality and empowering women. While noting that women’s employment has increased, they were concerned that two-thirds of employed women have vulnerable employment in part-time, seasonal, low paid or unpaid work. In addition, they noted that the gender gap in primary schooling has narrowed by 4 per cent to 95 girls to 100 boys, whereas the gender gaps in primary and secondary education should have been eliminated by 2005. Ministers stressed that gender parity and access to gender sensitive education are key building blocks in the achievement of economic growth and an essential constituent of gender equality.


6. Ministers expressed concern that least progress has been made on Goal 5: improve maternal health. While some improvement has been recorded, they stressed it was unacceptable that half a million women are still allowed to die each year from complications in pregnancy and childbirth. Sixty-six of every hundred such deaths are in the Commonwealth. They reiterated the call of Commonwealth Health Ministers for international support to meet the UN target of 90 per cent of births being attended by skilled health workers by 2015, while also agreeing to work towards increasing the number of births attended by skilled staff in their own countries. They further called for increased measures to reduce brain drain of health workers.


7. On MDG 6, and particularly its focus on HIV/AIDS, Ministers noted that nearly 60 per cent of the people living with the disease were women. They supported the call made by their Health Minister colleagues for concerted global efforts to ensure universal access to HIV prevention, care and treatment as a matter of urgency. They drew attention to MDG Goal 6 and the need to provide social protection to households made vulnerable by HIV and AIDs. They further emphasised the need to recognise and respond to the burden of unpaid care which often falls disproportionately on women and girls.


8. Ministers undertook to articulate, individually and collectively through the Secretary-General, the need for action on all MDGs, particularly those that impact on women directly, at the high level summit on the MDGs which is due to take place at the UN in September 2010. In this regard, they also noted the upcoming meeting between the Prime Minister of Canada and the Secretary-General to convey their concerns to the preparatory processes of the forthcoming G8 and G20 Summits, which will be hosted by Canada.

Women, the Economic Crisis and Recovery


9. Ministers noted the impact of the unprecedented global economic and financial crises on the economies of the Commonwealth. They especially noted that growth in the overwhelming majority of Commonwealth countries had fallen below its potential level with an attendant fall in living standards. They welcomed policy measures undertaken to maintain global demand and stabilise capital markets, especially by member countries of the G20, and stressed the need for continued concerted international action to achieve growth, improve livelihoods and financial stability.


10. Ministers noted that the impact of the economic crisis had been transmitted to poor and vulnerable countries through international trade, foreign direct investment, remittances and aid. In a number of countries, this has manifested itself in increasing fiscal deficits and indebtedness; deteriorating external balances; worsening poverty; and weakening social protection. In these countries, the crisis impacted disproportionately on women through rising unemployment and underemployment; increased care burdens; and greater pressure on survival and livelihoods, with negative long-term impacts for their families and themselves.


11. Ministers called for a more effective response from all actors in the global community to the disproportionately negative impact of the current national and international economic trends on women. They also emphasised that women are agents of change in attaining economic recovery, growth and sustainable development.


12. Ministers welcomed the signs of recovery seen in some countries but stressed that it remained fragile. While growth is expected to recover in 2010, it is still estimated to be significantly below the 2006-08 average. They also noted that poor and vulnerable countries continue to face an unsustainable financing gap, even after the adjustment effected since the onset of the crisis. They voiced concern that the setbacks experienced by women were still not being reversed and noted that cash transfers and other measures for social protection will help buffer the negative impacts.


13. Ministers were apprehensive that further adjustment would result in high social costs. They stressed that women would be disproportionately affected by this, thereby undermining their potential role in recovery and transformation.


14. Ministers called for an inclusive approach to economic recovery that takes into account the interests of all countries and social groupings. They recognised that all governments should continue to play an active role in promoting global recovery and growth with equity, characterised by sustained expansion in GDP and measured by opportunity, capability enhancement, access and security for all.


15. Ministers further called for special attention to the needs of vulnerable, poor and less developed states in relation to efforts at promoting economic recovery and growth.


16. Ministers pointed out that women would require, inter alia, access to productive resources; information and finance; participation in diversification strategies and technology transfer; increased and more efficient spending on education/training, health, nutrition; water and sanitation; strengthened institutional infrastructure to support innovation and enterprise, and effective participation in decision-making in a sustained recovery.

Towards an Inclusive Macro-Economic Framework


17. Ministers recognised that any new macro-economic framework should build on the concept of inclusive sustained growth. They also recognised that such a framework would need to be based on fiscal discipline; fair taxation and redistribution systems; and a competitive exchange rate. It should also take into cognisance social justice, dignity and the centrality of women’s roles in national wealth creation in both paid labour market activity and unpaid labour in the household and community.


18. Ministers called for greater focus on the delivery of an inclusive agenda that addressed identified gaps, such as unpaid work by women; the development of economic and gender indicators which included sustainable livelihoods for the poor, especially women; and effective participation of women in economic and governance systems in the last five years of the implementation of the PoA.


19. Ministers stressed the need for prudent fiscal management and the inclusion of women in the decision-making process as an important factor in ensuring strategic planning, prioritisation and implementation of policies for positive budgetary outcomes for women. Ministers called for urgent action to build capacities in all Ministries for more inclusive budgetary processes that embed gender equality. They also encouraged the good practice of gender auditing for all Ministries to deepen the work on Gender Responsive Budgeting.

Gender Responsive Investment


20. Noting that international investments have begun to improve, Ministers urged the investment community to learn from the mistakes of the recent past and put values of sustainability, transparency, responsibility and ethical finance at the forefront of new efforts to regain the growth momentum around the world. They stressed that short term, unsustainable and unethical risk-taking must now be replaced with sustainable investment and corporate responsibility in the pursuit of rebuilding economies and creating long-term growth and profitability.


21. Ministers also pointed to the need to engender investment at all levels including women’s participation in decision-making, gender perspectives in governance and regulatory practices and instituting the necessary social and environmental safeguards required for gender responsive investment. They cautioned that gender responsive investment should not be seen as a reaction to this latest economic crisis, but as a recognition of the investment community’s obligation to societies, the environment and future generations.


22. Ministers called for more transparency, and effective governance and management of financial investment, in order to promote a market in responsible financial products and services, committing investors and investment stakeholders to values and practices which promote gender responsive investment as a framework for best practice.


23. Ministers recognised the emerging role of innovative development financing, particularly philanthropic capital, where public and private investors leverage their funds to achieve economic, social and environmentally positive returns. They encouraged governments to ensure that principles and modalities governing such blended investment vehicles in order to ensure that women benefit from this promising financial innovation.


24. Ministers also acknowledged the continuing role of micro-finance and credit unions, particularly for many poor women-headed households. They stressed the importance of greater access for women to the full range of financial products.


25. Ministers recognised the potential of blended investment models to create market-based solutions, which are scalable and high-impact and promote public/private partnerships. They also affirmed the role of philanthro-capitalists in charting and financing new gender responsive business models and called for coalitions of social impact investors to build partnerships for creative solutions to education, health, climate change and poverty reduction. They requested the Secretariat to explore how best this can be promoted as models of alternative funding and public, private partnerships.


26. Ministers requested the Secretariat to explore all avenues for supporting women entrepreneurship and accessing external markets and report back at the next Commonwealth National Women’s Machineries Meeting, in the wings of the Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) 2011, with a roadmap on the way forward.

Gender, Economic Crisis and Social Protection


27. Ministers called for a gender analysis of policy frameworks for social protection measures in the formal and informal sectors in the context of the economic downturn and the ensuing global public debt crisis.


28. Ministers recognised the need to adopt measures that protect vulnerable sections of their populations from market volatility, poverty resulting from natural disasters and effects of climate change. They also pointed to the inadequacies of restricting social protection to the management of risk episodes. In this connection, they recommended protection measures designed to make livelihoods resilient, encourage decent working conditions and provide workers, particularly women in the informal sector, with space to organise for greater voice in collective arrangements that govern their lives.


29. Ministers also encouraged states to adopt, ratify and domesticate relevant conventions that provide for appropriate social protection for women in the informal or domestic sector, such as the ILO Convention on Domestic Workers, in order to ensure full protection of the human rights for women categorised as domestic workers in accordance with the ILO definition.


30. Ministers acknowledged that reducing vulnerabilities, increasing livelihood resilience and providing social protection are essential to ensure social justice and human dignity. They called for the provision of gender-responsive, life-cycle based social protection measures.

Peace, Security and Prosperity: Women’s Leadership Roles


31. Ministers noted, with serious concern, women’s minimal leadership role, in the executive and political spheres. They expressed concern that the presence of women in most national parliaments remains at less than 20 per cent in 2010, despite the PoA commitments of governments. They noted that lack of financial resources, disadvantageous electoral systems and exclusion from influential networks continue to be barriers to women’s full participation in politics in many countries. They noted that political processes and practices continue to disadvantage women’s interests, skills and competencies and called for inclusive democracy in the pursuit of good governance.


32. Ministers welcomed the growing recognition that women’s political participation in leadership goes beyond mere numbers to include factors such as quality and effectiveness of representation. At the same time, Ministers recognised the challenges that women Parliamentarians face given that many of their representative bodies have not yet met the targets set out in the Plan of Action. They called on governments to take measures to increase the participation of women in political leadership and request the Commonwealth Secretariat to increase its support to mechanisms that work for the advancement of women in leadership at national and regional levels.


33. Ministers observed that the absence of transparent, participatory democratic processes was a fundamental and recurring cause of community strife, conflict and war. They highlighted the heavy cost of this violence to families and communities. In this connection, they noted the active role of women in curbing community violence and also called for greater involvement of men in combating this violence in the community.


34. Ministers noted that ten years after the adoption of UNSCR 1325, only 19 out of 192 countries have developed national action plans for implementing the resolution. They further noted that, of 300 peace agreements reached since 1989, only 18 refer to sexual and gender-based violence. They called on the Secretariat to assist countries to develop inclusive, gender-sensitive governance models and urged that the Working Group on Gender Peace and Security, approved by Ministers, should be made fully operational.

UN Gender Entity


35. Ministers supported and look forward to the early establishment of the UN Gender Entity and its objectives towards advancing women’s rights and achieving gender equality through strategic partnerships, policy advocacy and programming.

PoA Delivery: Partnership for Synergy and Accountability


36. Ministers welcomed the Draft Final Report of the Mid-Term Review of the Implementation of the Plan of Action (MTR). In accepting the Report, they commended the assistance provided by the Secretariat to countries in regard to the implementation of the MTR. They noted the recommendations of the MTR Report and called for a more strategic and systemic approach to implementation, monitoring and evaluation, including strengthened partnerships with Civil Society.


37. Ministers also noted the need for a more concerted approach to gender mainstreaming within the Secretariat and called for a better resourced Gender Section.


38. Ministers stressed that partnerships, involving governments, civil society and the private sector, had an important role to play in delivering gender equality. In this connection, they welcomed the valuable participation of and statement from the Commonwealth Partners Forum which was held on 4^th and 5^th June at the same venue. In particular they noted their recommendations related to gender-responsive economic reforms; violence against women and girls; HIV/AIDs; maternal mortality and reproductive health; education; political participation and leadership; and peace and security.

Senior Officials Meeting


39. Ministers received a report from Senior Officials. They endorsed the recommendations of Senior Officials on the future work of the Secretariat under the three strategic pillars of economic, social and political development. In addition, they affirmed their commitment to the concerted effort required to meet the specific objectives of the PoA and urged members for increased commitment.


40. Ministers thanked the Government of Barbados for the excellent arrangements made for the meeting.

Based on a review of 50 country studies, this Assessment finds that the resources and know-how necessary to achieve the MDGs exist. Acceleration of progress over the next five years will need to focus on continuing proven strategies, policies and interventions and making a radical break with those that do not work.

There have been noticeable reductions in poverty globally. Significant improvements have been made in enrolment and gender parity in schools. Progress is evident in reducing child and maternal mortality; increasing HIV treatments and ensuring environmental sustainability. While there are welcome developments in the global partnership, where some countries have met their commitments, others can do more.

At the same time that the share of poor people is declining, the absolute number of the poor in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa is increasing. Countries that achieved rapid reductions in income poverty are not necessarily making the same progress in gender equality and environmental sustainability. Lack of progress in reducing HIV is curtailing improvements in both maternal and child mortality. Moreover, attention to the quality of education and health services may have suffered in the rush to extend coverage.

MDG progress is also threatened by the combination of high food prices and the impact of the international Financial and economic crisis. Economic growth declined in many countries, along with a reduction in foreign direct investment, remittances, as well as a fall in exports and tourist numbers, which led to significant job losses. Sustained poverty and hunger reduction is at risk because of vulnerability to climate change, particularly in the area of agricultural production. Weak institutional capacity in conflict and post-conflict environments slows MDG progress. Rapid urbanization and growth in slum dwellings are putting pressure on social services.

Key messages

This Assessment notes that there are important synergies among the MDGs - acceleration in one goal often speeds up progress in others. In households where women are illiterate, child mortality is higher, implying the links between education, the empowerment of women and the health of children. Given these synergistic and multiplier effects, all the goals need to be given equal attention and achieved simultaneously. This requires multi-sectoral approaches and coordination among various implementing agencies.

Policy commitments determine the success of the MDGs. Locally developed strategies, based on national consultation and participation through representative political structures, accountable and capacitated institutions and adequately incentivized public servants are the key to effective implementation of MDG strategies and policies. During conflict, non-state actors are better placed to provide social services. Building institutional capacities and restoring core government functions are needed in post-conflict situations.

Rapid poverty and hunger reduction is a result of high per capita growth driven by agricultural productivity, employment creation and equitable distribution of income, assets and opportunities. Supporting agriculture through farm input provision increases production and food security. Structural economic change is driven by public investments in infrastructure, transfer and diffusion of technology and systematic allocation of credit for industrial development. A trade regime that does not harm local productive capacity is required. Expansionary macroeconomic policies, focused on real output and employment targets, are needed to crowd-in the private sector.

Rapid improvements can be made when supply-side investments in education, health, water and sanitation are supported by demand-side policies, mainly the elimination of user charges. Abolishing school fees can lead to substantial increases in school enrolment. Investments in skilled health workers, particularly birth attendants, reduce maternal and child mortality. Free access to HIV treatment and prevention programmes save lives. Investment in water, sanitation, housing and other infrastructure, particularly in slum areas, leads to progress on a number of MDGs.

Ensuring girls have unfettered access to health, education and productive assets helps progress across the MDGs. Increased female school enrolment is associated with better health and nutritional intake of families. Enhancing reproductive and maternal health contributes across the MDG goals. Equitable provision of land and agricultural inputs significantly increases output and ensures food security. Constitutional and legal reforms enhance women’s empowerment and increase their political participation. Providing infrastructure to households with energy sources and water reduces the burden of domestic activities and frees girls to attend school, engage in self employment or participate in labour markets.

Targeted interventions, including social protection and employment programmes are key to MDG acceleration. Mass immunization and the distribution of bed nets and antiretroviral drugs contribute to saving lives. But targeted and disease-specific interventions must strengthen health systems and not create parallel structures. Social protection and cash transfer programmes provide cost-effective access to health and education services. Public employment programmes reduce poverty and serve as countercyclical policies in times of economies crisis.

Supporting the diversification of livelihoods away from climate-sensitive activities is an essential MDG strategy. Low-carbon activities benefit households through supply of clean energy and employment creation in non-agricultural activities. Traditional energy sources tend to cause indoor air pollution, with serious health impacts, particularly on women and children. Resources to finance adaptation to climate change must be additional to current aid flows.

Domestic resource mobilization is the primary source of sustainable MDG financing. Broadening the tax base and improving tax collection efficiency raises significant resources. But changes in tax structures should not lead to decline in total revenues, as is the case during transition from trade taxes to value added taxes (VAT). Progressive taxes are needed to avoid heavy burdens on goods and services that the poor disproportionately consume. Financial sector policies are needed to increase the pool of domestic savings available to governments and the private sector.

The global partnership needs to make a greater effort at constituting a coherent international enabling environment. Delivering on ODA commitments and improving the predictability, effectiveness, division of labour and modality of disbursement is urgently needed. Budget support is associated with better MDG outcomes. ODA is effective when provided as grants, distributed equitably through multilateral organizations. Action is required to make trade policies beneficial to the least developed countries. Policy coherence is needed so as not to undermine the achievement of the MDGs through contradictory policies.

Taking into account the needs, priorities and opinions of both women and men of the territory, ensuring that both benefit equally from social change and economic growth, and that gender inequalities are eliminated, are all essential for the success of any local economic development (LED) strategy aimed at creating decent work opportunities. However, in societies where women’s participation in public affairs is severely restricted by tradition, economic disadvantage and lower education this is easier said than done.

Obtaining the full participation of women in an LED process will require overcoming deeply entrenched discriminatory attitudes and challenging existing power structures. Where women enjoy relatively equal access to decision-making structures and resources, the LED approach will serve to strengthen their participation in the private sector, paying greater attention to their needs in terms of business development services (BDS), access to financial resources, association-building, knowledge about rights, rules and regulations, etc.

While national policy should provide an enabling environment for gender mainstreaming, it must be accompanied by targeted interventions at the local level. These, if carried out consistently over a certain period of time, generally yield perceptible results.

Objectives of this module
This guide is designed to assist LED practitioners – staff from international organizations, international development agencies and local authorities– in identifying and addressing the sometimes different needs and priorities of women and men, facilitating their full participation at every stage of the LED process, and contributing to gender equality objectives and outcomes.

Using this guide will enable practitioners to:

• understand why gender equality should be pursued at the local level;
• be aware of the barriers to women’s participation that may be encountered; and
• identify and implement strategies for addressing gender concerns throughout the LED process.

Since gender mainstreaming should be context-specific, the recommendations made must be considered as indicative guidelines rather than recipes for action. Under each section, reference is made to tools, further readings and checklists that can be used in project design, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation.

Structure
The first part of this module introduces key concepts, describes the potential role that women and men can play in the local economy, and points out the barriers to women’s representation and participation that need to be overcome. Questions that this guide strives to answer in this section are:

• How are gender equality, gender mainstreaming and gender budgeting defined?
• What is the link between gender equality and decent work?
• Why is gender equality important for local economic development?

The second part recalls the basic characteristics of LED and identifies strategies that have been and can be used to reduce gender gaps and strengthen women’s participation in each of the six phases of the LED process. Questions that this section answers are:

• Which measures can enhance an equal participation of women and men in decisionmaking structures at the local level?
• How can the potential contribution of women and men to the local economy in their different capacities be promoted and strengthened?
• How can local economic development strategies and implementation structures be made gender-responsive?

The module concludes with a precautionary note about the time frame required to achieve gender equality at the local level.

The CoST Working Paper Series¹ is intended to support the rollout of CoST and transparency in the construction sector more generally. This note summarizes the series.

Why worry about the construction sector?

The global construction sector is worth somewhere between US$2 and US$5 trillion per year.² Between 1984 and 2003, government spending accounted for about 78 percent of this investment.³ Recent studies have shown that corruption in public construction is widespread - for instance, it is estimated that corruption costs the infrastructure construction sector somewhere between US$18 and US$66 billion per year.

A significant amount of taxpayer money that is intended for constructing infrastructure is being misappropriated - resulting in at best overpriced, but all too often substandard, nonexistent, or even dangerous infrastructure assets. There is good evidence that poor governance disproportionately affects the poor, as they lack resources for alternatives. Since investment in infrastructure is a critical driver of economic growth; poor governance, mismanagement, and corruption in construction projects can undermine social and economic development outcomes, and serve as a structural brake on sustainable development.

What is the Construction Sector Transparency Initiative?

The Construction Sector Transparency Initiative (CoST) is a multi-stakeholder initiative to increase transparency and accountability in the construction sector.

What does CoST aim to do?

CoST intends to ensure that national governments, affected stakeholders, and the wider public get what they pay for in public construction projects.

CoST aims to increase value for money by increasing transparency

Greater transparency-through greater disclosure of project information - will yield benefits to government, industry, civil society, and ordinary citizens. Enhanced transparency will deter a range of poor practices, some of which may be the result of corrupt activity.

How will CoST increase transparency?

CoST countries will publish a set of “material project information” (MPI) about public construction projects. Since disclosing data on its own is unlikely to achieve greater transparency, the CoST process also involves:

• Engaging a third party overseer to evaluate the publication of MPI, and (in select cases) to make sure the MPI is an accurate reflection of the “situation on the ground”
• Supporting community oversight so communities are able to effectively monitor resource expenditure on public construction projects in their communities.

What is the “Working Paper Series”?

The four papers that make up the Working Paper Series are intended to support improved governance in construction and the rollout of the CoST initiative by:

• Providing a foundation paper to better inform governments, stakeholders, and citizens think about the linkages between poor governance, corruption, and transparency in the construction sector (Working Paper 1)
• Guiding governments on the critical information on public construction projects to publish in order to increase transparency (Working Paper 2)
• Guiding governments and stakeholders on how to use independent oversight to increase transparency and value for money in public construction projects (Working Paper 3)
• Guiding those who plan and benefit from public construction projects on how to use community monitoring to increase transparency and value for money in public construction projects (Working Paper 4).

What stages of the construction cycle are vulnerable to governance failures?

Governance failures (including corruption) in construction happen at all stages of the project cycle (see Working Paper 1). Yet this Working Paper Series, and the CoST initiative, focus on the period between the award of the construction contract award the final handover of the project.

Why do the Working Papers focus on “project implementation”?

Of course, corruption and inefficiency can be problems at all stages of the construction project cycle - design, procurement, and implementation. However, there is already a wealth of information on good procurement practices, while there is relatively little that is focused on improving value for money and reducing corruption during implementation. Furthermore, stakeholders may be more motivated and better able to reduce poor practices during project implementation, as it is during this stage that poor practices begin to physically “show” (in the form of poor construction materials, practices, or management resulting in poorly built or incomplete - or, at the extreme, non-existent-infrastructure).

Focusing on increasing transparency and oversight during implementation may not only uncover existing poor practices, but also deter future corruption by reducing the scope for contractors to cut costs in the implementation stage to fund bribes in the procurement stage.

1. The CoST Working Paper Series forms part of a study commissioned by the World Bank, and carried out by Castalia (www.castalia.fr) and GHK (www.ghkint.com).
2. Estimates from presentations by Pootman, C and Samiullah, Y (2009) at the “Opening Sessions Presentation”, Construction Sector Transparency Initiative International Advisory Group (IAG) meeting, 29 - 31 January 2009, Manila, Republi of the Philippines.
3. Kenny, C (2007) “Construction, Corruption, and Developing Countries” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4271, Washington, DC: The World Bank.

Lagos: The Nigerian Procurement Observatory is now live, online real time. The Observatory is a procurement monitoring web portal, developed in consultation with many NGO's and development agencies in Nigeria. It provides free online procurement monitoring training, free legal advice for registered journalists and procurement monitors and a mechanism for online collation and analysis of reports of procurement monitoring based on a standard checklist.

The portal, an information sharing platform also has capabilities for mass mailing and hosting sub-sites for stakeholders.  Visit the site now at www.procurementmonitor.org and register for any of these features. The First 50 Journalists, the First 50 NGO and the First 50 Professional body representatives to register on the portal will enjoy free legal advice from a Top Notch Nigerian Procurement law firm on all their procurement related activities via the blog.

For further information or enquiries concerning this program, please contact Seember (08029455583) or Bimpe (08033328096 or 09-2900171). For issues regarding how to use the portal please contact Davies on 07061523072.

Background:

PPDC provided the strongest CSO voice in support of procurement reforms, and secured the inclusion of a mandatory clause for NGO and professional bodies to monitor every public procurement activity carried out at the Federal level of government in Nigeria into the Public Procurement Act 2007.

Following the passage of that law with this sunshine provision, PPDC designed and launched its Procurement Watch (Monitoring) Program, which later gained the support of PACT Nigeria. This program has achieved some milestones, which includes the formation of the National Procurement Watch Platform along with many other CSO actors, the publication of the first guide for to activate and sustain the emergence of empowered citizenship participation, through which good governance, sustainable development and a life of dignity can be attained by all.

The program further trained the first set of citizens procurement monitors under the Public Procurement Act 2007 and through the platform, produced a Code of Conduct for civil society procurement observers, which has been approved and published by the Bureau for Public Procurement the federal procurement regulatory body in Nigeria. The program has also designed and produced a standard checklist for procurement observation reports.

With support from UNDEF, PPDC has deployed this independent national monitoring mechanism to collate, analyze and disseminate procurement monitoring reports. This ICT based PROCUREMENT OBSERVATORY is being deployed to provide virtual access for submission of monitoring reports by professional body and CSO representatives based on simplified standard checklists, support automated analysis and dissemination of such reports, provide daily legal advice for investigative journalists and monitors/observers through blogs and deploy a self tutoring mechanism for improving capacity of stakeholders. It also has a virtual library on Nigerian procurement issues. www.procurementmonitor.org.

Another aspect of this program is targeted at CSOs, professional bodies, trade associations and relevant committees of the National Assembly. It is deploying TOT and direct procurement monitoring trainings which seek to improve skills for procurement monitoring, oversight and introduce stakeholders to use of ICT and other tools, and creates opportunity and capacity for stakeholders to replicate trainings and increase the number of trained procurement monitors.

The Nigerian Procurement Monitoring Project is building relevant partnerships with international development partners, media outlets, and the legislature and government institutions to cooperate in the implementation of the Public Procurement Act, it is intended to improve citizens monitoring, support improved executive and legislative oversight and evolve effective, transparent and accountable procurement process. In particular, this will improve collaboration within CSOs and with legislative committees. The project carries out annual assessment of levels of implementation of the Public Procurement Act 2007, publishes reports identifying challenges and providing recommendations for improvements.

Manila: Efficient and effective operation of public school systems is a challenge for governments around the world. Many struggle to establish transparent performance monitoring systems that allow citizens to hold school officials and governments accountable for performance. The public school system in the Philippines is no exception.

The World Bank Institute's (WBI's) long-time partner, the Affiliated Network for Social Accountability in East Asia and the Pacific (ANSA-EAP) recently launched the "Checkmyschool.org" project to promote citizen participation in monitoring school performance. By simply clicking on a particular school on the GPS (Global Positioning System) map, citizens can obtain information about specific aspects of school performance - including number of teachers, condition of facilities, student achievements, status of nutritional health programs, and more.

The information is fed into the geo-referencing database by local school monitors who send in real-time data via their cell phones using SMS text messaging.  The initiative is a partnership of ANSA-EAP, the Filippino Ministry of Education, and Google.

Some 8,000 public schools in the Philippines are currently on the site, and the number is expected to grow quickly in the coming months.  

*  For more information on WBI's work on Social Accountability and its partnership with ANSA East Asia Pacific, go here Or contact: Mary McNeil (mmcneil@worldbank.org)

The workshop, which was organized by Civil Society Legislative Advocacy Centre (CISLAC) in collaboration with Bureau of Public Procurement (BPP), had a consortium of CSOs and other Non-State Actors (NSAs) in attendance.  Also in attendance are the Executive Director of CISLAC Auwal Musa Rafsanjani and the Director General, BPP Engr. Ezeh Emeka represented by Mohammed Gambo Mu’azu, Deputy Director Training at BPP. 57 Participants attended the training with three key paper presentations.

The objectives of the workshop are as follows:

1. To increase partnerships between CSOs, the Bureau and government procurement/ oversight institutions for a transparent and effective procurement process.
2. To increase awareness and improve the general knowledge and understanding of Public Procurement Act 2007.
3. To improve the practice and implementation of the procurement system at the state level in Nigeria via advocacy effort during programme implementation.
4. To understand and enhance the skill on the use of the checklist in monitoring and observation for public procurement implementation.
5. To increase the numbers of CSOs and professional bodies that effectively participate in monitoring of government procurement actions.

After deliberation and brainstorming, the participants therefore observed the followings:

1. That the promulgation of the Public Procurement Act (PPA) 2007 was timely and very much in order in view of the extent to which corruption has permeated the fabrics of the Nigeria nation.
2. That there is very low awareness of this Public Procurement Act 2007 and its intendment among Nigerians.
3. That the decisions of the BPP and CISLAC in increasing awareness on the Public Procurement Act 2007 is very much in order.
4. That many public office holders in Nigeria are used to not following the procurement process in awarding contracts. Since people are always reluctant to change; it means a lot of work has to be done to make these people cum officials comply with the provisions of the Public Procurement Act 2007.
5. That it is risky to blow whistles on corrupt practices in Nigeria as perpetrators may go to any length to keep whistle blowers quiet.
6. That absence of information democratic laws such as Freedom of Information (FOI) is protective of corruption and corrupt officers.
7. That Lip services are being paid to announce effort at combating corruption and at ensuring that due process is followed in awarding contracts.

In view of the foregoing; the workshop recommends as follows:

1. Sensitization, enlightenment and awareness creation be scaled up.
2. That would-be CSOs and monitors be more empowered.
3. That a lot more people need to be trained and educated on the provisions on Public Procurement Act 2007.
4. That those who might have been trained should be further empowered and logistically assisted to spread the knowledge gained among other people.
5. That Effort should be put in place to engage the active commitment of media organizations towards increasing visibility of the PPA at all levels in order to ensure adequate compliance with the Act.
6. That the BPP, CISLAC and CSOs need to collaborate further towards leading the process of establishing and utilizing concerted advocacy, communication and social mobilization strategies for implementing the provisions of the PPA at all levels.
7. That BPP and CISLAC spread enlightenment and awareness creation to more areas of state and local government levels.
8. That this awareness be taken to the local governments.
9. That our judiciary discharge cases more expeditiously especially cases bordering on corruption on procurement and contracts.
10. That the idea of ‘sacred cows’ be done away with in the dispensation of justice in Nigeria.
11. That the BPP should, as a matter of urgency, continue to collaborate with CISLAC and other stakeholders in the domestication of Public Procurement Act 2007 in all states of the Federation.
12. That it is agreed that sustainability of the reforms can only be achieved when the ordinary citizens feel a sense of true ownership and are willing to hold government accountable.
13. That CSOs in Oyo state demand a law on Public Procurement in  order  to  minimize  corruption  on  procurement and contract scam in Oyo state
14. Finally the participants thanked CISLAC and BPP and urged them to continue with this good intervention

Signed by:
Auwal Ibrahim Musa (Rafsanjani)
Executive Director
Civil Society Legislative Advocacy Centre (CISLAC)
Tunde Odunlade
ICBACA

Can mobile phones help bringing primary school teachers and pupils back into the classroom? Teachers absenteeism in Uganda is one of the highest in the world, with obvious implications for the quality of education. With absenteeism rates of 20% - 30% varying per districts, teacher absenteeism costs the Ugandan government US$ 30,000,000m every year for paid services that are not delivered (World Bank, MoES). And if teachers are absent, why attend as a pupil? 27% of Ugandan children are not in school at any given moment, despite free universal education. And it appears pupil drop-out is on the rise. Surprisingly, despite these dramatic figures, no routine data is available on pupil and teacher attendance.

The CU@SCHOOL pilot project by SNV Netherlands Development Organisation in Uganda (www.snvworld.org) uses mobile phones to monitor teacher and pupil attendance and absenteeism in 100 primary schools on a weekly basis. Provided the pilot is successful, which is measured using a randomized control trial methodology, the aim is to scale to 16,000 primary schools country-wide, included in Uganda’s Education Management Information System. Mobile phone coverage is exceptional in Uganda: Almost one out of three people own a phone, and mobile networks reach 90% of Uganda.

How does CU@SCHOOL work? Let us follow the flow of information. Each Friday the 100 head teachers type in attendance figures of boys and girls and of male and female teachers, using a simple form on their mobile phone. At the moment they send the message, the figures are automatically entered in a digital database and no paper forms or separate data entry are needed. The data is visualized (graphs, tables, geographical maps) real-time on the existing computers of district officials for their action. Starting from July 2010, the information is also sent to non state actors at (sub) district level, such as School Management Committees, Parent Teachers Associations, religious and other leaders, and the general public. Information is made available digitally (web, email), by automated SMS, by newspaper print and by local radio. The information will not only inform people about the situation in their school, but also provide suggestions on action Ugandan citizens themselves can take. This is done by giving inspiring examples of how others have managed to improve their school themselves, or how they held their school management or local leadership to account. In this way the project will help people imagine a different and better school than they have always known in their village.

The pilot uses revolutionary open source software called openXdata (www.openxdata.org): any data, anywhere, anytime on any device. Under leadership of Makerere University in Kampala, the software is developed by a consortium and is designed for the African rural context. OpenXdata is user friendly and allows for error-free capture of large datasets and digital photo’s on simple phones. More expensive phones will also support other features such as GPS. Rather than SMS technology, we use GPRS based forms, making it extremely cheap to collect data at a cost of only 1 US dollar for 2,000 messages! So can mobile phones bring teachers and pupils back in the classrooms? First results are hopeful, but we will really find out early 2011, when the pilot is concluded. Teacher and pupil absenteeism is a problem in many countries on our continent, and the CU@SCHOOL concept can be easily adapted to other contexts and replicated elsewhere. More importantly, informing citizens on their situation and providing them with knowledge and inspiration to take action themselves will make the difference. Using mobile phones are an inexpensive means to support such process that can be used in any sector.

In 2009 CU@SCHOOL has been supported by the Flora Family Foundation, while currently the project is assisted by Twaweza (www.twaweza.org). For more information on CU@SCHOOL contact Kees de Graaf of SNV Uganda through www.snvworld.org/en/countries/uganda/contact

.

We, the undersigned African civil society organizations and international organizations with a presence in Africa, call on African governments to make the most of the upcoming review conference of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), which will take place from May 31 to June 11, 2010 in Kampala, Uganda.

The review conference comes at a critical time in the development of the ICC. The court has made important progress since the Rome Statute entered into force in 2002 and is already providing a measure of justice for victims of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. But the court faces important challenges to implementing its mandate successfully. These include challenges in conducting court operations, such as obtaining adequate support to engage in outreach to affected populations. They also include external attacks on the institution, such as those advanced by some African leaders following the ICC arrest warrant for Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir in March 2009.

The review conference offers an exceptional occasion for African governments to help advance the global fight against impunity by restating their commitment to justice for the victims of grave crimes and offering views on the development of international criminal justice and the ICC. In addition to addressing several proposed amendments to the statute - including on the crime of aggression - the conference will have a general debate followed by two days of "stocktaking" of the Rome Statute system. The stocktaking exercise will provide a unique opportunity to provide input that can help to constructively shape accountability efforts domestically and internationally.

The review conference's location in Uganda only adds to its significance, as the event can help forge a stronger link between the ICC and Africa. The review conference will also be an important opportunity for victims and civil society to be heard on the ICC.

This Declaration provides observations and recommendations on the review conference, which is consistent with the African Union's call for attendance and effective participation at the conference (Decision on the Report of the Second Meeting of States Parties to the Rome Statute on the ICC, Assembly/AU/Dec.270(XIV), 2010).  This Declaration focuses on high-level attendance and a high-level declaration, pledging, and the stocktaking exercise at the conference. The Declaration does not discuss proposed amendments under consideration.

I. High-level Attendance and Declaration

High-level attendance by ministers and other senior officials at the review conference - especially during the general debate and the stocktaking exercise - and adoption of a high-level declaration on the conference are two important ways governments can send a strong message of support for accountability for grave crimes in violation of international law.We have heard that a number of African states will have ministerial level participation at the conference, which is very positive and should be encouraged among all African ICC states parties. With regard to a high-level declaration, a draft that underlines core aims of the Rome Statute and commitments of states parties to the court has been prepared and should be available in Kampala for consideration. The adoption of the draft declaration would be a tangible outcome of the conference and a renewed expression of support for the fight against impunity at the highest political level.

II. Pledges

Pledges are a way in which states may commit to undertake specific actions to advance support for the ICC, such as by pledging to adopt ICC implementing legislation by a specific date. Pledges - which can be made by individual states, groups of states, and regional and other groups - are a major, significant initiative around the review conference and an important way to help ensure the conference has impact beyond discussions in Kampala. Pledges should comprise tangible objectives to be attained within a specific time period and should be communicated to the Netherlands and Peru, as focal points on pledges, ideally by May 14. Pledges may be kept confidential until the review conference, although making them public in advance could help encourage pledges by other governments.

For African governments that are not yet parties to the court, a priority pledge is ratification of the Rome Statute by a particular date. As the ICC is a court of last resort, becoming a party to it is an essential way to demonstrate commitment to the fight against impunity. For African governments that are states parties, a priority pledge should be adoption of domestic implementing legislation for the Rome Statute by a particular date. To our knowledge, only five states in Africa - Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Kenya, Senegal and South Africa - have enacted comprehensive ICC implementing legislation. Such legislation makes genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity crimes under domestic law and provides for cooperation with the ICC. (While Uganda's parliament has also adopted such legislation, Uganda's president had not signed the bill into law as of this writing.)

Another important area for pledges is to work toward thetimely establishment of an ICC Liaison Office in Addis Ababa. This office would be an important way to create an avenue for essential discourse and access to the ICC by the African Union and to strengthen cooperation and engagement between the two entities. Work toward conclusion of a memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the AU and the ICC would also be a valuable pledge. MOUs already exist between the court and the United Nations, as well as the European Union, and are under consideration by other regional groups. The conclusion of a memorandum of understanding would be an important way to facilitate cooperation between the AU and ICC and a logical step in line with article 4 of the AU's Constitutive Act, which rejects impunity.

There are many other areas that merit consideration as possible pledges. These include: ratifying the Agreement on Privileges and Immunities by a specific date;building ICC support across ministries, and at regional and international organizations; promoting ratification or the adoption of implementing legislation in other countries; appointing a national ICC focal point or intra-agency task force; contributing to arrest operations and executing warrants; concluding agreements on sentence enforcement, witness relocation and interim release; and actively participating in sessions of the ICC Assembly of States Parties.

III. The Stocktaking Exercise

The stocktaking exercise will focus on four issues that reflect key challenges in bringing to account perpetrators of serious crimes in violation of international law: the impact of justice on victims and affected communities, state cooperation, complementarity, and peace and justice. Substantive and constructive discussions during stocktaking thus have the potential to enhance future accountability efforts. However, thoughtful preparation and participation will be essential: the exercise can only be as valuable as the contributions made to it.

It is crucial that views from Africa be heard in these discussions and we encourage African states to make interventions on relevant stocktaking topics. We also encourage African states to consider resolutions on topics where they are put forward.

As your government prepares for the stocktaking exercise, we would like to draw attention to several issues related to each of the topics that will be considered:

Impact of justice on victims and affected communities

The work of the ICC is at its core about victims who have suffered grave crimes. The ICC has unique elements to help realize victims' rights and expectations for justice, such as victim participation in proceedings and reparations. Hundreds of victims are already participating in situations and cases before the ICC and the victims' trust fund has undertaken projects to assist victims. With the court's first cases focused in Africa, African victims have been the primary beneficiaries to date of the ICC's efforts to promote justice for victims. At the same time, lack of execution of arrest warrants, lengthy proceedings, and limited cases are only a few of the areas where victims have expressed disappointment and frustration with the ICC. A key challenge is ensuring victims have adequate access to information about the court.

The stocktaking session provides an important opportunity for African governments to reflect on the central role of victims in the accountability process and key issues related to victims, such as: the significant advances included in the Rome Statute of the ICC in terms of promoting victims' rights; areas where more work is needed by the ICC, such as strengthening outreach and communications; and observations on best promoting victims' rights in domestic prosecutions for serious crimes. In addition, the draft resolution on victims merits attention as it includes important elements, such as on the need to deliver effective justice to victims and the priority of victims' rights and interests.

Cooperation

The ICC relies on cooperation to fulfill its mandate as the court lacks any police force. Cooperation includes two main components: judicial assistance and logistical support - such as facilitating investigations and witness relocation, and putting in place domestic frameworks that enable effective response to cooperation requests; and strong political support - including mainstreaming support for the court in regional and international organizations. One of the most significant areas of cooperation that relates to both of these components is apprehension of suspects. The ICC cannot bring justice to victims if suspects are not brought to the dock. Notably, the ICC has outstanding arrest warrants in three of the five situations where it is conducting investigations. Some of these warrants have been pending for several years and suspects continue to be involved in committing atrocities against civilians.

The stocktaking session on cooperation provides a valuable opportunity to discuss experiences thus far in addressing cooperation requests or providing political and diplomatic support to the court. Pledges and expressions of support to cooperate with the court and identify ways to strengthen domestic, regional, and international cooperation with the court - including with regard to arrest operations - would also be important. Finally, the session is a good occasion to consider publicly supporting the establishment of a working group by the Assembly of States Parties on cooperation to ensure continued focus on this important issue by states parties.

Complementarity

One of the most important ways to expand the fight against impunity is through complementarity. This principle concerns the role of national courts in assuming their primary responsibility in prosecuting serious crimes. It also touches on efforts to strengthen national courts to make sure they are able and willing to assume their responsibility to prosecute serious crimes. Too many national systems in Africa currently lack the capacity or the will to address serious crimes. The stronger the ability and willingness of national courts to prosecute these crimes, the more the ICC can truly act as a court of last resort.

The stocktaking session on complementarily is a significant opportunity for African governments to discuss how to ensure their national courts take up their responsibilities in investigating and adjudicating Rome Statute crimes. This includes overcoming lack of political will to prosecute, and promoting targeted assistance to enable fair, effective domestic prosecutions, including by enabling proper witness protection, and support for victims. Finally, a resolution on complementarity has been prepared, which discusses the key elements of the principle and merits due consideration.

Peace and Justice

As the ICC conducts its work in different situations where conflict is ongoing, concerns that efforts to achieve peace will be undercut by efforts to ensure justice have consistently arisen. Few deny that peace and justice must go hand in hand in the long-term, but the analysis often becomes more difficult during particular periods of conflict or peace negotiations.

The stocktaking session on peace and justice is an important moment for reflection on identifying ways to pursue peace and justice simultaneously, and to recognize several core principles that are fundamental to state parties' commitment to the ICC in the context of debates on peace and justice. These include that perpetrators of serious crimes should not go unpunished; that the ICC should function as an independent institution; and that accountability for grave crimes is a key way to contribute to sustainable peace, including by promoting the possibility to deter future crimes.

These principles are central to the Rome Statute, and have been consistently supported by African governments since before the ICC came into existence. This is reflected by the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Principles, adopted in 1997, and Dakar Declaration in support of an international criminal court, adopted in 1998.

Organizations supporting this Declaration:

1. Abubu-Dukire (Association for the Rights of the Missing and the Victims of Mass Killings), Bujumbura, Burundi
2. Access to Justice, Lagos, Nigeria
3. Action Against Impunity for Human Rights (ACIDH), Lubumbashi, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)
4. Action of Christian's Activists of Human Rights in Shabunda (ACADHOSHA), South Kivu, DRC
5. Action of the Christians for the Abolition of Torture (ACAT - Burundi), Bujumbura, Burundi
6. Advocates of Public International Law-Uganda (APILU), Kampala, Uganda
7. African Assembly for the Defense of Human Rights (RADDHO), Dakar, Senegal
8. African Assembly for the Defense of Human Rights (RADDHO), Guinea
9. African Association for the Defence of Human Rights (ASADHO), South Kivu, DRC
10. African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, Sudan
11. African Development and Peace Initiative (ADPI), Adjumani, Uganda
12. Amnesty International, Dakar, Senegal
13. Article 19, Nairobi, Kenya
14. Association for Human Rights and the Penitentiary World (ADHUC), Brazzaville, Republic of the Congo
15. Association of the Christians for the Abolition of Torture, Senegal
16. Association of the Shipowners on Lake Kivu (ASSALAK), South Kivu, DRC
17. Association of the Women Lawyers, Bangui, Central African Republic
18. Association of Victims of Crimes and Political Repression in Chad (AVCRP), Chad
19. Association pour la Promotion et la Défense de la Dignité des Victimes, DRC
20. Barefoot Women Solar Engineers Association of Sierra Leone, Freetown, Sierra Leone
21. Burkinabe Coalition for the International Criminal Court (CB/CPI), Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso
22. Burkinabe Movement for Human and Peoples' Rights, Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso
23. Burundi Coalition for the International Criminal Court (ICC-CB), Bujumbura, Burundi
24. Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies (CIHRS), Cairo, Egypt
25. Cameroon Coalition for the International Criminal Court, Douala, Cameroon
26. Campaign for Human Rights in Burundi (CADRHO-BURUNDI), Burundi
27. Capacity Builders, Freetown, Sierra Leone
28. Center for Democratic Empowerment, Monrovia, Liberia
29. Center for Human Rights and Rehabilitation (CHRR), Lilongwe, Malawi
30. Center for Justice Studies and Resolution 1325 (CJR/1325), Kinshasa, DRC
31. Center for Media Studies and Peace Building (CEMESP-Liberia), Monrovia, Liberia
32. Center For Reparation and Rehabilitation (CRR), Gulu, Uganda
33. Center for Trauma Counseling and Conflict Resolution (CETCCOR), Monrovia, Liberia
34. Central African Republic Coalition for the ICC, Central African Republic
35. Centre for Citizens with Disabilities (CCD), Ikeja, Lagos, Nigeria
36. Children and Women's Empowerment Society, Freetown, Sierra Leone
37. Children Education Society (CHESO), Dar es Salaam, Tanzania
38. Cite des Droits de l'Homme et de Paix (CIDHOP), DRC
39. Citizens Coalition for Constitutional Culture (4Cs), Nairobi, Kenya
40. Civil Resource Development and Documentation Centre (CIRDDOC), Enugu, Nigeria
41. Civil Society of Congo (SOCICO/NK), North Kivu, DRC
42. Club of the Friends of Law in Congo, DRC
43. Coalition for Justice and Accountability, Freetown, Sierra Leone
44. Congolese Foundation for the Promotion of Peace and Human Rights (FOCDP), Kisangani, DRC
45. Congolese Initiative for Justice and Peace (ICJP), Bukavu, DRC
46. Congolese Observatory of Human Rights (OCDH), Brazzaville, Congo
47. Conscience International, Freetown, Sierra Leone
48. Consortium for the Empowerment and Development of Marginalized Communities (CEDMAC), Nairobi, Kenya
49. Darfur Artists Union (SAD), Darfur, Sudan
50. Darfur Bar Association (DBA), Khartoum, Sudan
51. Darfur Democratic Forum (DDF), Darfur, Sudan
52. Darfur Displaced People and Refugees Union, Cairo Egypt
53. Defence for Children International (DRC), Freetown, Sierra Leone
54. DITSHWANELO - The Botswana Centre for Human Rights, Gaborone, Botswana
55. East and Horn of Africa Human Rights Defenders Project (EHAHRDP), Kampala, Uganda
56. Fédération des Jeunes pour la Paix Mondiale, DRC
57. Formerly Abused Development Program-Uganda (FADEPU), Uganda
58. Foundation for Human Rights and Democracy (FOHRD), Monrovia, Liberia
59. Foundation for International Dignity (FIND), Monrovia, Liberia
60. Grassroots Initiative, Freetown, Sierra Leone
61. Group Agora for the Education on Rights of the Child and Peace (GRA-REDEP), Dakar, Senegal
62. Groupe Equitas, DRC
63. Heirs of Justice, Bukavu, DRC
64. Human Rights and Advocacy Network for Democracy (HAND), Khartoum, Sudan
65. Human Rights Concern, Eritrea
66. Human Rights Network-Uganda (HURINet), Kampala, Uganda
67. Human Rights Watch, Johannesburg, South Africa
68. Human Rights, Justice and Peace Foundation, Aba, Nigeria
69. International Center for Policy and Conflict, Nairobi, Kenya
70. International Crime in Africa Programme (ICAP), Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, South Africa
71. International Refugee Rights Initiative (IRRI), Kampala, Uganda
72. International Society for Civil Liberties and the Rule of Law (Inter-Society), Anambra state, Nigeria
73. Ivorian Coalition for the International Criminal Court (ICC-CI), Abidjan, Ivory Coast
74. Justice Plus, DRC
75. Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC), Nairobi, Kenya
76. Kolan Kissy Rural Development Agency, Freetown, Sierra Leone
77. League for Human Rights, Jos, Nigeria
78. League for Peace and Human Rights in the DRC (LIPADHO), DRC
79. Legal Defence and Assistance Project (LEDAP), Lagos, Nigeria
80. Légalité, DRC
81. Liberia Democratic Institute, Monrovia, Liberia
82. Liberia Media Center, Monrovia, Liberia
83. Lira NGO Forum, Lira, Uganda
84. LOTUS, Kisangani, DRC
85. Nagaad Umbrella for Somaliland Women NGOs, Hargeisa, Somaliland
86. National Coalition for the International Criminal Court in DRC (CN-CPI/RDC), Kinshasa, DRC
87. National Organization of Human Rights, Senegal
88. Network Movement for Democracy and Human Rights, Freetown, Sierra Leone
89. Network of the NGOs in Congo, North-Kivu Province (REPRODHOC/NK), RDC
90. Nigerian Coalition for the International Criminal Court (NCICC), Abuja, Nigeria
91. One Family People, Freetown, Sierra Leone
92. Parents without Partners and Victims Forum, Freetown, Sierra Leone
93. Peace Pen Communications, Nairobi, Kenya
94. Peace Youth Association (PYA), Darfur, Sudan
95. People's Educational Association, Freetown, Sierra Leone
96. Prison Watch, Freetown, Sierra Leone
97. René Cassin Institute (IRECA), South Kivu, DRC
98. Rights and Rice Foundation, Monrovia, Liberia
99. Samotalis Coalition of Human Right Organization, Hargeisa, Somaliland
100. Social Action for Peace and Development (ASPD), Goma, DRC
101. Social Reform Centre (SOREC), Nairobi, Kenya
102. SocialJustice Advocacy Initiative (SJAI), Lagos Nigeria
103. Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project (SERAP), Lagos, Nigeria
104. Solidarity for Social Advancement and Peace (SOPROP), Goma, DRC
105. Solidarity of the Women for Peace and Integral Development (SOFEPADI), North Kivu and Orientale, DRC
106. Somali Human Rights Defenders Network (SOHRIDEN), Mogadishu, Somalia
107. Somaliland Impartial Human Rights Organizations Network (SOHIRA-Net), Somaliland
108. South African Coalition for the International Criminal Court (SACICC) Durban, South Africa
109. Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) Lawyers Association, Gaborone, Botswana
110. Southern Africa Litigation Centre, Johannesburg, South Africa
111. Synergy of Congolese NGOs for the victims (SYCOV), DRC
112. Synergy of Women for the Victims of Sexual Violence (SFVS), North Kivu, DRC
113. The Africa Freedom of Information Centre (AFIC), Kampala, Uganda
114. The Center for Research on Environment, Democracy and Human Rights (CREDDHO), Goma, DRC
115. The Kenyan Section of the International Commission of Jurists, Nairobi, Kenya
116. The League of Human Rights in the Great Lakes region, Rwanda
117. Uganda Coalition for the International Criminal Court (UCICC), Kampala, Uganda
118. Ugandan Victims Foundation, Lira, Uganda
119. Unit of Service and Assistance, Harare, Zimbabwe
120. Women and Law in Southern Africa Research and Educational Trust (WLSA), Zambia
121. Women's Advocates, Sierra Leone
122. Women's Forum, Sierra Leone
123. Youth Empowerment Organization, Freetown, Sierra Leone
124. Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights, Harare, Zimbabwe

Access to quality services – in particular in health and education – has been recognized as fundamental for wellbeing and economic development (World Bank, 2003). However, in Africa and other developing countries, service delivery is often poor or nonexistent: schools and health clinics are not open when they are supposed to be; teachers and health workers are frequently absent from schools and clinics and, when present, spend a significant amount of time not serving the intended beneficiaries; equipment, even when available, is not used; drugs and vaccines are misused; and public funds are expropriated.¹ Unfortunately, poor people suffer the most when the public sector does not deliver.

Inadequate service delivery is also reflected in poor results in terms of health and education outcomes. In Africa, many health and education indicators are dismal. Given the rate of progress, current trends will not allow these countries to meet the 2015 Millennium Development Goals (MDG) targets (UNESCO, 2009).

To accelerate progress toward the MDGs, developing country governments, donors and NGOs have committed increasing resources to improve service delivery in social sectors. However, budget allocations alone are poor indicators of the actual quality of services in countries with weak institutions and systematic service delivery failures. Moreover, when the failures are systematic, there are no quick fixes and relying on governments to address them by themselves seems unrealistic, not least since many of these failures have largely been unaddressed for a long time. A complementary approach calls for empowering citizens and other actors to bring pressure on governments to reform the system. However, for this to work, citizens need to have access to hard evidence on service delivery performance. The Delivering Services Indicators is an attempt to start providing such information.

To date there is no robust, standardized data set to measure the actual quality of service delivery as experienced by the user in Africa. Existing indicators in social sectors are disparate and limited and focus is almost exclusively on development outcomes/outputs rather than on the service delivery systems that create those outcomes. In fact, no set of indicators exists for measuring constraints associated with the supply side of service delivery and the behavior of frontline providers, both of which have a direct impact on the quality of service citizens receive. Without consistent and accurate data on the quality of services, it is difficult for citizens or their governments to know which services are under-performing, consequently leaving little incentive for citizens and governments to act on.

The Delivering Service Indicators (DSI) seeks to provide a set of indices for benchmarking service delivery performance in education and health in Africa in order to track progress in and across countries over time. It seeks to enhance effective and active monitoring and evaluation of service delivery and to become an instrument of public accountability and good governance in Africa. One of the key objectives of the DSI Index is to help reduce the gap of information between citizens, service providers and the state, which is at the root of poor service delivery performance, rent capture and misappropriation of resources. Ultimately, the purpose of the DSI Index is to help policymakers, citizens, service providers, donors and other stakeholders in enhancing the quality of service provision and ultimately improve development outcomes. The perspective adopted by the DSI index is that of citizens accessing services and facing potential shortcomings in those services made available to them. The DSI index is thus presented as a Service Delivery Report Card on education and health. It seeks to measure the performance and quality of service delivery as experienced by citizens. However, instead of using citizens’ perception to assess performance it assembles objective and quantitative information from a survey of service delivery units, using modules from Public Expenditure Tracking Survey (PETS), Quantitative Service Delivery Survey (QSDS), Staff Absenteeism Survey (SAS), and Observational studies.²

The index takes as its starting point the recent literature on how to boost education and health outcomes in developing countries. This literature shows robust evidence that incentives aimed at influencing the choice of effort exerted and the type of individuals attracted to specific tasks at different levels of the service delivery hierarchy, are positively and significantly related to education and health outcomes. In addition, conditional on providers exerting effort and being motivated, increasing resources can have beneficial effects. Therefore, we suggest that the indicators focus predominantly on measures that capture the outcome of efforts and type (broadly defined) both at the frontline service unit and by higher level authorities entrusted with the task of ensuring that schools and clinics are receiving proper support as well as the provision of physical resources to the service delivery unit. This choice also avoids the need to make strong structural assumptions on the link between inputs, behavior, and outcomes. While the data collection effort focuses on frontline providers, the indicators will mirror not only how the service delivery unit is performing but also indicate the efficacy of the whole institutional system in health and education. Importantly, we do not argue that we can measure these incentives directly, but, at best, measure the outcome of the set of incentives and constraints, including various supply constraints that influence performance using micro data.

Over the past decade, new micro-level survey instruments (PETS, QSDS, SAS etc.), and dissemination tools like Citizen Report Cards, have proven to be powerful tools for identifying bottlenecks, inefficiencies and waste in service delivery, especially problems of resource leakage, delays, absenteeism, and inequities in the actual resource allocation. In the Ugandan education sector, for example, Reinikka and Svensson (2005, 2009) use a PETS approach to study the effects of a public information campaign aimed at empowering parents. They find a large reduction in resource leakage toward primary schools in response to the campaign. The introduction of a Citizen Report Card for Bangalore’s public agencies led to major improvements in public satisfaction and the agencies’ ratings. Similarly, corruption in the transactions between users and public officials declined markedly (Samuel, 2002). A randomized evaluation of a citizen report card intervention in the health sector in Uganda in 2005 concluded that the CRC led to significant improvements in the quality and quantity of primary health care provision and resulted in improved health outcomes in the communities (Björkman and Svensson, 2009).

This cumulative evidence provides grounds for hope that better information, particularly measurable and actionable indicators, will contribute to more accountability and transparency and ultimately to improved outcomes. The capacity to measure and compare key components of the main service delivery sectors over time and across countries should prove useful for various stakeholders. For citizens in particular, such information on public expenditure and service delivery performance would be especially valuable. As emphasized by CAFOD (2007), such information could help citizens: “keep an active eye on government’s progress and check whether policies are making a difference... help people give feedback to their government on the services they are providing... informed dialogue between government and citizens leads to more effective, fair and inclusive policies from which everyone benefits...” (CAFOD, 2007, p.i)

This concept paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the citizen’s perspective guiding the construction of the DSI Index and the main categories of indicators. It also presents the proposed indicators and the justification for their inclusion in the DSI index. Section 3 discusses the source of data to be used to construct the indicators. Section 4 presents the indicators’ aggregation process and country ranking mechanisms and section 5 briefly discuss how the data could be presented and the pilot survey. Section 6 concludes.

1. Chaudhury et al. (2006) and Reinikka and Svensson (2004), among others, provide systematic evidence of public service delivery failures. For additional evidence, see World Bank (2003).
2. PETS trace the flow of public resources from the public budget to the intended final users through the administrative structure, as a means of ascertaining the extent to which the actual spending on services is consistent with the intended outcomes envisaged when budgets are allocated. QSDS examine activities and services at the provider level and the incentives and behavior of various agents in order to assess performance and efficiency of service delivery on the frontline. SAS focuses on the availability of teachers and health practitioners on the frontline in order to identify incentive problems and inefficiencies in resources utilization. An observational study aims at measuring the quality of services, proxied for by the level of effort exerted.

The Gender, Poverty and Environmental Indicators on African Countries Report is published by the Statistics Department of the African Development Bank Group. The publication provides some information on the broad development trends relating to gender, poverty and environmental issues in the 53 African countries. Gender, Poverty and Environmental Indicators on African Countries 2010 was prepared by the Economic and Social Statistics Division of the Statistics Department.

Introduction

L’égalité entre les hommes et les femmes est aussi bien un droit humain qu’un objectif de développement. Il est maintenant généralement accepté que l’égalité entre les femmes et les hommes et le renforcement de l’autonomie des femmes constituent des pierres angulaires fondamentales pour la réalisation des résultats de développement. En septembre 2008, les Ministres des pays en développement et donateurs responsables de la promotion du développement, ainsi que les chefs des institutions de développement multilatérales et bilatérales ont approuvé le Plan d’action d’Accra (PAA) pour accélérer et approfondir la mise en oeuvre de la Déclaration de Paris sur l’effi cacité de l’aide. Le PAA a indiqué, en particulier, que les pays en développement et les donateurs feront en sorte que les politiques et programmes de développement soient conçus et exécutés de manière à tenir compte de l’un des engagements internationaux convenus en matière d’égalité entre les femmes et les hommes.

Des preuves récentes donnent à penser que les progrès de l’Afrique vers la réalisation des objectifs du millénaire pour le développement (OMD) en 2015 sont sérieusement remis en cause. Il y a des preuves qui montrent aussi que jusqu’au début de 2008, l’Afrique était dans la bonne voie en ce qui concerne la réalisation de bon nombre de ses OMD. Néanmoins, avec les récentes crises alimentaire, énergétique et fi nancière, il y a un grand risque de retard dans l’atteinte de ces cibles, en particulier celles en rapport avec la santé, l’éducation, et la sécurité alimentaire. Ce sont les fi lles qui courent le plus le risque d’être retirées de l’école lorsque les ménages voient leurs revenus baisser, tandis que les femmes ont tendance à entreprendre des activités économiques supplémentaires pour combler le défi cit de revenu, ce qui accroît leur charge de travail. A cela s’ajoute la menace croissante de changement climatique qui, selon toute vraisemblance, risque de compromettre davantage encore les gains limités réalisés par rapport au rôle de la femme dans la sécurité alimentaire et la gestion des ressources naturelles. En outre, bien que des progrès signifi catifs aient été signalés pour des indicateurs tels que l’éducation primaire pour tous et l’égalité entre les femmes et les hommes, aucun résultat similaire ne peut être rapporté sur la parité hommes-femmes dans l’enseignement secondaire et l’enseignement supérieur. De plus, la Banque africaine de développement (BAD) mettra tout en oeuvre pour que ses programmes et ses politiques prennent en compte l’impact de la crise fi nancière sur l’égalité entre les femmes et les hommes.

Au cours de la phase récente de réformes institutionnelles, la BAD a réaffi rmé son engagement à apporter le soutien technique et stratégique nécessaire aux pays membres régionaux (PMR) dans tous les domaines prioritaires de développement. À ce titre, la BAD a un rôle clé à jouer dans la promotion de l’égalité entre les femmes et les hommes sur le continent et en montrant la voie à suivre au niveau régional dans la manière de s’attaquer aux faiblesses persistantes de politiques de développement en ce qui concerne le renforcement de l’autonomie des femmes.

La Politique en matière de genre de la BAD (2001) développe l’engagement à promouvoir l’égalité entre les femmes et les hommes, ainsi qu’un développement humain et économique durable en Afrique, et il spécifi e les principes directeurs pour atteindre ces buts. Le premier Plan d’action en matière de genre de la Banque (GPOA) 2004-2007 visait à exposer dans les grandes lignes une approche de l’opérationnalisation de la Politique en matière de genre et à identifi er les activités spécifi ques qui appuieraient davantage la prise en compte des questions de genre dans des opérations telles que : le développement d’outils et de stratégies pour les programmes, d’outils pour les projets des secteurs prioritaires, le renforcement de la capacité institutionnelle et l’appui institutionnel.

Le plan d’action actualisé de la BAD en matière d’égalité entre les femmes et les hommes et le renforcement de l’autonomie des femmes (UGPOA) a pour but principal est de soutenir la croissance économique et la réduction de la pauvreté dans les pays africains). Son objectif spécifique est de promouvoir le renforcement de l’autonomie économique équitable et durable des femmes et des hommes.

Cet article est subdivisé en trois sections. La première section introduit brièvement les progrès réalisés jusqu’à présent dans la mise en oeuvre de la prise en compte des questions de genre à la BAD et le nouvelle priorisation globale des questions de genre. La deuxième section présente quelquesunes des opportunités et défi s en rapport avec la prise en compte des questions de genre tant au niveau de la Banque qu’au niveau régional. La troisième section expose les principes directeurs du Plan d’action actualisé en matière de genre (UGPOA) et les domaines d’intervention sur lesquels la BAD se concentrera au cours de la période de mise en oeuvre, 2009-2011.

Contents

• Preface (415 KB)


• Country Classification by Region/Grouping (413 KB)


• Part I Promoting Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment in Africa: The African Development Bank’s Perspective (557 KB)


• Part II Comparative Cross Country Tables: The Millennium Develoment Goals (1.4 MB)


• Section 1 Gender Indicators (749 KB)


• Section 2 Poverty Indicators (688 KB)


• Section 3 Environment Indicators (687 KB)


• Part III Country Tables (4.8 MB)


• Annexes (620 KB)

Download Full Report

The Gender, Poverty and Environmental Indicators on African Countries Report is published by the Statistics Department of the African Development Bank Group. The publication provides some information on the broad development trends relating to gender, poverty and environmental issues in the 53 African countries. Gender, Poverty and Environmental Indicators on African Countries 2010 was prepared by the Economic and Social Statistics Division of the Statistics Department.

Introduction

Equality between men and women is both a human right and a development goal. It is now widely accepted that gender equality and women’s empowerment are fundamental cornerstones for achieving development results. In September 2008, the Ministers of developing and donor countries responsible for promoting development and heads of multilateral and bilateral development institutions endorsed the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA) to accelerate and deepen the implementation of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. The AAA has specifically outlined that developing countries and donors will ensure that development policies and programmes are designed and implemented to take into consideration one of the agreed international commitments, gender equality.

Recent evidence suggests that progress in Africa in meeting the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by 2015 is highly challenged. Evidence also shows that until the beginning of 2008 Africa was on track to meet many of its MDGs. However, with the recent food, fuel and financial crises there is now a high risk of slippage in meeting these targets, especially those related to health, education, and food security. As gender equality, a critical element in achieving all MDGs cuts across all these key livelihoods indicators, the threat of loosing out on achieving gender equality and women’s empowerment in Africa is much greater than ever before. Added to this is the increased threat of climate change which is further likely to compromise the limited gains made with regards to women’s role in food security and natural resources management. Moreover, while significant progress has been reported for indicators such as universal primary education and gender equality, no similar achievements can be reported on gender parity in secondary and tertiary education. Furthermore, the African Development Bank (AfDB) undertakes to ensure that its programmes and policies are responsive to the impact of the financial crisis on gender equality.

In the recent phase of institutional reforms, the AfDB has reaffirmed its commitment to provide the necessary technical and policy support to regional member countries (RMCs) in all priority development areas. As such, the Bank has a key role to play in promoting gender equality on the continent and providing regional leadership to addressing persistent weaknesses in development policies as regards women’s empowerment.

The AfDB’s Gender Policy of 2001 elaborateed the commitment to promote gender equality and sustainable human and economic development in Africa, and specifies guiding principles to achieve these ends. The Bank’s first Gender Plan of Action (GPOA) 2004–2007 aimed to outline an approach to operationalising the Gender Policy and to identify specific activities which would further support gender mainstreaming in the Bank’s operations, such as: developing programme tools and strategies, project tools for priority sectors, institutional capacity building, and organizational support. The goal of AfDB’s updated gender equality and women’s empowerment plan of action (UGPOA) is to support African countries in their effort to attain gender equality as a principal means to poverty reduction. The specific objective is to promote sustainable and equitable economic empowerment of men and women.

This article is divided into three sections. Section one introduces briefly the progress to date on the implementation of gender mainstreaming in the AfDB and the re-prioritisation of gender issues globally. Section two provides some of the opportunities and challenges related to gender mainstreaming both in the Bank and regionally. Section three outlines the guiding principles for the UGPOA and the areas of intervention that the AfDB would focus on during the implementation period 2009 - 2011.

Contents

• Preface (415 KB)


• Country Classification by Region/Grouping (413 KB)


• Part I Promoting Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment in Africa: The African Development Bank’s Perspective (557 KB)


• Part II Comparative Cross Country Tables: The Millennium Develoment Goals (1.4 MB)


• Section 1 Gender Indicators (749 KB)


• Section 2 Poverty Indicators (688 KB)


• Section 3 Environment Indicators (687 KB)


• Part III Country Tables (4.8 MB)


• Annexes (620 KB)

Download Full Report

The birth of the World Wide Web as we know it today dates back to March 1989 when Tim Berners Lee, then a research fellow at European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN) in Geneva, wrote a proposal for an Internet framework that would allow online documents to link to one another. Eight months later in neighboring Germany protesters brought down the Berlin Wall, and with it fell more than half a century of Communist rule in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. The next decade would also see an end to the repressive era of military dictatorships in Latin America, the birth of multiparty democracy in much of Sub-Saharan Africa, and a financial crisis in Southeast Asia that led to calls for greater governance and improved accountability. The World Wide Web and the movement for transparency and accountability in government have grown up together over the past two decades, though often in parallel, and with little research evaluating the role and potential of online technologies to bring about greater transparency, accountability, and civic engagement.

This report is the culmination of four months of research examining the objectives, challenges, successes, and effects of online technology projects that aim to promote transparency, political accountability, and civic engagement in Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, Southeast Asia, South Asia, China, and Central & Eastern Europe. A team of eight regional researchers documented a total of 37 case studies of relevant technology projects. Though this report contains only executive summaries of each case study, full interviews including audio podcasts and related documents, are available on our website.¹ In addition to the in-depth case studies, we have also documented over 30 project listings, which provide basic descriptive information and context about related projects.

This report is structured in three sections. The introduction examines the differing aspects between traditional watchdog journalism and online media that rely on raw data sources, often directly from government websites. The introduction also aims to contextualize the benefits of transparency, accountability, and civic engagement from a grassroots, networked perspective. The second section of the report consists of regional overviews authored by each of our eight researchers. These overviews document the history of the good governance movement in each region, the role of technology in promoting transparency and accountability, and summaries of the case studies they documented. The concluding section groups case studies thematically in order draw out trends, conclusions, and recommendations that apply across a number of projects.

What is Transparency?

The very metaphor of transparency suggests a medium through which we view things and through which others can view us. This metaphor makes two important assumptions, as J.M. Balkin has noted.² First, it assumes that what is on one side of the transparent medium is conceptually separate from what is on the other side. Second, it assumes that the process of seeing through the medium does not substantially alter the nature of what is being viewed.

Both of these assumptions are demonstrably false. The Stasi, for example, had one agent for every 166 citizens of East Germany. And when you add informants to the formula, John O. Koehler has estimated that there was one spy per every 6.5 citizens.³ Who was surveilled and who was surveilling? It is often more difficult to differentiate each side of the transparency window than we assume. The concrete division we make between the government and its citizens is, in fact, a thin and constantly shifting membrane. The second assumption of the transparency metaphor - that the process of seeing through the medium does not substantially alter the nature of what is being viewed - has also been proved false. Beth Noveck, in a conversation with fellow open government advocate, Tim O'Reilly, observed that a new directive requiring stricter documentation of government meetings led to an increase in “informal lunches” where public officials can discuss topics without making their discussions publicly accessible. Such behavior could lead many to believe that public officials are discussing secrets they wish to hide from public view, but Noveck points out that most government officials simply don’t have time to discuss, document, and then implement.

The Transparent Society

The Stasi stored enormous amounts of data about the citizens of East Germany. It sifted through their garbage, collected “odor” samples of their sheets and underwear,⁴ and tapped phone lines to listen in on citizens’ private conversations. The point was to spread fear as much as it was to collect information. But, as common as government surveillance of citizens was and continues to be,⁵ the fall of the Stasi in 1990 also illustrates another natural impulse that has been at the heart of investigative journalism and the transparency movement over the past few decades, and that is citizens demanding both information and accountability from their government.

On January 15, 1990 a large crowd formed outside of the Stasi headquarters and demanded access to the information the Stasi had collected over the previous 40 years.⁶ This process is still ongoing today and has been a painful part of German reunification,⁷ but it reveals to us a change that is taking place in many countries around the world as they transition from societies where only the government surveilled its citizens to what David Brin calls “The Transparent Society,” where citizens and governments surveil each other.⁸

From the Fourth to the Fifth Estate?

The notion of the press as watchdog is more than 200 years old. Yet the idea of vigilant media monitoring government and exposing its excesses has gained new traction in many parts of the world, writes Sheila S. Coronel in “The Media as Watchdog.”⁹ There are many examples¹⁰ and countless movies¹¹ based on stories that reveal how investigative journalism ensures justice, transparency, and accountability. The press monitors the day-to-day workings of government in order to help citizens assess the efficacy of its performance. Watchdog journalism exposes the corruption of a traffic policeman, the wrongdoings of a priest, or of billion dollar financials scandals. The best investigative journalism doesn’t doesn’t just expose corrupt individuals, but entire systems that are flawed and in need of reform, writes Coronel. As Thomas Jefferson famously remarked¹²: “The basis of our governments being the opinion of the people, the very first object should be to keep that right; and were it left to me to decide whether we should have a government without newspapers or newspapers without a government, I should not hesitate a moment to prefer the latter.”

After the fall of the Berlin Wall, when many countries moved from authoritarian to more democratic styles of governance, a new industry called media development was born.¹³ The assumption was that a healthy press would lead to healthy democracies. So donors like the Ford Foundation, the United States government, and the World Bank began funding projects that would train reporters and editors in investigative journalism as well as the business side of the news industry. Many of these projects began in the former Soviet Union, then spread to the Balkans, and are now common in Africa, Southeast Asia, and Latin America.

But there are criticisms of watchdog journalism too. Some observers argue that that the adversarial nature of watchdog journalism erodes trust in governments and institutions, and presents the government as more inefficient and wasteful than it really is.¹⁴ Others say that a constant barrage of reporting about scandals desensitizes people to actual instances of government corruption. There are even suggestions that in countries that are new democracies, watchdog reporting can lead to dissatisfaction with democracy itself and lead to riots and chaos. In Asia there are criticisms that Western style watchdog journalism doesn’t lead to the type of social harmony that is valued in Asian societies.¹⁵

Watchdog journalists have come up against two major obstacles to their work – the state and the market. The state censors their work and threatens their safety. The market demands that they make their work entertaining enough to sell advertisements, newspapers, magazines, and website subscriptions. In many countries the media industry has been privatized to shield it from government control only to find that there is now no business model to sustain the time intensive work that goes into investigative journalism.

As traditional media companies are forced to cut their budgets due to falling advertising revenue, investigative journalism and international coverage are the two most common areas to disappear. David Simon, in his testimony before Congress about the death of the newspaper industry, remarked that with a vacuum of investigative journalism, “it is going to be one of the great times to be a corrupt politician.”¹⁶

This has led to a lot of concern about the decline of the fourth estate, but also to a lot of excitement and enthusiasm about the rise of the so-called fifth estate – networked citizen media platforms that rely on the volunteer contributions of citizens who are not necessarily trained journalists.¹⁷

One such platform is WikiLeaks, which earlier this year published a video of US soldiers firing on a van that was picking up an injured journalist in Iraq.¹⁸ WikiLeaks is a website where any citizen whistleblower can anonymously upload a leaked document that exposes wrongdoing.¹⁹ In an interview with Russia Today, WikiLeaks co-founder Julian Assange makes an important distinction between source information and the contextualization of that information which informs the public and shapes public opinion.²⁰ According to Assange, Washington Post reporter David Finkel apparently had access to the video, or at least the transcript, which helped inform his reporting.²¹ But increasingly reporters are not the sole custodians of source information. Rather than relying on journalists to procure and distribute information from the government to citizens, we now see a new approach where citizens demand information from their governments and use online tools and platforms to make sense of that information collectively, and use it to hold their leaders accountable.

For example, newspapers have traditionally employed a “crime beat” reporter to visit the local police department, publish selections from the crime report, and help add context to crimerelated statistics. Today websites like Oakland Crimespotting²² and EveryBlock²³ automatically take crime report data from police department websites and display it on a map interface which can be filtered by time, location, and crime type. While such automated websites don’t replace the need for the contextualization of such information, they do open up that process to anyone willing to invest the time to understand the spread of crime across location and time.

1. http://transparency.globalvoicesonline.org
2. http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/jbalkin/articles/media01.htm
3. http://www.nytimes.com/books/first/k/koehler-stasi.html
4. http://boingboing.net/2007/07/03/stasi-smell-museum.html
5. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stasi_2.0
6. http://www.stasimuseum.de/en/enindex.htm
7. http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,486390,00.html
8. http://www.davidbrin.com/transparent.htm
9. http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/pnorris/Conference/Conference%20papers/Coronel%20Watchdog.pdf
10. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pulitzer_Prize_for_Investigative_Reporting
11. http://psacot.typepad.com/ps_a_column_on_things/journalism-movies.html
12. http://jayrosen.tumblr.com/post/99295974/that-jefferson-quote-newspaper-journalists-always-use
13. http://www.pbs.org/idealab/2009/10/the-new-era-of-media-development-part-1280.html
14. http://www.nextgov.com/nextgov/ng_20090903_7217.php
15. http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/pnorris/Conference/Conference%20papers/Coronel%20Watchdog.pdf
16. http://www.onthemedia.org/transcripts/2009/05/08/01
17. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fifth_Estate
18. http://www.collateralmurder.com/
19. http://wikileaks.org/
20. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7QEdAykXxoM
21. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/discussion/2010/04/06/DI2010040600750.html
22. http://oakland.crimespotting.org/
23. http://www.everyblock.com/

On the 24^th and the 25^th of August 2009, a conference took place in Windhoek, Namibia with the title: Southern Africa: 2020 Vision. Public Policy Priorities for the Next Decade. The conference brought together academics, civil society activists, politicians and business people from Namibia, South Africa and Europe to consider topics in four areas: economic development, healthcare, democracy and governance, and legal and civil rights.

Speakers were encouraged to use a scenario-based approach to bring a focus to their presentations and the ensuing discussions. Speakers were asked to assess likely developments and outcomes in their area of expertise over the next ten years, including assumptions about resource allocation, the quality of governance and the development of infrastructure. Through discussion the conference aimed to identify areas of consensus and areas of disagreement, both with regard to the aims of public policy and with regard to the relative priorities that should be accorded to policy in different areas.

The conference was a great success, not least in its impact with the local media. The second day began with the organizers drawing attention to the front page of The Namibian, the largest-circulation English language newspaper in the country, which reported on a number of the presentations from the first session of the conference on the previous day. Press coverage continued for some days, in the principal English, German and Afrikaans language papers, the best examples of which are collected in the Appendix to this volume.

Throughout both days of the conference, speakers addressed matters of central importance to Namibia and the wider region in frank and open way. There were some sharp questions and some lively discussions among the conference participants at each session, but all took place within a positive framework. This volume reprints all but one of the papers presented at the conference, in the order in which they were given.

ANSA-Africa acknowledges permission from The Namibia Institute for Democracy to post this report on our website. Other NID reports can be accessed off their website: www.nid.org.na

Inquiries and comments on this publication can be submitted to Mark H Hannnam

The Federal Budget is the Federal Government's instrument for allocating public resources among the nation's competing socio-economic needs. It is a financial representation of government's spending plans for delivering public goods and services to our key stakeholders - Nigerian citizens.

However, many stakeholders do not understand the Budget due to misconcept ions arising from the complexity of the Budget, with its innumerable heads, sub-heads, figures and provisions. Without this understanding of what the Budget is all about, citizens and other stakeholders cannot easily engage in the budget process and hold Government accountable for the prudent management of the financial resources held in trust for the benef it of all Nigerians.

This Citizens' Guide therefore seeks to illuminate the Budget by making it a more open, transparent and accessible document, empowering citizens to have a better understanding of the Budget preparation process, implementation and review and to ultimately be in a better position to influence, monitor and assess the effectiveness of Government’s fiscal policies.

This Citizens' Guide is presented in two parts. The first addresses general issues regarding the Federal Budget: what it is, how it is prepared, what financial resources are spent on and where the revenue comes from. This is followed by the second part which focuses specifically on the 2009 Budget - its background, contents and priorities - as well as options available to Government for coping with the challenges of the oil market downturn.

We hope that the Citizens' Guide will enable readers to have a better understanding of this important aspect of Government's work, and that it will put citizens in a better position to hold their government accountable.

Dans le rapport de l’an dernier, nous esquissions un programme d’action pour des progrès en Afrique sur la base de l’expérience acquise et des attentes du continent. Nous appelions les dirigeants africains à prendre l’initiative de réaliser ce programme d’action et leurs partenaires internationaux d’y apporter leur soutien. Nous faisions valoir que les succès que les pays africains ont obtenus démontrent de façon concluante qu’en Afrique les objectifs de développement peuvent être atteints. Nous soulignions la responsabilité que l’Afrique et ses partenaires se partagent s’agissant des progrès à accomplir et de la nécessité d’une responsabilité mutuelle plus nettement affirmée – pour une bonne gouvernance, une utilisation responsable des ressources de façon à promouvoir une croissance durable et équitable, et pour réaliser chacun des objectifs du Millénaire pour le développement. Nous répétons cette exhortation.

Nous espérions que la crise économique de l’année dernière servirait d’appel à l’action pour les dirigeants africains et leurs partenaires internationaux. La crise, en mettant en évidence les liens étroits entre pauvreté, crise alimentaire, crise de l’énergie et changements climatiques, devait assurément mettre en évidence l’importance d’une action plus synthétique que fragmentaire pour promouvoir une croissance économique durable et réduire la vulnérabilité.

La crise a-t-elle eu cet effet? Les faits sont peu concluants. Elle a mis en évidence un certain nombre de tendances inquiétantes, non seulement sur le terrain – une inégalité grandissante, des revers dans la réalisation des OMD, une vulnérabilité et une insécurité alimentaire croissantes – mais également, plus généralement, la crainte que la contraction économique et les coupes budgétaires ne relèguent à l’arrière-plan l’engagement de concourir au développement humain.

La crise a mis en évidence un certain déficit de la gouvernance africaine et mondiale. La récession et le chômage ne sont peut-être pas la cause des coups d’État et des conflits, mais ils accroissent certainement les tensions, en particulier quand les griefs politiques sont compliqués par un sentiment d’exclusion économique et d’injustice. À l’échelle mondiale, la crise a accéléré la reconfiguration des grandes structures – pas toujours d’une façon qui profite aux pays les moins avancés ou aux pays africains. Le G20 sera-t-il aussi attentif que le G8 à la situation de l’Afrique?

Il est difficile de mesurer la volonté d’action des hommes politiques. Le volume et la part des ressources financières réservées au développement sont un indicateur objectif, qu’il s’agisse tant des recettes publiques des pays africains que de l’APD fournie par les membres de l’Organisation de coopération et de développement économiques (OCDE).

À s’en tenir à cet indicateur, l’élan engendré par la première décennie du vingt et unième siècle, en particulier en faveur du Nouveau Partenariat pour le développement de l’Afrique (NEPAD) et des décisions de Gleneagles, se maintient, mais semble désormais un peu compromis.

Le problème est de formuler de façon convaincante la justification d’une solidarité mondiale et d’une croissance équitable – qui englobent, sans s’en limiter, les chiffres de l’APD. Du fait du changement climatique, cette justification pourrait s’imposer plus vite qu’on ne le prévoit.

Un sentiment de déception, sinon d’échec, est apparu à la suite de la XVe Conférence des Parties à la réunion au sommet de Copenhague et au vu de l’accord qui en est issu. Mais les faits scientifiques et physiques qui affectent l’existence quotidienne et les moyens d’existence de millions d’habitants ne disparaîtront pas pour autant. L’impact de la hausse de la température est chaque jour plus évident. On peut s’attendre à une transformation du paysage politique et spécialement s’agissant du développement, une transformation qui fera que c’est la nécessité plutôt qu’un souci altruiste qui obligera les hommes politiques à persuader l’opinion qu’en fin de compte, il est impératif d’investir dans un développement mondial viable à terme.

Notre rapport montre ces changements et d’autres qui sont pratiquement tectoniques, en particulier l’avènement du G20, la place prédominante que prennent de plus en plus, sur le plan politique et économique, le Brésil, la Chine et l’Inde, et le potentiel qu’offre la technologie de la communication de refondre à la base les conditions politiques du développement de l’Afrique.

Le rapport commence par une évaluation des progrès accomplis par l’Afrique au cours des cinq dernières années jusqu’à présent, en mettant l’accent en particulier sur les promesses formulées et tenues, ainsi que sur les différentes feuilles de route convenues. Nous poursuivons en dégageant six domaines prioritaires d’action, trois à l’intention des dirigeants africains, et trois à celle de leurs partenaires internationaux.

Étant donné la diversité des 53 pays qui forment le continent africain et la grande variété de leurs économies, ces choix ont un caractère essentiellement général. Nos recommandations devront être adaptées et ajustées à la situation propre à chaque pays. Nous sommes néanmoins convaincus que si elles sont appliquées, elles contribueront à la réalisation de résultats mesurables qui ne pourront qu’améliorer le bien-être des Africains et des possibilités qui s’offrent à eux.

Africa is now being described as a new economic frontier. Barely a week goes by without news of the discovery of more oil, gas, precious minerals or other resources. Deals are being signed by African countries with an ever-broader array of partners, including from China, the Far and Middle East, South Asia and Latin America.

Trade is growing, both within the continent and internationally, including with the global South. Turnover of African corporations and banks is increasing. Domestic revenues, foreign direct investment, remittances and official development assistance (ODA) have all climbed steadily over the last decade, although the upward trajectory dipped in the wake of the global financial and economic crisis. After a gloomy year, economic growth rates are predicted to climb again, and restore the continent’s place as one of the fastest-growing regions of the world.

All of this begs some obvious questions. Despite some extraordinary successes, why does progress on achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) remain so slow, so uneven? Why do the absolute and relative numbers of people living in poverty remain so high? Why do so many people face food and nutrition insecurity, joblessness, with minimal access to basic services such as energy, clean water, healthcare and education? Why are so many women marginalised and disenfranchised? And why is inequality increasing?

At issue is not just the ability of African countries to attract and mobilize revenues, but their political determination and capacity to use what revenues they have to achieve results for people. Economic growth rates and increased trade are necessary but insufficient for genuine progress, which means sustained improvement in the quality of life of every African woman, child and man. However, growth can be exclusive, reinforcing or resulting in inequality and social tension; growth can fail to create opportunities or address the insecurity faced by families in rural areas and of people in search of work in the continent’s burgeoning cities. This kind of growth does not necessarily represent progress.

It cannot be said often enough that Africa is not homogenous; it is raucously diverse, a celebration of different cultures, traditions and landscapes. Some African countries are blessed with resource wealth; others less so or not at all. Landlocked or densely populated countries face circumstances very different from others. But they all share a common challenge: investment in their citizens’ productive capacity, and in public goods and services that will broaden the opportunities and benefits of growth for all.

The ingredients of success are not a mystery. Climate change is adding a new dimension, and urgency, to the challenge; sustainable development and job creation must be anchored in low-carbon growth, buttressed by attention to disaster-risk and vulnerability reduction. But it is not altering the fundamentals: the critical importance of political leadership to set and drive plans for equitable growth and poverty reduction; the importance of building the technical, management and institutional capacity to mobilize revenues and to implement plans; and the centrality of good governance, the rule of law and of systems of accountability to ensure that resources are subject to public scrutiny and to keep political and business leaders on their toes.

Over the last decade, our understanding of what makes development effective has increased. Good, even visionary agendas have been formulated in every field, including infrastructure, food and nutrition security, women’s empowerment, health systems, education and governance. We have a better appreciation of the centrality of domestic revenues, the importance of unleashing entrepreneurship and an enabling environment, of responsible investment, the need for concerted international action to address illicit financial flows and corruption, the value of public-private partnerships, and of the most strategic use of ODA to support national and regional development plans.

Lack of knowledge and shortage of plans are not the problem. Lack of funds per se may not be the problem either, given the continent’s vast natural and human resources and the ongoing, often illicit, outflow of wealth. Political will is the issue, both in Africa and internationally.

Ten years ago, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) got behind the vision of a group of influential African leaders to promote a poverty-busting development agenda; the African Peer Review Mechanism was equally innovative. Today, a number of leaders stand out as champions of development, but they are still a minority, their achievements overshadowed by stories of other leaders’ personal enrichment and authoritarian behaviour.

Internationally, there are understandable concerns that the consensus around development has been eroded by the global economic crisis. Everything must be done to keep hard-won commitments of the Millennium Declaration, the Monterrey Consensus, and the Gleneagles Declaration front and centre in international policy-making. One way of measuring this commitment is by whether ODA levels are being met. Many OECD and G8 countries are doing so; others are falling badly behind, raising doubts about their credibility at top decision making tables.

These shortfalls do not result from a decrease in human solidarity and sympathy between ordinary people around the world, which, I believe, is as solid as ever. Nor can it be ascribed to budgetary constraints alone, given the relatively modest sums involved. It comes from politicians’ failure to communicate the imperative of putting the needs of least developed and African countries at the heart of global institutions and policies. The arguments for doing so, whether relating to climate change, food and nutrition security, trade, intellectual property, fighting crime, or investment in health and education, are not just ethical or altruistic, but practical and in the self-interest of richer countries.

More can be done by African leaders, in government, business or civil society, to advocate for development policies and resources, including with politicians and tax-payers in richer countries, whether the big emerging economies or traditional donors. Their voice is vital to the case for maintaining promises relating to ODA, which, despite what its detractors say, remains pivotal as a source of investment in public goods and services, particularly for people in resource-poor and fragile states.

Africa’s growth needs to be measured not just in GDP figures but also by the degree to which it brings social benefits for all its people. Responsibility for driving equitable growth and for investing in achievement of the MDG targets rests firmly with Africa’s political leaders. Civil society can be an ally if given the space to ensure that revenues and growth are not abused or limited to elites but shared more broadly and invested in jobs and public goods. The approach and actions of the private sector and of Africa’s international partners, traditional and more recent, can also make a decisive difference to leaders’ success.

If this goes wrong, Africa may face the prospect of greater inequality, more conflict and a perpetuation of chronic poverty and marginalization. If this goes right, the future is bright. The key is shared responsibility, and mutual accountability, between African leaders and their partners. Not just Africa’s people, but those of the whole world stand to benefit.

Read full executive summary

Read full report

Throughout our mapping and analysis of the 36 case studies on the Technology for Transparency Network we have tended to group projects by their geographic region. This is in large part because our team of researchers and research reviewers were hired explicitly to map and evaluate technology projects that promote transparency and accountability in the regions were they are based. However, when one steps back to take in all of the projects from a global perspective, it becomes readily apparent that there are thematic and strategic categories which apply across regions. This week's posts aim to tease out some of those trends and offer constructive criticism and concrete recommendations to funders, project leads, and researchers as to how such projects can become more effective, efficient, and sustainable.

On the Technology for Transparency Network platform we have organized case studies and project listings into ten different categories: budget monitoring, civic complaints, election monitoring, parliament informatics, extractive industries, private sector transparency, advocacy, crime, local government, and aid transparency. You can sort through each of the ten categories by clicking on the filters beneath our map interface. If you have suggestions for other categories that we should be tracking, please leave a comment below.

Today's post will focus on two of the largest categories we reviewed - budget and election monitoring.

Budget Monitoring

Monitoring the budgets of local and national governments is a key instrument in the toolkit of any accountability activist. Active budget monitoring can both prevent and expose corruption. As an example, despite protests from privacy activists, the Mexican government decided to publish the salaries of elected officials. (At the time, Mexican governors were among the highest paid in the world.) The reasoning is that any elected official who is clearly spending more than his/her salary permits should be scrutinized closely to determine where that money is coming from, and whether it is linked to political misbehavior.

Budget monitoring can also lead to improved public services and infrastructure. For example, in the United States the government recently passed the largest economic stimulus program in the country's history. To track how that money was spent the government created Recovery.gov while ProPublica created Eye on the Stimulus, which also tracks how the money is spent. Kenya had its own stimulus program, called the Constituency Development Fund, which started in 2003 as a way to fund local governments to improve their infrastructure and services. Budget Tracking Tool is a way to see how that money is being spent and to leave comments to report on the progress of those projects. However, so far few people seem to use the tool, and even fewer comment on the progress of the development projects in their constituency.

In order to effectively monitor and evaluate any budget, the data must be available in a format which allows for analysis in a spreadsheet or database program. The information should be both granular, in order to evaluate as many variables as possible, and timely, in order to expose corruption and inefficiencies before it is too late. Unfortunately, most governments that do publicly release their budget information do so using Adobe's PDF format, which doesn't allow for data analysis. As Noam Hoffstater and Alon Padan of Our Budget pointed out in our interview, the accounting offices of governments obviously have their budget information in spreadsheet format, but they purposely publish it as a PDF document in order to discourage closer scrutiny.

Our Budget uses OCR technology to create an Excel spreadsheet version of the Tel Aviv municipal budget. Volunteers go over and check every entry, and then they make visualizations and graphs of how the municipality is spending taxpayers' money. Importantly, while they have done this for two years running, in the end they decided that litigation (demanding that the municipality release the budget in spreadsheet format) was a better strategy than time-consuming, technological solutions.

Dinero y Politica uses a similar strategy to create more information about campaign financing in Argentinian elections so that voters can make fully informed choices. In Argentina, political parties must disclose all of the campaign contributions they received at least ten days before the election. But, once again, they only have to disclose those numbers in a PDF report, which, doesn't allow citizens analyze the data to see relationships between political interests and politicians. So the Dinery y Politica team has created an interactive database which maps donations and creates visualizations of which parties receive donations from which groups, unions, and companies.

Recommendations:

Both Our Budget and Dinero y Política use Many Eyes to visualize the data they collect. We recommend that other budget monitoring activists learn how to use Many Eyes and Many Eyes Wikified in order to dynamically visualize budget information. Google's Fusion Tables is another powerful online tool to both store and visualize complex information related to public budgets.

The information collected and analyzed from all three projects does not seem to be exploited well by civil society organizations, journalists, or bloggers in the countries where they are based. We recommend to project leaders that they do more outreach to train journalists, activists, and bloggers how to use the tools they have developed. A sample gallery of effective ways their information has been used could help inspire others to build on that work.

A number of traditional civil society organizations have been working in the realm of budget monitoring and open budgets for quite some time. The International Budget Partnership has a very useful world map which links to country profiles with related information and organizations working on budget monitoring. We recommend to donors that they support an international event that brings together technologists and budget monitoring activists to share best practices and strategies regarding the use of modern technology and information management systems to improve the efficiency of budget monitoring. This event should be followed by a three-day intense “book sprint” which leads to a open licensed, freely accessible book that explains the technical steps in order to: 1) extract financial information from PDF documents using OCR technology, 2) store budget information in structured, public databases, 3) verify and cross-reference information, 4) analyze and evaluate data using Many Eyes and Google Fusion Tables, and 5) use resulting findings and conclusions to partner with media, bloggers, civil society and government to seek greater accountability.

Following the publication of such a book - and its translation into relevant languages - we recommend that donors support barcamp-style events at the national level that bring together technologists, civil society organizations, government officials, investigative journalists, and bloggers to focus specifically on budget monitoring.

Finally, we recommend that budget monitoring platforms partner with accounting, statistics, and computer science professors at local universities so that the students of their classes can help improve the governance of their country while learning new skills and techniques.

Election Monitoring

Like budget monitoring, election observation is an activity of government accountability and transparency with a long history. According to Wikipedia, it dates back to at least to the 1866 plebiscite of Moldavia and Wallachia, which led to modern Romania. In more recent times, election monitoring has tended to focus on countries with weak democracies or democracies in transition, and has been organized by international organizations such as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the European Union, the Commonwealth Secretariat, the Council of Europe and the African Union. Major international NGOs like the Carter Center, the International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES), the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), the Electoral Institute of Southern Africa, the National Democratic Institute, and the European Network for Election Monitoring have also become increasingly active, and often partner with local NGO's to take advantage of established national networks.

As if all of those many players weren't enough, a new generation of election monitoring websites now ask ordinary citizens to also become election observers by using their cell phones to report any voting irregularities they may encounter. If all goes to plan, such reports are then verified, categorized, and placed on a publicly accessible map.

One such project that we did not document because we felt that it has been discussed sufficiently in both mainstream and citizen media is Vote Report India. In fact, co-founder Gaurav Mishra has joked that perhaps there were more articles about the project than reports submitted to the platform. Mishra has also written an excellent and candid evaluation of the project, which lists successes, failures, and - most importantly - lessons learned for the next incarnation of the platform for the 2014 Indian elections.

Last month saw the first multiparty election to take place in Sudan in over 20 years. Sudan Vote Monitor is one of many Ushahidi-based websites we reviewed that allow voters to report irregularities by submitting text messages which are then verified by a partner NGO and placed on a map. To understand the context behind Sudan Vote Monitor and the difficulty in implementing a technology project in Sudan, I highly recommend Rebekah Heacock's post, “Sudan: Is ICT all it's cracked up to be?” Most of the attention given to the initiative during the election itself focused on the fact that the site was temporarily blocked by the government. Less reported was the website's impact on ensuring credible elections. According to the website itself, 257 reports of voting irregularities were received. In a followup interview with Heacock, project coordinator Fareed Zein says that number is probably somewhere between 300 - 500 if you count all SMS reports, which have yet to be added to the system. But few, if any, of these reports have been verified, and there has been no official response to any of the reports. Still, Zein suggests that the objective of this first implementation was simply to create more information, rather than necessarily holding anyone accountable:

"In previous elections it was all a closed door affair — nobody knew exactly what went on on the ground. The intention of this was to be able to get the information out to the public, internally and externally, about what's going on. Just being able to get the word out was enough for us. We didn't set out to try to urge anybody to take any specific action. Our mission was to get the information out and then let people judge and act for themselves."

Zein says it is likely that Sudan Vote Monitor will be used again during the January 2011 Southern Sudanese independence referendum.

Like Vote Report India and Sudan Vote Monitor, Cuidemos el Voto is another national election monitoring platform that uses Ushahidi. Co-founder Oscar Salazar notes that, while Mexico transitioned to multiparty democracy in 2000 with the election of Vicente Fox, vote buying and conditional cash transfer programs are still corrupting the democratic process. Cuidemos el Voto managed to achieve something important that other, similar projects lacked: support and endorsement from an official government body, in this case, Mexico's Special Prosecutor's Office. Still, that endorsement did not apparently lead to any sort of accountability. For example, on July 5, 2009 someone reported that in Puebla they were offering 500 pesos to vote for the PAN party. But this report wasn't verified and we don't see any kind of followup. For such election monitoring projects to make an impact in terms of accountability, they need the staff and resources to verify all reports and ensure that the proper government body responds. Or, perhaps more appropriately, they must partner with other organizations who can invest in the long haul of followup work. It could even be the perfect semester-length project for a political science graduate-level class.

The African Elections Project differs slightly from other election monitoring projects we reviewed in that 1) it doesn't use Ushahidi and 2) it focuses on multiple countries throughout Sub-Saharan Africa. The project, funded by the Open Society Initiative for West Africa, uses new media tools to produce and disseminate more information about elections in ten African countries including Malawi, Namibia, Botswana, Niger, Guinea, Mozambique, Mauritania and Togo. Their hope is that more watchful eyes reporting on the electoral process will help prevent and expose vote fraud, and encourage clean elections. However, most of the countries where they work have broadband penetration levels between five and ten percent. Until there is greater connectivity, the impact of an online project like African Elections Project is inherently circumscribed, despite its relatively large budget.

VoteReport PH is the last Ushahidi-based election monitoring initiative we reviewed. Most of these projects were only attract the participation of very few users because there was not broad awareness that the websites exist at all. VoteReport PH is different in that its team spent six months prior to the election going around the country and giving voter education classes about how to use automated voting machines (which were used for the first time), and simultaneously, how to submit reports to VoteReporter PH by sending text messages. Such on-the-ground outreach work is necessary in order to create more awareness about citizen election monitoring platforms. In all, 654 reports of voting irregularities were submitted. For example, at 1 p.m. on May 10 “massive vote buying” was reported by an anonymous contributor via text message. We are told that the report was verified, but there is no further detail on what constitutes verification, or if anything was done to follow up on the report. One very useful strategy by the VoteReportPH team was to write a separate blog post highlighting the most urgent reports of vote fraud. They also published a helpful blog post summarizing some of their early experiences and conclusions. I recommend Mong Palatino's overview, “Monitoring Philippine Elections through Social Media“, to get a better idea of how Twitter and blogging played a distributed role in monitoring the Philippine elections.

Though Ushahidi was created to map reports of violence that occurred after Kenya's 2007 election, it was quickly adapted to monitor elections themselves. In addition to the above-mentioned case studies, Ushahidi was also used to map voting irregularities in Afghanistan and Lebanon.

Ushahidi implementations have already been set up for Colombia's presidential election later this month, the Puebla municipal elections in July, and Brazil's general election in October.

Recommendations:

We recommend to project implementers that they plan at least one year ahead of the elections they will monitor. In addition to the technical challenges of implementing and localizing the Ushahidi platform, they must also concentrate on outreach efforts to 1) establish an SMS shortcode, 2) hold on-the-ground training workshops, 3) partner with relevant civil society organizations, and 4) partner with media organizations to spread awareness. Such projects should also seek funding to cover the expenses of marketing the project via billboards, radio commercials, posters, and leaflets. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, election monitoring platforms should establish strong relationships with the governing electoral commission in order to agree upon a protocol for verifying and acting on reports of vote fraud. Without a signed agreement in place, the project is unlikely to make a concrete impact toward greater accountability and credibility of elections.

We recommend that online election monitoring projects partner with students at universities to verify and follow up on all submitted reports, similar to how Tufts University students worked to verify reports submitted to the Ushahidi implementation for the Haiti earthquake.

We recommend to funders that they fund specific election-related plugins that make Ushahidi a more functional platform for election monitoring. Oscar Salazar of Cuidemos el Voto has noted that Ushahidi lacks certain features for election monitoring:

"Ushahidi's main design was to provide a common pool of reports. So if I started giving administrative access to everyone, everyone will see the same pools . What happen's if two NGOs that are associated with two different political parties get access to the same pool and start approving or disapproving the reports? I don't want everyone to have access to the same pool. i want to give special accounts to different NGOs, where they see only their own reports plus the citizen reports. Ushahidi wasnt designed for a lot of NGOs working together. So we are tweaking it for these local elections to make it work in this way."

The tweaks by the Cuidemos el Voto team should be packaged into a plugin that can be shared with other election monitoring initiatives.

We recommend to the Ushahidi team and to their funders, that increased emphasis be placed on documentation, especially in regard to best practices regarding election monitoring. Patrick Meier has written an introductory primer and Erik Hersman has made a forum posting to compare common election-related categories, but there is still a lack of needed documentation for any activist wanting to use Ushahidi to monitor elections. We suggest that Ushahidi aspire to a documentation resource as thorough and easily accessible as WordPress' Codex.

We recommend that researchers do both more longitudinal and comparative research in order to better understand the impact and methodology of online, citizen election monitoring websites. How does verification compare across projects? What strategies bring about accountability? How do you increase the signal to noise ratio for submitted reports? How do you best visualize reports to inspire action? What are obstacles to collaboration with traditional election monitoring organizations? What are the pros and cons of anonymity in citizen election reporting? These are just a few open-ended questions that require more research.

Finally, we recommend that multilateral and civil society organizations focused on election monitoring organize an international event to bring together the coordinators and technologists behind the various online election monitoring websites we have listed above to share experiences and prepare improved documentation for future implementations. This has already happened at the regional level in East Africa, which led to calls for a “Tech Election Monitoring Toolbox”, but it should also happen at the international level to share skills, techniques, resources, and future plans across distinct tech communities.

In the next post we will summarize and offer our recommendations related to more categories of case studies from the Technology for Transparency Network.

Nigeria is fifty years old having gained independence in 1960. Fifty years is a significant year in the life of any organisation or nation. It is the year of jubilee and it has symbolic and spiritual significance. It is therefore a good year to reflect on the challenges facing the nation.

Scholars are in agreement that every society has the capacity to develop and all societies strive for development. But the concept of development is a very controversial one. We have argued elsewhere that the definitions and interpretations of development are influenced by history, discipline, ideological orientation and training. In this paper, we examine the challenges of development in Nigeria. But first, we explicate the concept of development.

The MENA-OECD Conference on Gender Equality in Government and Business brought together participants from 19 OECD countries, 14 MENA countries, and several regional and international organisations including the Arab Administrative Development Organisation, the World Bank, UNIFEM, and the Union of Arab Banks. Several NGOs and universities were also present, including AFEM (the Moroccan businesswomen’s association), the Arab International Women’s Forum (AIWF), the Centre of Arab Women for Training and Research (CAWTAR), the Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE), Lund University, the European Academy for Law and Legislation, Secours Islamique, and the Women’s Forum for the Economy and Society. The conference provided an excellent opportunity to present the findings of recent international research on gender issues. Drawing on concrete examples of successful gender strategies, participants identified best practices and collectively determined future avenues for action. The discussions resulted in proposals for regional activities to support MENA countries in their ongoing efforts to promote gender equality in public management and business.

OPENING SESSION

The chairs of the MENA-OECD Initiative, H.E. Mr. Mohammed Saâd El Alami, the Moroccan Minister of Public Sector Modernisation, and H.E. Mr. Nizar Baraka, the Moroccan Minister of Economic and General Affairs, opened the conference by recognising the importance of women’s contribution to economic development and highlighting policy actions taken by their government over the last decade. They underlined that despite significant efforts to improve women’s situation in the MENA region, public and private sector actors will have to work together to reduce persistent discrimination and gender inequalities. Improving the educational system and increasing women’s labour force participation were presented as two key conditions for enhanced gender equality and the development of the middle class in the MENA region.

H.E. Ms Karen Kornbluh, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of the United States to the OECD, reported about the support of her government to the MENA region to enforce women’s rights and increase their participation in the economy. Ambassador Kornbluh underlined her personal support to the MENA-OECD Initiative by announcing her acceptance to co-chair the OECD-MENA Women’s Business Forum. She encouraged the Initiative to contribute to the OECD’s planned horizontal project on gender equality in employment, education and entrepreneurship.

SESSION 1: ATTRACTING TALENT TO THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTORS

Because women represent half of the world’s human capital, facilitating their participation in the labour force is a means of capitalising on the available talent pool, thereby increasing countries’ competitiveness. Participants explored strategies for increasing gender diversity in the workplace – in both the public and private sectors – and discussed their impact on innovation, competitiveness, efficiency, and quality of service delivery. They reported on enabling factors, challenges and possible impacts of their strategies.

Participants:

• Identified three main reasons for attracting and retaining talented women in decision-making positions: the rights argument, the resource argument and the performance argument;
• Highlighted studies which show evidence of barriers to women’s economic involvement including social obstacles and religious interpretations, and stressed the importance of ensuring gender equality in the law;
• Stressed the importance of addressing gender imbalances in the public sector, in particular in MENA countries, where the public administration remains the main, and sometimes exclusive employer of women;
• Identified tools for attracting talent, such as: legal and regulatory review, blind tests in recruitment processes, gender labels and other incentives, monitoring and reporting on women’s representation by public and private sector employers, and sanction mechanisms;
• Suggested putting in place means to allow for a better work/life balance;
• Underlined the value of building women’s leadership capacities through training, mentoring, and networking;
• Stressed the importance of raising awareness and combating stereotypes through high-level political support and the promotion of positive role models by the media.

Actions of the Initiative:

• Link up with other initiatives involved in promoting women’s empowerment, education, employment, and entrepreneurship in the MENA region to build on synergies, and to create a “network of networks”;
• Engage in studies and peer reviews to identify good practices for both attracting and retaining women to top level positions in public administrations and business;
• Provide concrete means to support women’s empowerment (e.g. coaching and training).

SESSION 2: PROS AND CONS OF QUOTAS

Women’s representation in decision-making positions – managerial positions, corporate boards, and political positions – is low in both MENA and OECD countries. Affirmative action measures, such as quotas, have been taken to remediate existing gender imbalances. Governments and businesses have experimented with different types of voluntary or legally binding quotas, such as: reserved seats in parliament, minimum thresholds for electoral slates, quotas for political parties, and quotas or targets in public and private sector employment. Their use has generated intense controversy in MENA and OECD countries related to justice, democracy and equality considerations. Participants discussed the use of quotas as a measure to achieve greater gender diversity in the workplace, in particular in decision-making bodies in the public and private sectors. They discussed the theoretical expectations of different programmes, showcased experiences in implementing and enforcing different types of quotas and discussed their impacts on gender equality. They also reflected on the applicability of such a policy tool in countries with low female labour force participation rates.

Participants:

• Highlighted different country experiences with the implementation of quotas – only few OECD countries have introduced mandatory quotas, and some have introduced legislation on voluntary quotas;
• Noted that they may not necessarily be in support of quotas, but that evidence has proven that the introduction of quotas is the most efficient means to enhance women’s participation in both the public and the private sector;
• Pointed out when there are no quotas, men generally hold the leading positions;
• Supported the establishment of progressive quotas that increase with time, to be lifted when the concept of equality is a reality;
• Underlined that quotas have so far mainly been introduced in government but that they can also be applied to companies which are encouraged to reflect their codes of conduct (this can be accompanied by ”gender labels” which reward companies with higher representation of women in decision-making positions)
• Underlined that clear and transparent standards would be necessary to avoid the concern that the use of quotas contradicts the principles of merit and competence;
• Stressed the need to complement quotas with other measures including financial support to engage in politics. Actions of the Initiative:
• Consider commissioning studies on human resource management in the public and private sector and best ways to introduce quotas and identify criteria to ensure the effectiveness of quotas as a means of supporting the promotion of women’s talents;
• Collect examples and data on how women contribute to economic growth.

SESSION 3: WOMEN’S ACCESS TO GOVERNMENT AND BUSINESS SERVICES

Equal access to government and business services is a precondition for women’s empowerment. In practice, however, institutional, cultural, or practical obstacles may constrain women’s access to services. In this session, participants examined structures, institutions, policies and processes, which either advance or impede women’s access to services. Participants explored gender-specific biases in service delivery and provided examples of good practices for adapting service design and delivery mechanisms to women’s specific needs and constraints. Discussions covered several themes such as women’s access to public services, to justice, to finance, and to business support services.

Participants:

• Stressed the importance of access to information in both the public and private sectors, and that institutional and business climate reforms are essential to accompany women and to ensure their access to public services, justice, finance, and business support services;
• Acknowledged that ICT tools can facilitate women’s access to public services, but can also widen the gender gap;
• Reported on the difficulties women may encounter to access finance and land in the MENA region when establishing and expanding their businesses;
• Highlighted women’s unequal access to justice services in the MENA region, which are often too expensive, distant, do not respond to women’s needs or do not allow the prosecution of discrimination, injustice and violations of women rights. The high prevalence rates of violence against women are an important indicator for insufficient accountability in terms of law application and enforcement;
• Noted that several tools can help promote women’s equal access to justice, including gender budget analysis (to take stock of public spending devoted to the national justice system with performance indicators), reviews of policy priorities, regulatory impact analysis, analysis of women’s access to justice, and the development of indicators for monitoring purposes;
• Reported on women’s unequal access to public services at local and national level and noted that a range of diversified tools should be put in place to enhance women’s access to public services, including the use of ICT tools, comprehensive impact evaluations, gender budgeting, networks of locally elected decision-makers, mediation services, public service satisfaction surveys, gender databases, and job databases for gender experts;
• Received a presentation on the OECD-MENA Women’s Business Forum, a regional body which supports the expansion of women-led businesses and women’s employment through policy assessments and recommendations, as well as training and mentoring for women entrepreneurs in the MENA region.

Actions of the Initiative:

• Lend support to the work of the MENA-OECD Gender Focus Group and the OECD-MENA Women’s Business Forum, in particular by organising capacity-building training workshops, and by facilitating mentoring and networking between women decision-makers and entrepreneurs in OECD and MENA countries;
• Enhance policy dialogue through the WBF’s interactive web platform;

CONCLUDING REMARKS

In the concluding remarks, the co-chairs of the MENA-OECD Initiative, H.E. Cristina Narbona-Ruiz, Ambassador and Permanent Representative from Spain to the OECD and H.E. Mr. Chris Hoornaert, Ambassador and Permanent Representative from Belgium to the OECD:

• Welcomed the opportunity to engage in an active debate over gender equality with an audience composed of men and women;
• Underlined the need to carry the discussions forward in a gender-balanced platform;
• Provided support to the MENA-OECD Gender Focus Group and to the OECD-MENA Women’s Business Forum which should provide, in collaboration with other international and regional government and non-governmental organisations, analytical and practical support to women in the MENA region;
• Suggested that the MENA-OECD Gender Focus Group and the OECD-MENA Women’s Business Forum take into account the discussions and recommendations put forth during the conference, and incorporate them into their respective Programmes of Work;
• Welcomed the input of these groups to the horizontal OECD-wide project on gender.

Actions of the Initiative:

• The OECD-MENA Women’s Business Forum (Investment Programme) will reconvene in autumn 2010 and in order to mainstream women’s entrepreneurship it will forward its work and conclusions to the MENA-OECD Business Council to complement and support its recommendations;
• The Gender Focus Group (Governance Programme) will come together on 4 June 2010 in Tunis to address the question of gender analysis in regulatory quality frameworks and in autumn 2010 in Cairo;

The rise of corruption as an issue on the international agenda is recent; and, in a relatively short period of time, it has achieved significant importance. Initially a marginalized element in international aid programs, corruption is now regarded as a dynamic feature on the development agenda. As a consequence, a heightened sense of accountability among politicians, public bodies, and institutions has emerged, as has a consequent demand for anticorruption agencies.

These agencies are created with great optimism and fanfare. They often are the major initiative by a new party or government swept into office on a reform platform. In most cases, the initial publicity around these agencies and the officials appointed to run them is positive and supportive.

However, it seems to take little time for that “honeymoon period” to end. In South Africa, for example, the Directorate of Special Operations (an elite unit of investigators known as the Scorpions), established in 1999, officially was abolished by Parliament in 2009. The Scorpions were responsible for prosecutions against then-President of the African National Congress Jacob Zuma and his financial adviser Schabir Shaik. Jackie Selebi, the national police chief and an ally of former President Thabo Mbeki, also was arrested. The police force’s Directorate of Priority Crime Investigation, which has less statutory protection from political interference, has taken over the Scorpions’ mandate.

Anti-corruption agencies often are under extraordinary scrutiny from many different quarters. Their lack of quick action to address corruption is interpreted often as incompetence or political favoritism. The perceptions of the media and public can overwhelm an agency and force it into a defensive position. From there, it cannot actively honor its mandate and fight corruption; rather, it can only react. Anti-corruption agencies face two closely interconnected forces: the media and the public, including civil society organizations (see case study A). The media and the public pass judgment on the work of the agencies, and they play an active role in fighting corruption. The media largely determine where both forces stand: with or against the agency. If the forces stand against, an agency’s work may turn out to be simply futile. If the forces stand in favor, an agency is more likely to be successful. Furthermore, when the media supports the anti-corruption agency’s work, it is possible to turn the culture of an entire country toward openness and accountability.

Communication determines where the media stand in this struggle. And anti-corruption agencies themselves determine how much and how well they communicate with the media and with citizens. To their immense cost, many agencies underestimate the critical challenges and negative effects of weak and inadequate communication. This failure is one of the reasons why we are losing the fight against corruption.

When a media storm occurs, the absence of an agency’s response to the alleged corruption under investigation can facilitate an adverse perception in the public mind. Unchecked, such a perception may develop into assumptions about an agency’s legitimacy. In those circumstances, an agency can promote public trust in its operations by acting on an agreed media strategy. Providing basic information does not have to incorporate an acceptance or denial of the allegations. Instead, the public appetite can be satisfied with basic background information on why the allegation arose, what measures are in place, and what steps are to be taken.

This paper provides a practical overview of how an agency may work with the media to win the support of the public in the fight against corruption. The first part explains why anti-corruption agencies need to take the media particularly seriously, how the media communicate, and what effects they have on the public. Case studies illustrate all of these points - showing, for instance, how the media can distort the reality of corruption by following their own preformed perceptions of a corruption case. Government agencies can set things straight only by providing sufficient and clear information, and by working closely with the media to ensure the message is accurate.

The second part of the paper focuses on the role of public opinion in the fight against corruption. Public opinion can be a powerful tool in promoting an agency’s work - or in bringing about its downfall. If citizens misunderstand the issue, they are unlikely to support the fight against corruption. But if public opinion is in favor of an anti-corruption agency, the people are able to change their country’s culture.

The media can shape public opinion and, most of all, change norms about corruption. Here is an example: Communication campaigns can show that it not only is illegal to pay bribes to public officials, but also is immoral and does real harm to the community. This message can encourage the public to change the expectation of bribes and to resist demands for them - one more step in the fight against corruption. In India, for instance, anti-corruption efforts led to the printing of the “zero-rupee” note with a picture of Gandhi on its face. These notes were given to bribe seekers to shame them.

In the context of public opinion, it also is important that anti-corruption agencies understand the role of journalism and the conditions under which journalists work. Their reporting directly influences the perceptions and opinions of the public. Because of economic and other pressures, journalists often tend to simplify or dramatize stories - and that can produce the wrong perceptions among their audiences. Again, this paper provides real-world stories that show the impact of journalism on public opinion. Anti-corruption agencies have another large problem to overcome: they must communicate and clarify the differences between types and degrees of corruption. Moral corruption is not necessarily legal corruption, and petty corruption is not the same as grand corruption. A common definition of corruption has been suggested by Transparency International. Another helpful source for understanding the actual meaning of corruption is the list of offenses presented by the United Nations Convention against Corruption. The third part of this paper addresses the difficulty of communicating these complex issues, including the specific case of asset recovery.

The citizenry as well as government officials may misjudge the success of an agency’s work entirely if they measure it only through the simplified corruption indexes that some civil society organizations regularly publish. These indexes are perception based, and can over - or underreport the actual level of corruption in a country. The fourth part of the paper addresses communication in this context. The media may overemphasize the problem of corruption by honing in on a specific number from a corruption index. People reading or hearing that message may believe that corruption is a greater problem than it actually is and that the corruption-countering agencies are not doing their jobs. If people are helped to understand how various indexes are structured, they are more likely to apply them correctly. Clear and comprehensive information is needed to explain the role of such indexes to the media and their audiences.

The fifth part of this paper gives practical, handson advice for dealing with the media and for building corruption-fighting coalitions with the media and civil society. Anti-corruption agencies need to use very specific communication techniques such as framing - to make their messages interesting to and easily understood by the media and the public. There are particular problems that must be addressed and overcome when planning a communication campaign. For instance, the lack of freedom of information and speech can hinder any good work done by the media. Journalists need to be motivated to investigate corruption cases, so media bias has to be overcome. The paper concludes with pragmatic media actions that can be taken by anti-corruption agencies.

In addition to its discussion of the role of the media, this paper also provides several tools and checklists for agencies. These tools either have proved helpful to practitioners in other contexts or have been assembled directly by anti-corruption agency officials. The first toolkit comprises tools that list real-world challenges that anti-corruption agencies face in their daily work and activities designed to help meet those challenges. The second tool is a road map for designing a communication strategy with steps that easily can be followed to realize a desired outcome. The last tool sketches the phases of a coalition-building strategy, from building trust to achieving sustainable transformation.

Overall, this paper is designed to help anti-corruption agencies become more effective in fighting corruption. Communication is crucial for enlisting the media and civil society as partners in the fight. Agencies do not necessarily have to fear the media and civil society organizations. Instead, those groups can become strong supporters of anti-corruption efforts if agencies know how to work with them. This paper provides the guidance and tools to equip agencies to counter corruption with a new weapon: communication.

The handbook is now available for download!

Global Integrity, an award-winning international non-profit organization dedicated to tracking governance and corruption trends around the world, is seeking interested journalists, researchers, social scientists, and other experts with a background in governance and corruption issues to prepare the Global Integrity Report: 2010.

The Global Integrity Report is a compilation of in-depth country assessments prepared by local experts that combines qualitative journalistic reporting with quantitative data gathering to produce a powerful “snapshot” of the strengths and weaknesses of national anti-corruption mechanisms. The Report is widely used by development experts and aid donors; reform-minded governments; private sector investors; and grassroots journalists and advocates to prioritize governance challenges and promote anti-corruption reform efforts.

In February 2010, Global Integrity released its Global Integrity Report: 2009, covering more than 35 diverse countries around the world. Final country selection for the Global Integrity Report: 2010 has not yet been determined and is influenced in part by the interest expressed by qualified country experts, all of whom are compensated for their efforts. We invite any expert from any country to express their interest in collaborating with us.

To learn more about collaborating with us on the Global Integrity Report: 2010, please see the Fact Sheet below. Interested candidates, including those colleagues who have worked with us before, should apply online no later than June 1, 2010 by visiting http://www.globalintegrity.org/apply. Additional information about Global Integrity is available on our website (http://www.globalintegrity.org).

We look forward to working with you to produce another groundbreaking report in 2010.

Nathaniel Heller
Managing Director

Global Integrity Report: 2010 – Call for Experts Fact Sheet

Who We Are: Global Integrity is an international, non-profit, non-partisan organization dedicated to tracking governance and corruption trends around the world. We work with local in-country experts to combine journalistic reporting with in-depth data gathering to produce actionable analysis that arms decision makers – including donors, government officials, investors, journalists, and grassroots advocates – with evidence-based strategies for promoting anti-corruption reform. Our work is unique in that it relies on the contributions of local in-country experts and seeks to assess the opposite of corruption (i.e., good governance and anti-corruption mechanisms) rather than corruption itself.

What We Do: Our flagship publication is the Global Integrity Report, which is comprised of individual country assessments exploring the existence and effectiveness of national anti-corruption mechanisms. The two primary components of each country assessment are the Integrity Indicators scorecard and the Reporter’s Notebook. In each country that we cover, we hire a lead researcher to carry out investigative research (through interviews and document research) to score our more than 300 Integrity Indicators. The Indicators assess the laws, institutions, and mechanisms designed to curb or deter abuses of power in a country; the degree to which those mechanisms are implemented in practice; and the extent to which citizens have access to those anti-corruption mechanisms. In parallel, we hire a lead reporter in the same country to prepare a short (approximately 1,250-word) qualitative “Reporter’s Notebook” that highlights, in narrative form, the current climate of corruption in the country – how corruption looks, tastes, feels and smells to the average citizen. Finally, we hire 3-5 peer reviewers (both in-country and out-of-country experts) who blindly review both the Reporter’s Notebooks and the Integrity Indicators to contribute additional information, comments, and criticisms of both products – the peer review comments are published as an integral component of the final country report. You can find examples of our country reports as well as a detailed description of our methodology on the Report’s website: http://report.globalintegrity.org.

Who We Are Looking For: We are seeking qualified and motivated experts to work with Global Integrity as we go into the field in 2010. We are inviting interested journalists, researchers, social scientists, and academic experts from any country with expertise in governance and corruption issues to apply online at http://www.globalintegrity.org/apply no later than June 1, 2010.

A qualified Lead Journalist will fit the following profile:

An experienced journalist with a background covering politics and economics and currently working in the country of study. Having reported for international publications is a plus. Lead journalists should have a working knowledge of corruption issues in the country and should be able to write and communicate in English. Please include relevant clips as part of your application. Accuracy, professionalism, objectivity, and independence are critical qualifications. All applicants should be familiar with the AP Stylebook.

A qualified Lead Researcher will fit the following profile:

A proven researcher with experience conducting original fieldwork projects of similar or larger scale to the scoring the Integrity Indicators. While we prefer our lead researchers to have direct experience studying corruption, we often hire experts with background in the broader democracy, rule of law, governance, and human rights fields. Lead researchers must be working in the country of study and be independent of government (having not served in a government position for at least 3 years) with at least 5 years relevant professional experience. A strong command of English is essential.

A qualified Peer Reviewer will fit the following profile:

A country-specific expert located either within the country of study or abroad. Successful peer reviewers can come from a variety of backgrounds (journalism, academia, NGOs, private sector) but must have a working understanding of corruption issues in the country of study. Peer reviewers must have at least 3-5 years of related professional experience and working English.

Timing: We anticipate lead researchers and journalists beginning their fieldwork in late-June 2010, with initial submissions due to Global Integrity in late-August 2010. Peer reviewers will receive the draft reporting and data for their review beginning in September 2010. Our goal is to release the Global Integrity Report: 2010 in February 2011.

Country Selection: The Global Integrity Report: 2009 was the first in a series of more standardized Global Integrity Reports with regard to country coverage. We have identified a core set of 70 countries to be covered on a biennial basis beginning in 2009. Half of the countries on our list of 70 were included in the Global Integrity Report: 2009 while the other half will be covered in 2010. These groups of 35 countries will continue to be covered every other year, while additional countries of interest and importance will be added to the “core” group on an ad hoc basis. The core 2010 countries are:

Albania
Angola
Argentina
Bangladesh
Bolivia
Bulgaria
Cameroon
Canada
East Timor
Ecuador
Egypt
Ethiopia
Guatemala
Hungary
Italy
Japan
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
Malaysia
Moldova
Morocco
Nigeria
Pakistan
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Romania
Russia
Somalia
South Africa
Tanzania
Thailand
Turkey
West Bank and Gaza
Yemen

If you do not see your country of expertise on the list, we still encourage you to complete the online application, as your country may ultimately be added to this list or included in future rounds of the Global Integrity Report. We welcome applications from all experts in all countries.

Compensation: We compensate all of our experts for their efforts. Global Integrity generally contracts with individuals, not institutions, and final payment schedules and deadlines are agreed upon in a contract before work commences. We typically pay our lead reporters approximately US$1,500 for preparing the Reporter’s Notebooks, our lead researchers approximately US$2,250 for scoring the Integrity Indicators, and our peer reviewers US$300 for each country assessment they review (some review more than one country assessment and are compensated additionally).

Working towards an ideal
By Bongani Qwabe

With the recent wave of democratisation in southern Africa the emphasis is now on how to improve the system of local government. Democratisation in the region marked the development of municipal legislation which requires not only that policies, structures and processes change, but that the very culture of local government becomes more responsive and democratic in pursuit of the developmental challenges envisaged in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) declaration.

The MDGs are emphatic that local governments should work towards realisation of the basic socio-economic rights that contribute to human development. In a major shift in developmental thinking, improving the human condition and placing it at the centre of progress, is now the focus of achieving the MDGs.

Consequently, local governments have explicit objectives, such as fighting extreme poverty and addressing unemployment and HIV/AIDS. Therefore, local governments have to make considerable efforts to integrate MDGs into their local development plans, including adopting local policies and programmess to facilitate the achievement of MDGs.

Furthermore, it is mandatory that local governments promote participatory governance as this will improve the effectiveness of people in various functions and roles. Local governments should continue to strive toward quality in governance and development at local level by encouraging citizen engagement and participation in decision-making processes. Good governance must actively be promoted.

The advancement of good governance should be based on the following key pillars:

• citizen awareness and capacity building for government officials and civil society to address governance issues;
• participation from the bottom up in the deliberation of policy decisions;
• sound policy framework for improving governance at local level and quality of life for disadvantaged communities.

It is important to note that good governance is not just about providing a range of local services, it is also about creating space for democratic participation and civil dialogue; about environmentally sustainable local development, and facilitating outcomes that enrich the quality of life of citizens.

Unqualified and total good governance is an ideal which few countries and societies have come even close to achieving. But, if we want to ensure sustainable human development, action must be taken to work towards this ideal.

In this first edition of Local Governance Barometer, you can read about the exciting work of the Local Governance Unit (LGU) of the African Democracy Institute (Idasa) in its attempts to strengthen democracy and good governance through its local government capacity development projects in South Africa, Botswana, Zambia and Malawi.

Since its inception in 1995 the LGU has been engaged and instrumental in helping local governments in Africa build and shape democratic institutions for effective local governance systems.

Bongani Qwabe is the Manager of the Local Governance Unit at Idasa

The Country-level Advocacy Toolkit aims to help NSS managers and statisticians in developing countries start their own advocacy work and to demonstrate the advantages of planning advocacy systematically. It gathers, in a single package, advocacy methodology, tools, tips and messages.

As there are many different ways to conceptualize advocacy and no internationally agreed definition, it is essential to share a common definition of advocacy. “Advocacy is pleading for, defending or recommending an idea before key people” in order to obtain change. Whenever change is sought, advocacy is concerned.

It is also important to have a clear understanding of the differences between advocacy and other related concepts, such as communication, dissemination, lobbying. Communication is the mere process by which information is exchanged and as such, is the umbrella concept. Data dissemination is about providing and promoting access to statistical products. Lobbying includes all attempts to influence organized groups. Governments often define and regulate organized group lobbying.

The Toolkit deals with statistical advocacy at country-level. It focuses on statistical advocacy as a means to convince policy-makers, civil society, Media, NGOs and representatives of multilateral and bilateral agencies in developing countries of the importance of statistics in the wider context of development and, in particular, of the necessity for developing countries to have a well-prepared, adequately funded and succesfully implemented National Strategy for the Development of Statistics (NSDS). The NSDS is both a product and a process aimed at improving the NSS.

The product is a document which provides an assessment of the National Statistical System (NSS) and converts statistical priorities into a detailed but flexible work program over a 5-10 year period. As a process, it includes three main inter-linked stages, namely the preliminary, design and implementation. It helps break the “vicious circle” of weak production of statistics and, as such, appears as one of the main opportunities for statistical advocacy, in particular at its design stage. Every opportunity should be taken to show how the implementation of the NSDS will contribute to statistical development in the country and therefore to development itself.

With the target dates set for the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the widespread implementation of Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRSPs), statistical advocacy is all the more relevant.

A large part of effective advocacy depends on the relationships that advocates develop with decision-makers and other key audiences. The stronger the ties of trust and mutual support between advocates and audiences, the more effective those advocates will be. Often you can do together what no one can do alone. Building an advocacy network with all the partners (policy-makers, statisticians) will be a challenging yet rewarding initiative.

But where does country-level advocacy stand and on which levels does it operate? The toolkit provides assistance to NSS managers and statisticians in developing countries advocating to specific targets.

At country-level, the targeted audiences are:

1. Policy-makers in developing countries
   Prime Minister, Minister in charge of statistics, Government “spokesperson”, Finance/Economy ministry, Rural development ministry, Education Ministry, Health and Social Affairs ministry, Fishing ministry, Labor ministry, Planning ministry, Agriculture ministry, Trade ministry, PRSP coordinators, NSDS coordinators, Parliamentarians, Ambassadors.
   
   Change: policy-makers are convinced of the advantages of the NSDS and allocate a bigger proportion of their national budgets to the implementation of the NSDS and scale-up support to statistical capacity building.


2. Civil society, media, NGOs in developing countries
   Change: the civil society recognizes the importance of statistics and collaborates more easily during surveys and in lobbying government.


3. Multilateral and bilateral representatives in developing countries
   European Union representative, World Bank representative, IMF representative, Chief of cooperation representative, UN representative.
   
   Change: representatives recognize that the use of better statistics improves development and they allocate resources, to support statistical development.

The extent to which health rights are neglected or promoted is a major factor in the promotion of public health and health equity in Africa. As a result, health and human rights have been incorporated in international and regional human rights treaties and in national laws, policies and strategies. Central to the recognition of health rights is the incorporation of the right to health in the national Constitutions. The national constitutions are the supreme laws of the country and any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect. This means that observing a right as a constitutional right provides a bench mark for the government obligations to respect, protect, fulfil and promote the right to health.

This report presents a desk review of the constitutional provisions on the right to health in 14 countries in east and southern Africa (ESA) covered by EQUINET: Angola, Botswana, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zimbabwe and Zambia, one other country Congo Brazzaville. It does not cover two countries in the region covered by EQUINET, DRC and Mauritius, due to difficulties with accessing information. The review was carried out within the Regional Network for Equity in Health in East and Southern Africa (EQUINET) by the Center for Health, Human Right and Development, and co-ordinated by Training and Research Support Centre.

This paper used the six core obligations as spelt out in General Comment 14 to assess the inclusion of the right to health in the constitutional provisions of the ESA countries:

• to ensure the right of access to health facilities, goods and services on a nondiscriminatory basis, especially for vulnerable or marginalised groups;
• to ensure access to the minimum essential food which is nutritionally adequate and safe, to ensure freedom from hunger to everyone;
• to ensure access to basic shelter, housing and sanitation, and an adequate supply of safe and potable water;
• to provide essential drugs, as from time to time defined under the WHO Action Programme on Essential Drugs;
• to ensure equitable distribution of all health facilities, goods and services; and
• to adopt and implement a national public health strategy and plan of action

In general, the analysis suggests that, although some Constitutions expressly provide for the right to health, many do not and this right is rather inferred from other rights.. In some countries the right to health is restricted to principles of State policy and objective and thus excluded from enforcement by courts of law, as is the case with Lesotho. South Africa is a unique case in the region, as its Constitution combines the right to health with other rights critical for its realisation, such as the right to food, to water and to social security.

Some countries provide for the right to medical services and health care, rather than the right to health, as in the Constitution of Mozambique. Madagascar’s constitution makes reference to international human rights instruments that spell out the right to health. This means that even if the Constitution is silent on the right to health, the provisions of these international instruments can be invoked to remind the State of its obligations.

Most of the constitutions in the region capture the right to life as one of the fundamental human rights. Some permit taking life when enforcing the death penalty. Most also permit the limitation of other rights to ensure protection of public health and safety. In fact, for some countries, this limitation of rights in the public interest was the primary mention of health in their Constitutions.

We suggest that countries in the region review how other ESA countries have crafted the provisions on the right to health in their constitutions and familiarise with the relevant international human rights instruments, to inform their constitutional reform processes. We suggest some ‘best practice’ examples below from the constitutions in the region as an input to constitutional review processes (see page 21 for full details):

• With regard to the right of access to health facilities, goods and services on a non-discriminatory basis, Article 116 of Mozambique's Constitution:
• On access to food that is nutritionally adequate and safe, and to ensure freedom from hunger to everyone, Uganda Constitution, Objective XXII
• The South African Constitution provides good provisions access to basic shelter, housing and sanitation, and an adequate supply of safe and potable water. In Section 26
• Section 27 of the South African Constitution provides for health care, food, water and social security.
• In terms of equitable distribution of all health facilities, goods and services, Section 116(4) of the Constitution of Mozambique.
• Regarding the national public health strategy addressing the health concerns of the whole population, Article 13(c) of the Constitution of Malawi could be a reference point.
• Almost all constitutions have general provisions on prohibition of conduct injurious to health. There range from restricting other rights to the most extreme form in the death penalty.

This study reviewed the law as written. We thus recommend that further study be done in those countries that have express provisions on the right to health on how they have implemented and enforced this right, including how advocates of health rights have subjected constitutional provisions to court interpretation. We also recommend further review of how rights to health are being dealt with in countries where they are not explicitly provided for in the national constitutions.

Purpose: This report was commissioned by the NTA (National Taxpayers Association) to gauge citizen perceptions of public accountability in Kenya. The study will be used to design a more comprehensive quantitative survey to inform strategy and mechanisms for improved citizen participation in public accountability processes.

Methods: The study is based on a representative cross section of citizens in 8 regions across Kenya. The research involved 24 Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) in rural and semi-urban areas across Kenya, comprising women, men & youth. In addition, 22 Key Informant Interviews (KII) were conducted Malaa, Western Province and Mukirunge, Coast Province.

1. Citizen Perceptions of Government Funds and Services

Citizens could mention roughly half the available government funds and services, and were sometimes confused as to which was which, showing that more civic education is needed.

All groups understood that it was citizens who paid for government services and funds through taxation, and specifically through VAT. This showed a high level of awareness of the dependence of government spending on the contributions of ordinary citizens.

Women were universally of the opinion that it was their right to receive government services and funds. Men and youth were more divided, with a number of groups stating that it was both a right to receive high quality services and a responsibility to see that services are effectively delivered. Youth were the most proactive in perceiving their responsibility in the effective delivery of government provisions. This may indicate that youth will provide a ready constituency for the NTA’s initiatives to involve citizens in public accountability, but that the NTA are likely to have to try harder to draw in women.

When asked why citizens had a ‘right’ to receive good quality services from government, the main response was ‘because I pay tax’; ‘its our money’. This shows that citizen’s perceive their relationships with the state to stem not only from their political rights, but because also from their economic contribution to the state - they pay for government spending and government salaries. This factor should be leveraged to the maximum in drawing citizens into play a larger part in public accountability systems.

Non-government providers were rated as ‘good’, while government services were rated as ‘average’ and government funds as ‘poor’.

Devolved funds were valued mainly because of evidence of construction. However this becomes a façade for low quality construction and unfinished buildings. Rampant corruption and lack of information / inaccessibility were also mentioned as barriers to the effectiveness of devolved funds. The poor rating of devolved funds is an interesting finding, given that devolved funds have been designed to increase citizen involvement in planning and execution.

Government services were valued for the fact that they were universally accessible and low cost. Criticisms of government services centred partly around low quality and partly around ‘hidden costs’. Greater involvement of citizens in budgeting and planning, e.g. through DDCs, may make it clearer to citizens how far government resources can meet existing needs, and how far communities or non-government and private sector need to step in.

Citizens clearly appreciated quality as well as price, in which respect non-government providers were highly rated. Non-government providers were also rated highly on accountability and delivery (services being delivered ‘straight to the people’ without complicated bureaucracies). However, they are inaccessible to the majority either because of price or because interventions are targeted to specific groups, and, in the case of NGOs, services are normally short term.

Most often mentioned services were Education, Health, Roads, Water, Agriculture, Security and Electricity. Most often mentioned funds were the Constituency Development Fund (CDF), Local Authority Transfer Fund (LATF), Constituency Bursary Fund (CBF), Women and Youth Funds. This information indicates citizen priorities in relation to services and funds- which matter most, and/or are most visible. The NTA may wish to prioritise these particular services and funds as entry points to increasing overall public accountability systems.

2. Barriers to Accountability

The citizen-state interface has been significantly altered over the past two decades through decentralization and public service reforms. While the greater role played by citizens could be a positive factor, thinly spread resources, expensive administrative structures, proliferation of roles and responsibilities and distorted incentives (e.g. electoral populism vs development planning) undermine the efficiency and accountability of public spending. Particularly with respect to CDF and LATF, government monies are used to boost political power rather than in accordance with strategic development agendas. These issues are systemic, and need to be addressed at a constitutional level.

Decentralisation has created a new managerial layer in which citizen participation has been foregrounded. This is expressed principally through representative committees, where citizens, government representatives and other stakeholders jointly engage in the management of public monies and development planning. Given the centrality of committees for citizen participation, much more investment is needed to build the capacity of committee members and streamline management structures (electoral processes, constitutions, reporting channels etc.). This applies not only to committees, but also to barazas, suggestion boxes, accessibility of government offices and so forth. Linkages need to be developed between committees and local sites of power and representation (especially religious, women’s groups & youth groups). Otherwise, committees will tend to support individual rather than collective interests, and be subject to malpractice.

Alongside managerial and systemic factors, behavioural dynamics also undermine the effectiveness of the governance system and create barriers to citizen participation. These include intimidation, exclusion and theft, which feed off ignorance and lack of empowerment. In order to address the problem of ignorance, massive civic education is needed on the nature of government provisions (funds and services), the channels of reporting, monitoring and management. Education and awareness will also help to address lack of empowerment or ‘fear’.

In the Kenyan context, decentralization processes suffer from a number of more widespread factors that have accompanied contemporary governance reforms. Decentralisation reforms are implemented in a top down fashion rather than being instigated from the bottom up by citizens actively claiming a greater role in governance systems, thereby undermining ownership and the extent of genuine citizen participation. Decentralization processes are under-resourced and under-capacitated undermining their effectiveness to deliver good governance. Decentralization processes tend to support normative power structures, even while shifting the locus of power from national to local levels. (Hadiz , Cornwall and Coelho, 2007).

While the increased involvement of citizens in governance is generally seen as positive, informants stressed time and again that this needs to be accompanied by civic education, capacity building and managerial reforms. Without these provisions, citizen involvement

In 2008/09 the National Taxpayers Association (NTA) undertook an assessment of roads infrastructure across Kenya to gain an in-depth understanding of the extent to which the Government of Kenya and citizens (who pay for roads infrastructure through taxes) were getting value for money. The key questions that the study sought to address were: Is the government procuring contractors at a competitive rate in terms of the overall contract value? Are contractors building quality infrastructure commensurate with the money they were paid? Is Kenya getting a good return on its investment?

To undertake this study the NTA contracted qualified and experienced Kenyan engineers to undertake a detailed physical inspection and assessment of a selected number of roads in Kisumu, Mombasa, Machakos and Nyeri districts. The objectives of the road inspections were:

1. To undertake a physical assessment of selected roads infrastructure in four districts to get a snap-shot of the overall quality of investments made;
2. To demonstrate the viability of rapid roads assessments to inform decision-making and planning;
3. To provide practical recommendations that will address the study findings.

Prior to undertaking the study a workshop was held with all contracted engineers to discuss and agree on the methodology to be used in all four districts. At this workshop the reporting format and the sediment processes, such as whom to meet at the district level, and how to go about selected roads, were also agreed. A total of 42 urban and rural roads were assessed across the four districts.

The findings from the roads assessed in each district are listed in the tables below. All contracted engineers were required to give an overall score for each road out of 100%. Based on the final scores each road was classified as either Good (60 to 100%), Fair (50 to 59%) or Very Poor (0 to 49%).

Despite the policy realm’s growing recognition of fiscal devolution in gender development, there have been relatively few attempts to translate gender commitments into fiscal commitments. This paper aims to engage in this significant debate, focusing on the plausibility of incorporating gender into financial devolution, with the Thirteenth Finance Commission of India as backdrop.

Given the disturbing demographics - the monotonous decline in the juvenile sex ratio, especially in some of the prosperous states of India - there can be no valid objection to using Finance Commission transfers for this purpose. A simple method for accomplishing this could be to introduce some weight in favor of the female population of the states in the Commission’s fiscal devolution formula. The message would be even stronger and more appropriate if the population of girl children only - that is, the number of girls in the 0 - 6 age cohort - is adopted as the basis for determining the states’ relative shares of the amount to be disbursed by applying the allotted weight. A special dispensation for girls would also be justifiable in a scheme of need-based equalization transfers. While social mores cannot be changed by fiscal fiats, particularly when prejudices run deep, a proactive approach by a high constitutional body like the Finance Commission is called for, especially when the prejudices are blatantly oppressive. Indeed, such action is imperative. The intergovernmental transfer system can and should play a role in upholding the right to life for India’s girl children. That being said, it needs to be mentioned that it is not plausible to incorporate more gender variables in the Finance Commission’s already complex transfer formula.

In other words, inclusion of a “gender inequality index” in the formula may not result in the intended results, as the variables included in the index may cancel one another out. Accepting the fact that incorporating gender criteria in fiscal devolution could only be the second-best principle for engendering fiscal policy, the paper argues that newfound policy space for the feminization of local governance, coupled with an engendered fiscal devolution to the third tier, can lead to public expenditure decisions that correspond more closely to the revealed preferences (“voice”) of women. With the 73^th and 74^th constitutional amendments, this policy space is favorable at the local level for conducting gender responsive budgeting.

We, members of civil society Participating in ‘Civil Society Experts Consultation on Maternal, Child and Infant Health and Sexual and Reproductive Health in Africa’ Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, April 17-18, 2010, organised by Solidarity for African Women’s Rights Coalition (SOAWR), IPPF-Africa Region, Ipas Africa Alliance, Save the Children International, Abantu for Development, and the UN Millennium Campaign in collaboration with the AU Commission to assess progress in reducing maternal, child and infant mortality and implementation of the Continental Framework on Sexual and Reproductive Health (Maputo Plan of Action 2007-10):

Commend African governments for committing themselves to address maternal, newborn and child health as outlined in the Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa, The African Youth Charter, Continental Framework on Sexual and Reproductive Health (Maputo Plan of Action 2007-10) and The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child. We further commend the African Union for declaring maternal, newborn and child mortalities continental emergencies requiring commensurate urgent actions;

Congratulate countries that have launched the Campaign on Accelerated Reduction of Maternal Mortality in Africa (CARMMA) and taken action to address the maternal, newborn and child health at national level as indicated in the best practices below. However, a lot more needs to be done.

This Legislative Report Card seeks to provide Liberian citizens with accurate, objective, and comprehensive information about their elected leaders on a quarterly basis. It is the ambition of the Liberia Democratic Institute that the Report Card will contribute to greater transparency and, ultimately, greater democratic accountability in Liberia. The Report is based on three areas in which lawmakers have traditional mandate to execute their formal responsibilities in the interests of their constituents and country.

First, the Report Card evaluates each lawmaker on his or her “Constituency Representation”. That is, the number of meetings held with constituents to solicit their views on legislative matters, number of functional constituency offices, attendance, number of times he or she published bills or laws from the legislature in your constituency for information purposes

Second, the Report Card evaluates each lawmaker’s “Law Making Efforts” during the quarter. For instance, the number of bills presented to plenary during the 5^th session, number of those bills passed into law, number and pattern of vote towards those bills, and bills sponsored.

Third, the Report Card evaluates each lawmaker on his or her “Oversight Responsibility” which relates to instances where the lawmaker has requested Ministries and Agencies of government on issues bordering his or her interaction with government ministries and agencies upon who he or she has oversight right or responsibility.

The Report provides a thorough description of each measure and raises a few caveats that are important when considering the performance of lawmakers. It includes the full set of scores for each lawmaker, presented on general report card. Finally, the report describes Legislature’s overall performance relative to its primary and fundamental responsibilities.

During the course of the research, we observed the following issues:

• The current composition of the Legislature, in which all of the 16 local tribes are represented, is a sign of good democratization.


• “Representation”, which is a cardinal objective of the Legislature, is ill-manifested not only in the infrequency of legislators’ visits to, and consultation with, constituencies, but also in fact that most of the lawmakers don’t have active legislative offices in their constituencies. It was therefore difficult for researchers to determine whether lawmakers who stood in plenary sessions and claimed they were speaking for their constituencies were actually articulating their constituents’ aspirations or their personal convictions.


• There is a “Secret Session syndrome” plaguing the transparency and accountability commitment of the National Legislature. This syndrome, which is more prevalent in the Senate, speaks to the tendency where the lawmakers take behind closed doors critical national decision-making processes in an apparent bid to evade public monitoring and observation of how subsequent decisions of the secret deliberations are arrived at; who took what stance and why. Though authorized by the rules of both chambers, most of the secret sessions held by the Legislature, particularly the Senate, were void of state security justifications consistent with best legislative practices.
  
  Examples,


• The passage of the National Investment Act 2009 and the National Investment Commission Act of 2009 and the National Referendum were voted on in closed door in the Senate. However, the National Investment Act of 2009 and National Investment Commission Act of 2009 was voted in open session at the House of Representatives.


• Legislative Committees serve as the nerve-center of a functional Legislature. Our research findings revealed that most legislative committees are neither transparent and effective nor efficient. The criticisms and blames which the Liberian Legislature incur for delays to expeditiously enact crucial laws and take prompt actions and other important decisions are actually a direct spillover from Senate and House Committees which are opaque in nature and don’t lent themselves to monitoring and any form of public evaluation and pressure.

Based on the observations herein, we would like to recommend the following:

• Membership in the National Legislature should be a full time job. At the moment we have observed a number of Legislators who used their absence from plenary sessions to engage in private services of their professional careers at the expense of their legislative responsibilities and functions.
• While we acknowledge the contribution of the International Organizations including National Democratic Institute (NDI), for playing a role in developing the capacity of lawmakers, they should endeavor to provide support in specialized training of members of the Legislature and their key staff persons especially on public policy formulation processes, law research and the raison d’être of legislative entities in so far as the checks and balances which are inherent in our Republican form of Government are concerned.


• The Legislature should review its standing rules on secret sessions in view of making legislative deliberations, particularly the workings of Legislative Committees, more transparent and participatory.


• We observed during this reporting period that there were difficulties in extracting information on legislative proceedings and processes. We therefore recommend that the legislature should endeavor to translate its legislative modernization commitment which seeks among others, to enhance information flow to the public by reducing bureaucratic bottlenecks.

Part 1:
Beyond the legislative veil – see your lawmakers at work

Part 2:
Legislative report card

Education is a priority area across East Africa and huge investments have been poured into the sector by governments, the donor community and parents. Recent years have seen school enrolment soar to an all time high. Every child is expected to attend school and acquire knowledge and abilities necessary to thrive in the world.

The key question now is, are Kenyan children better off as a result of the expansion of schooling? Are children acquiring the basic skills expected of them? Are our children learning?

Uwezo, meaning ‘capability’ in Kiswahili is a four year initiative to improve competencies in numeracy and literacy among children aged 6-16 years in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda through an innovative, civic-driven and public accountability approach to social change. In Kenya, the initiative is anchored within the Women Educational Researchers of Kenya (www.werkenya.org) and regionally within Twaweza (www.twaweza.org).

Each year an Annual Learning Assessment report (ALA) will be published and the information distributed in a comprehensive and simple manner that can be understood by all citizens. The ALA Kenya 2010 is the first ever to be published. The full report can be downloaded on www.uwezo.net

Idasa’s Public Expenditure and Smallholder Agriculture Project held a conference with the theme, Governance and Small Scale Agriculture in Southern Africa, from November 9-11, 2009. The ai